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Introduction
1 | Introduction
Modeling the way people make decisions in Economics builds upon assumptions regarding
individual preferences. To better understand the underlying process of individual decision mak-
ing, it is important to study the primitives of behavior, such as risk aversion, discounting and
social preferences. Modeling individual preferences by means of economic experiments is the
common motivation of this thesis. I study the connection between these preference measures
and real economic behavior of subjects. These subjects participated in experiments that belong
to a large representative panel of the Dutch population, the LISS Panel 1. The first three chap-
ters of this thesis focus on risk taking and time preferences. The last chapter studies the role of
socioeconomic status on trust and reciprocity.
Why is it interesting to study preferences underlying economic decisions? This question is
studied in the first three chapters of the thesis. In many areas, individual financial choices play
an important role. For example, in the Netherlands, the number of self-employed people has
increased 2 and, therefore, the responsibility of saving for retirement falls into their own hands.
Likewise, the transition of pension schemes from “defined benefit" to “defined contribution"
shifts the risks to pension participants. Under these new pension schemes, households need
to decide whether to increase their savings to compensate for the decrease in future pension
income. This leads to the following more general questions: How are financial choices within a
household being made? If a household is composed of more than one individual, which family
members decide and what influences their decisions? Are individual preferences stable over
time? These questions are approached by using experimental data and information on actual
1The LISS panel (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) consists of approximately 8000 in-
dividuals. The panel is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from the population register by
Statistics Netherlands




financial choices such as household portfolio composition and financial wealth.
Not only risk and time preferences have an influence on economic outcomes, but also social
preferences are important. In the last chapter, I focus on studying the relationship between trust
and reciprocity with socioeconomic status. There is evidence showing that trust has a positive
relationship with economic growth since it lowers transaction costs and increases cooperation
(Knack and Keefer, 1997). Although trust depends highly on the institutional environment of
a given society (as shown by cross-country studies, Falk et al. (2015)), demographic charac-
teristics such as age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status or gender can play a role. For instance,
Dohmen et al. (2008) find that being female is related to stronger reciprocal tendencies. Glaeser
et al. (2000) find that differences in race or nationality are related to less reciprocity.
To have a better understanding of the main notions of this thesis, I explain how some con-
cepts of the literature on economic preferences are defined.
Risk aversion
Risk aversion refers to the distaste of individuals towards options that have certain degree
of risk in their outcomes. These outcomes have a wide range, for example, risk related to
health-related choices (smoking), sports and leisure activities (sky-diving, driving) or financial
decisions. Why do people prefer to have large amounts of savings in the instead of investing
these savings? The formal definition of risk aversion dates back to von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1954). Later, the seminal work of Arrow
(1971) and Pratt (1964) laid down the foundations of measuring the attitude towards risk as
the curvature of the utility function. Since then, the literature has developed to account for the
observed heterogeneity in behavior with respect to risk. For example, Moffat (2005) proposed
a random coefficients mixed model to classify people into expected utility or rank dependent
expected utility theory. One important method of elicitation of risk aversion is the so called
Multiple price list method which consists of inferring the curvature of the utility function from
choices between lottery options. As will be shown in the next chapters, we build upon this
method to construct a modified version that takes into account different timing of the payoffs.
Time discounting
The difference in valuation of money or consumption between different time periods is re-
lated to what is called the discount rate or time preference. For example, it is common in the
experimental literature to elicit this discount rate by observing the amount of money it takes
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for someone to delay immediate payoffs at different time periods (Frederick, Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue, 2002). Let’s assume that somebody would need 110 euros in one month in order
to forego a payoff of 100 euros today. This would imply a 10% monthly discount rate. The lit-
erature on this topic has identified certain aspects of discounting which better capture behavior,
such as non-linear discounting (exponential), time-inconsistent discount rates (hyperbolic dis-
counting) and other more flexible specifications of the discounting function (quasi-hyperbolic).
Throughout the next three chapters of this thesis, we will be talking about time discounting to-
gether with risk aversion (which we elicited through a lottery task involving both risk and time
delays).
Trust and trustworthiness
When studying the social environment where economic transactions take place, trust has
a central role in explaining behavior, which deviates from economic models based on self-
interested individuals. Trust and trustworthiness are related to each other but describe the be-
havior of two different roles in a given transaction that involves some uncertainty. Trust is
expressed by the person who decides to, for example, transfer money to another person with
some expectations of future returns. Trustworthiness describes the behavior of the second per-
son who decides whether to reciprocate to the person who trusted him or her and by doing
so, increasing the returns of the trustors. In other words, trustworthiness describes how much
a person is worth trusting. Trust has been seen to vary across countries (at the macro-level)
and across individuals (at the micro-level), this heterogeneity can sometimes be explained by
differences in institutions and the economic environment. In the last chapter of this thesis, I
explore whether socioeconomic status can be related to the level of trust and trustworthiness at
the individual level.
Structure of the thesis:
Chapter 2 focuses on the analysis of risk and time preferences at the individual level. To study
these preferences we constructed an experiment in which we measured these attitudes with a
modified multiple price list lottery design and additionally with stated preference survey ques-
tionnaires. Based on choices between lotteries, we used this data to fit structural parameters of
utility taking into account sociodemographic background variables. The econometric specifica-
tion accounted for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in risk and time preference parame-
ters as well as in the tendency to make suboptimal choices. We take into consideration insights
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from literature in psychology which shows some personality traits are important for economic
success (Almulund et al., 2014; Rustichini et al., 2016; Becker et al., 2012; Borghans et al.,
2006). So far, most studies have tried to link and look at correlations between economic prefer-
ences and personality traits and some of them suggest that personality traits might explain better
the variation in economic behavior (Rustichini et al., 2016). We contribute to this literature by
studying the association between traits and economic preferences, and focus especially on their
influence on individuals’ portfolio choices. We test whether personality traits have a direct or
indirect effect on portfolio choice when controlling for economic preferences of risk aversion
and discounting.
As opposed to the study of Rustichini et al, we find that the channels through which per-
sonality affects behavior are different from those measured by economic preferences (even if
these are significantly correlated with each other). We also find strong correlations between
our individual predictions of risk aversion and discounting with the traits Agreeableness and
Intellect/Openness. When we study financial decisions, e.g., investment in risky assets, we
find that economic preferences are more predictive than psychological traits. We also find that
the trait Conscientiousness is not correlated to our predictions of economic preferences, but it
is significant in predicting accumulated financial wealth. Our results therefore point towards
complementarity rather than substitution of economic preferences and personality traits in ex-
plaining economic outcomes.
As mentioned before, it is important to understand not only how individuals choose how
much to save or invest, but also how these choices reflect preferences of different household
members. Imagine the life expectancy of a wife being much higher than the life expectancy
of her husband. Does this create different incentives to save? However, it is not clear whether
different incentives or different tastes translate into a strategy that is beneficial to all parties.
There is ongoing literature which tries to open this “black box" of household decision making
and looks at it from the perspective of game theoretic bargaining models (Vermeulen, 2002).
However, bargaining with respect to decisions which might be less frequent and involve differ-
ent levels of risk, such as how much to save or whether to invest in other type of assets has not
been so widely explored in the literature.
Chapter 3 continues the analysis on financial decision making and economic preferences
when households consist of two people or more. We focus on the interaction between pref-
erences of spouses either married or living together. In empirical studies, the decision process
within households is overlooked since as researchers we cannot often observe how people divide
4
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tasks or negotiate at home. However, it is not straightforward why we would assume spouses
to have the same preferences with respect to risk taking if, for example, a robust result in the
literature of risk aversion is that women are significantly more risk averse than men (Croson and
Gneezy, 2009) and therefore might prefer investments in safer assets. We study whether risk
aversion and discounting are similar within the couple and how this results in different bargain-
ing scenarios and insights into their actual portfolio decisions. From literature on socialization
and economic preferences, researchers have found positive correlations between couple’s risk
and trust attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2012; Bacon et al., 2014) or no correlation (Abdellaoui et al.,
2013). We go further and perform a reduced form analysis, which incorporates bargaining with
respect to economic preferences. We find that the husband’s risk aversion coefficient is more
influential in the household decision to invest in risky assets than the wife’s if we do not control
for bargaining power. Both time preference parameters are significant in predicting the level of
financial wealth a household has accumulated. We find that the bargaining power with respect
to risky and intertemporal choices is not always equally divided within couples. Furthermore,
controlling for the bargaining position of spouses helps to predict household saving decisions
from the preferences of the two individuals.
Chapter 4 approaches the following questions: Are preferences stable? Can financial shocks
have an effect on preferences? Do these effects affect the preferences of their spouses? Eco-
nomic models often rely on the assumption that preferences are rather stable over time. This
allows us to identify causal effects of changes in behavior as a result of changes in relative
prices or policies. Some studies have found that time and risk preferences are stable across time
periods (Wölbert and Riedl, 2013; Andersen et al., 2008; Falk et al., 2016) but the amount of
stability shown depends on the elicitation method and noise which is captured by the respec-
tive measures. Given that we have estimated measures of preferences, we seek to understand
whether these can also be stable across time and whether temporary shocks to their employ-
ment or financial expectations are correlated to changes in preferences. We compare the level
of stability that we can capture with experimental measures and that of survey questions. In line
with previous literature, we find that survey measures are more stable (due to less noise) than
experimental measures (Chuang and Schechter, 2015).
We used a second wave of experimental choice data and qualitative survey questions to
analyze the stability of risk and time preferences at the individual level and to study cross-
spousal effects in couples. We constructed a structural model of preferences at the individual
level for two different time periods. We found small positive correlations between time periods.
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The main novelty of our approach is that we explore not only individual channels of temporal
instability but also possible effects through the spouses. Using fixed effects models explaining
the experimental measures from (changes in) individual and partner health, occupational and
financial status, we find, for example, positive associations between the husband’s impatience
and a transition of either the husband or the wife into non-employment due to work disability.
Additionally, we find that several variables are associated with the tendency to make suboptimal
decisions. Using the stated preference indexes of risk aversion and time preference leads to
substantially different results.
Finally, Chapter 5 introduces two new topics which are related to social preferences; namely,
trust and trustworthiness (which we also refer to as reciprocity). Using experimental methods,
it is possible to control for the amount of information being shared during a transaction and
study people’s motivations and preferences. Previous research has shown that high status in a
group (Ball et al., 2001) or in high socioeconomic status (Falk and Zehnder, 2013) can result in
higher payoffs to these groups or socioeconomic classes. However, when the only information
available is, for example, a name, how do people process this information? Is it possible to infer
their socioeconomic status from it? Examples where people sometimes only observe names in
transactions and involve a degree of trust and reciprocity can be services like Uber, Airbnb and
Ebay, among others.
We study the effect of social status and social status differences on trust and trustworthiness
in a representative sample of the Dutch population. We do not find social status of the matched
participant to be an important factor in the decision to trust or reciprocate. Instead, trustwor-
thiness is related with own social status as well as with differences in status: trustees with high
social status, or trustees whose social status is very different from that of the matched trustor,
reciprocate more often. With respect to trust, we find no such effect.
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2 | Economic preferences and personal-
ity traits on portfolio choice outcomes
2.1 Introduction
The study of individual behavior has been the interest of economics because its potential out-
comes on the economic welfare. At the core of economic decisions, economists study the way in
which individuals take risks and their motivations of saving for future consumption. A common
way to study these decisions is by modeling the economic preferences of the individual (esti-
mating parameters of risk and time preference1). Another alternative way to study economic
decisions has been approached from Psychology based on Personality Theory. Within this per-
spective, psychologists have identified five different factors involved in this process of decision
making: namely, Agreeableness, Openness/Intellect, Neuroticism, Conscientiousness and Ex-
traversion. Many authors have intended to mix these two kinds of approaches, the economic
and the psychological to understand the process of decision making in economics. However,
the way in which they predict economic decisions is not yet conclusive. For instance, an open
question is whether personality shapes economic preferences or whether these two capture dif-
ferent dimensions through different channels that impact particular outcomes. Heckman et al.
(2006) motivate that “Common sense suggests that personality traits, persistence, motivation,
and charm matter for success in life".
In this paper, we seek to understand how measures of economic preferences relate to mea-
1For example, assuming certain parametric functions of utility and discounting.
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sures of personality. In particular, we observe how these are related and how both of them influ-
ence real economic decisions. The real economic decisions we study are self-reported Portfolio
choices. We focus on measures of risk aversion and time preferences 2. Other economic out-
comes related to these preferences are the decision to buy life insurance, the inclination to a
riskier career path with higher expected income growth or a secure job, the decision to invest in
education, among others. These choices involve different levels of risk and uncertainty about
present and future outcomes. If personality traits affect the way in which people make financial
decisions, we expect these to be correlated to our suggested measures of risk aversion and impa-
tience. Understanding this relationship better could help policymakers design policies directed
at improving the economic welfare of individuals and society. For example, interventions aimed
at improving personality traits of young children have proven to be beneficial at later stages of
their life (Heckman et al., 2010, 2006).
Roberts and Mroczek (2008) define personality traits as “the relatively enduring patterns of
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that distinguish individuals from one another". Personality
measures may help economists understand and explore new dimensions of behavior that can
potentially explain patterns, inconsistencies and irrationalities often observed in decision mak-
ing in economics. Part of the literature has already looked at correlations between measures of
personality traits and economic or educational outcomes. For example, Almulund et al. (2014)
shows that conscientiousness can predict educational attainment and job performance. This trait
captures the ability to exert control over behavior in order to pursue future goals. Theoretically,
we would expect this trait to be negatively correlated with the discount rate. Rustichini et al.
(2016) find that Openness/Intellect trait, which is normally related to general intelligence, has
a strong positive effect on credit score and job persistence. Personality could also influence
the duration of unemployment or occupational choice, which would in turn have an impact on
economic success. Dohmen et al. (2010) find no correlation between personality traits and risk
aversion or impatience. Other studies include personality traits to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity such as Choi et al. (2014), who find a correlation (although not statistically significant)
between Conscientiousness and economic success (wealth).
Our study is similar to Rustichini et al. (2016) and Becker et al. (2012) where they analyze
correlations between personality, preferences and life outcomes (life satisfaction, health, labor
2The literature on risk aversion dates back to von Neuman and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior (1954). Later the seminal work of Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) provided de foundations for measuring
risk attitudes based on the curvature of the utility function.
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market success, credit score and truck accidents). However, we contribute to the literature
not only by repeating the exercise of studying correlations of both measures and comparing
to existing findings, but we additionally study other economic outcomes, such as investment
decisions and financial wealth accumulation. Also, in our study, we add a measure of decision-
making error. Methodologically, we also differ in the type of samples used to elicit preferences.
While Rustichini et al. (2016) focus on truck drivers and Becker et al. (2012) compare a sample
of student and non-student samples, we obtain a large adult sample. We also differ in the
methodology for eliciting preferences and show that an integrated lottery method can identify
both risk and time preferences jointly.
We contribute to this literature by studying the association between traits and economic
preferences, and focus especially on their influence on individuals’ portfolio choices. We test
whether personality traits have a direct or indirect effect on portfolio choice when controlling
for economic preferences of risk aversion and discounting.
We carried out a lottery experiment in the LISS panel, which is an Internet survey panel rep-
resentative of the Dutch adult population3. This method is based on previous methods which
make use of lotteries, specifically the method used by Holt and Laury (2002). Since our main
interest lies in estimating parameters that we can use to model decision making in a structural
way, we show, with different specifications, how we can estimate parameters of risk aversion
and time discounting (impatience). Previous research has shown that estimating risk aversion
and time preferences jointly can significantly improve the discount rate estimates. Andersen
et al. (2008) find that joint estimation of these two parameters provides estimates of discount
rates that are significantly lower than those found in other studies where estimation is done
separately. The estimation of the curvature of the utility function and computation of time
preference parameters jointly is now an active topic of research (Ventura, 2003; Voors et al.,
2012; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a; Potters et al., 2016). The main difference between our
method and that by Andersen et al. (2008) is that we elicit preferences in the same task (as
opposed to splitting risk elicitation from time preference elicitation). Using a structural model
with random coefficients to account for heterogeneity in risk and time preferences, we estimate
individual level parameters for risk and time preference. Participants had to make 20 choices
which varied in risk and timing of the payments. With these choices, we constructed a struc-
tural model of utility including parameters of risk and time preference jointly. We offered real
monetary incentives of one randomly chosen choice with 10% probability.
3See www.lissdata.nl
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The data we used to construct the Big-5 personality traits corresponded to the same in-
dividuals who participated in our experiment that same year4. We also made use of the rich
background information available in the panel to control for observed background characteris-
tics. We controlled for these when studying the effects of both preferences and psychological
traits on financial outcomes.
We find some patterns of correlations between economic preferences and personality traits
as measured by the Big-5. We find that the experimental measure of risk aversion is positively
correlated with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness and negatively with Openness/Intellect.
Impatience and the tendency to make suboptimal choices are negatively correlated to Open-
ness/Intellect. We expected such a relationship since Openness is closely related to different
measures of cognitive ability according to the literature (Ackerman and Heggestad, 1997; DeY-
oung et al., 2011).
Preferences for risk and discounting have a clear correlation to investment and savings de-
cisions. On the other hand, most dimensions of personality have no direct effect on these
financial decisions. We find that our experimental measures of risk aversion, impatience and er-
ror propensity significantly contribute to explaining portfolio choice and accumulated financial
wealth. We find a significant and negative association between risk aversion and the propensity
to own risky assets. An increase in the parameter capturing the tendency to make suboptimal
choices also lowers the likelihood of owning risky assets. The experimental impatience mea-
sure is negatively associated with the amount of financial wealth of individuals. Finally, as a
robustness check we use alternative measures of risk taking and impatience based on qualitative
self-assessment, we find the same direction of correlations as with the experimental predictions.
We do not find an indirect effect of personality traits on financial decision making. The cor-
relations between personality traits and outcomes are robust to including economic preferences
in the model. Hence, when we include preferences together with psychological traits to ex-
plain economic outcomes, e.g., ownership of risky assets, most of the traits are not statistically
significant. Agreeableness is marginally significant in the propensity to own risky assets and
Conscientiousness is highly significant in predicting accumulated financial wealth. Preferences
and personality apparently have different effects on economic outcomes.
Aside from personality, other important determinants of economic success that are related to
learning and mathematical abilities, are cognitive ability and financial literacy. These abilities
4Source: Core study on Personality.
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are key in explaining why some people, e.g., choose to invest in risky assets, save or decide to
take on more debt (Lusardi, 2008; Van Rooij et al., 2011). Therefore, in addition to individual
specific parameters for risk aversion and time preference, our structural model also has an indi-
vidual specific measure for the tendency to make suboptimal decisions: the standard deviation
of the Fechner error in the individual’s binary choices. Following the recent literature to take
errors in decision making seriously (Loomes, 2005; Andersen et al., 2008; Von Gaudecker et al.,
2011), we consider this parameter as a third “economic” characteristic of the individual. It is
informative of unobserved characteristics such as numerical ability or motivation. Similarly, to
the two preference parameters, we also investigate how this error tendency parameter relates to
personality traits and economic outcomes.
In section 2.2 we describe in detail the experimental design along with the specification of
the individual level preference parameters and in section 2.3, the data description. In section
2.4 we show the results from the correlations between preferences and personality traits and
their relationship with portfolio choice and financial wealth accumulation outcomes. Finally,
we conclude in 2.5 and point towards future research applications.
2.2 Experiment and individual preferences
The experiment
Following the methodology of Holt and Laury (2002) and similar to Von Gaudecker et al.
(2011), we designed a modified Multiple Price List. The experiment consisted of four separate
tasks, each including five choices. Therefore, each subject provides 20 binary choices which
are used to infer risk and time preferences. Additional to these tasks, we included qualitative
questions of self-evaluation of risk taking and impatience.
The experimental procedure was as following. Subjects first faced a screen with instructions
to the experiment and payment specifications which were then followed by an example of a
binary choice. After these introductory screens, the first screen containing five lottery choices
was shown. Subjects were only allowed to continue once they had filled all five questions. It
was also allowed to return to previous screens or instructions if necessary. At the end of the
experiment, it was revealed to the participants whether they were selected for payment, and one
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of their choices was randomly realized and paid as described in the instructions5.
In every screen, each individual had to choose five times between two lotteries which varied
in probabilities but did not vary in the payoffs. Lottery A and B differed in the variance of the
payoffs. Typically, lottery A offered the least variance. Hence, the expected value of the riskier
lottery B increased as subjects scrolled down the list. The modification we introduced to the
MPL method, is that we varied the timing of the payouts in the following way: immediate or
delayed 3, 6 or 9 months. Table 4.7 in the appendix shows the experimental design in detail – the
probabilities, the amounts, and the timing of payments for each choice option in each treatment.
Typically, the switching point is then an indicator of the individual’s risk aversion: more risk
averse individuals would switch later. In our design, the interpretation of the switching point
combines the taste for risk as well as impatience.
In summary, the payoff structure was the following. We informed the subjects at the be-
ginning of the experiment that they had a probability 10% of actual payment; at the end of
the experiment, they were informed whether they were selected for real payment or not. The
literature has demonstrated that this is a good strategy to keep the tasks incentive compatible
and simultaneously limit the costs for the experimenter (Dohmen et al., 2010). Conditional
on being selected for payment, the average payoffs were 13.4 euros with a standard deviation
of approximately 7 euros. The participation fee is calculated according to the expected time
it takes to fill in the questionnaire. Therefore, we paid subjects 2.50 as participation fee for a
duration of the experiment of approximately 10 minutes6.
The key aspect of this design is that the choice lists have enough variation in risk and timing
of payoffs to allow us to accurately predict individual preference parameters. Before taking the
experiment to the field, we ran simulations assuming a structural form of the utility function
and discounting to ensure that this was indeed the case. In Figure 3.4 we present an example
of one of the lottery choices of the first part of a screen that subjects faced during one of the
treatments. Each screen contained five choices and pie charts illustrating the probabilities,
following Von Gaudecker et al. (2011). Under options A and B we denoted in red text the
timing of the payment. Since there is no experimenter present in an online experiment, we
allowed participants to switch back to a previous choice or to read the instructions, and to
change previous choices if they wanted to.
5The instructions and examples of the experiment are included in the Appendix 2.5
6The median duration of the experiment was 9.35. The participation fee is standard of the LISS panel for
participation in regular surveys, the calculation is based on 15 euro per hour.
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Figure 2.1: Screen shot example of one choice
Even though we included pie charts to help participants understand the trade-offs graphi-
cally, we observed some inconsistencies. One type of inconsistency in behavior that can arise
in this type of elicitation method is multiple switching between options A and B: If a person
switches from a safer lottery to a riskier one and then decided to switch back to a safer lot-
tery, that individual is not choosing according to maximizing a smooth (concave or convex)
expected utility function or according to one of the standard generalizations of expected utility
maximization. Following, for example, Von Gaudecker et al. (2011), we deliberately chose not
to enforce a single switching point when designing our experiment, so that we can incorporate
possible inconsistencies and errors into the decision making model.
Another possible inconsistency was the possibility of choosing dominated options. In ev-
ery screen, the last lottery choice involved a dominated option. For example, in choice 5 of
treatment 1, subjects could earn either 20 euros with 100% probability or 25 euros with 100%
probability. If a subject would choose the certain amount in option A, we would classify her
as picking a dominated choice. This implied she preferred less money with certainty to more
money with certainty, which would violate monotonicity of the utility function. In the next
section we show the percentage of people who display either multiple switching or dominance
errors. In some cases, if an individual was, e.g., infinitely impatient (and lottery A had the
“sooner" payout), this dominated choice would not necessarily imply an inconsistency. This is
why, as we will describe in the next sections, we do not eliminate these observations from our
sample.
Finally, after the lottery tasks were completed, we included questions to gather self-assessed
qualitative measures of risk taking (in different domains) and impatience. These types of prefer-
ence elicitations were not incentivized and therefore might or might not capture true preferences
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(Charness et al., 2013). However, studies using the same survey questions to elicit risk taking
in different domains have been performed in large scale panels (Dohmen et al., 2011, 2005),
showing that this method provides a measure of risk attitudes that correlates well with actual
decision-making under risk. Based on the literature so far, we consider that these types of elic-
itation procedures can be useful depending on the research question and context. We extended
these studies by also qualitatively measuring time preferences with a question on impatience to
spend money.
The risk questions which we included are standard in the literature of risk elicitation and are
the following:
• How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please give a value between 0 and 10, with 0 for “not
at all willing to take risks" and 10 for “very willing to take risks".
– How would you rate your willingness to take risks concerning financial matters?
– your willingness to take risks... - in your occupation?
– your willingness to take risks... - during leisure and sport?
To measure stated time preference or discounting, we included the following questions7:
• On a scale from 0 to 10, how patient do you consider yourself to be? (10 being the most
patient value)
• How much do you agree with the following: If I get money I tend to spend it too quickly
(on a scale from 0 strongly disagree to 10 fully agree).
Utility specification and random coefficients model
Following an empirical strategy similar to that of Von Gaudecker et al. (2011), we included
parameters of utility curvature (risk aversion) and time preference from a quasi-hyperbolic dis-
count function. We also allowed for heterogeneity in the tendency to make suboptimal decisions
7Similar formulations were included in surveys before, for example in the German SOEP 2008 and validated
by Vischer et al. (2013). Charness and Viceisza (2015) uses these in a field experiment in rural Senegal. The
second question relates to impulsiveness and impatience and was taken from Jamison et al. (2012).
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by including Fechner errors with a variance that varies across participants. We show the results
for the CARA utility (exponential) function which does not encounter problems around 0 as
do typically CRRA functions (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005). This is useful given that our






where γ ∈R is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The monetary payoff of the lotteries
is denoted by z ∈ R. We do not include background wealth or consumption in our specifica-
tion. This assumption is based on the work by Noussair et al. (2014). They found evidence of
increasing relative risk aversion of a sample of the LISS panel. CARA utility function has been
proposed as an alternative (opposed to CRRA). With our data, we confirm that a CARA utility
function fits better than the model using CRRA. One of the properties of such a utility function
is that adding a fixed amount of money (as for example, income or wealth), does not affect the
choice outcome. Also, the stakes which we offer in our experiment are not large enough to have
a significant impact on people’s wealth.
Discounting function:
D(r, t) = e−rt (2.2)
where r is the discount rate (note that when t = 0 this term becomes 1). We tested other specifi-
cations such as hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting to account for present bias. How-
ever, the model which best fit the data was the one with the exponential discounting function.
This is similar to what Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) found in their estimation of time prefer-
ences using the convex time budget method.
Discounted expected utility (DEU):
DEU = D(r, t)∗U(γ,z) (2.3)
We assume respondents choose the lottery which maximizes their discounted expected util-
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ity (DEU) plus Fechner error τε . Therefore a subject will choose lottery B if:
DEUB + τεB > DEUA + τεA (2.4)
where the ε’s follow a type I extreme value distribution and are independent of each other. The
difference of the errors ε = εA− εB follows a logistic distribution. The parameter τ can be
interpreted as the tendency of making a suboptimal choice.
Let us denote the difference between the DEU of option A and the DEU of option B for
individual i in choice problem j as:
∆DEUi j = DEUBi j−DEUAi j (2.5)
If an individual chooses option B, Yi j = 1 and it is zero otherwise. Then:
Yi j = I{∆DEUi j > τiεi j} (2.6)
We use a random coefficients model with three individual specific parameters, γ,r and τ ,
that are allowed to depend on observed and unobserved characteristics. Previous studies have
found that observed characteristics are rather poor predictors of risk attitudes, which is why we
also introduced unobserved heterogeneity parameters (Von Gaudecker et al., 2011). The three
random coefficients are captured by a vector ηi = (γi, ln(ri), ln(τi))′. The logarithm is taken to
guarantee that r > 0 and τ > 0.
For respondent i with given observed characteristics Xi, we assume ηi is drawn from a
three-variate normal distribution with arbitrary covariance matrix and means that are linear




s +ξi,s = 1,2,3 (2.7)
We assume that the vector ξi is drawn from a three-variate normal distribution, independent
of all regressors. The variance covariance matrix of ξi is Σ′Σ and we define ξ ∗ = (Σ′)−1ξ .
We estimate the model using simulated maximum likelihood (SMLE). The individual’s con-
ditional likelihood to observe choice Yi j given the individual specific parameters η =(γ, ln(r), ln(τ))
is given by:
16
Economic preferences and personality traits on portfolio choice outcomes







where Λ(·) is the cumulative standard logistic distribution function.











where li j(η) is the conditional likelihood given in (2.8) and φ(·) denotes the three dimen-
sional standard normal probability density function. The loglikelihood is given by the sum of
the individual contributions of li over all subjects. To approximate the integral above we use
simulation with Halton draws of length R=200 for each individual8. The variance covariance
matrix of the parameter estimates is based on the outer product of the gradients of the logarithm
in (2.8).
Using the estimated model parameters and the individual choices Yi j, the (“posterior”) dis-
tribution of the random coefficients ηi given Xi and the Yi j can be determined using Bayes rule.





Here l(yi,Xi) is the likelihood contribution of individual i, integrating out the unobserved het-
erogeneity parameters. k(η ,Xi) is the estimated density of the “prior” distribution of ηi given Xi,
which we assumed to be multivariate normal. P(yi|η ,Xi) is the probability of observing choice
sequence yi given η ,Xi. The mean of the posterior distribution gives the vector of predicted in-
dividual level parameters. In the empirical analysis below, these predicted parameters are used
as indicators of risk aversion, time preference, and error propensity for each individual.
8We used Matlab to program the Likelihood function and Knitro package for the optimization procedure which
uses the BFGS algorithm. The Halton draws were programmed in Matlab (Beusch, 2015), but are equivalent to
mdraws command from STATA. The prime numbers used were 3, 7 and 17. More recently, Zeng (2016) shows
that it is not necessary to increase the number of Halton draws when the sample size increases. Our sample size
is relatively big and we do not have more than three integration dimensions, therefore, we considered 200 Halton
draws to be more than enough to obtain precise estimates.
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2.3 The data
We performed an incentivized experiment in the LISS panel, administered by CentERdata at
Tilburg University; see, e.g., Scherpenzeel (2011). The LISS panel is an ongoing Internet sur-
vey in which participants are invited irrespective of whether they have access to Internet or not;
if necessary CentERdata provides them with a simple personal computer with limited function-
ality and Internet access to the survey. Participants are asked to answer different types of survey
modules every month and receive monetary compensation for this through amounts regularly
transferred to their bank accounts. The panel contains rich information on demographic vari-
ables and many other socio-economic topics, including the respondents’ self-reported financial
situation. The survey took place in the wave of April 2014 and background characteristics
belong to that same year.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Female 0.501 0.500 0 1 2825
Position in the household 1.598 0.667 1 6 2825
Age 52.041 14.935 18 91 2825
High education 0.345 0.476 0 1 2825
Married 0.804 0.397 0 1 2825
Number of kids 0.824 1.098 0 6 2825
Financial literacy 2.398 1.028 0 4 1697
Numeracy 8.548 2.488 0 11 1477
Civil servant 0.007 0.082 0 1 2778
Self employed 0.055 0.227 0 1 2825
Investments 0.140 0.347 0 1 2534
Financial wealth 22355.236 68342.296 -90000 1300000 2530
Total wealth 17671.429 76099.509 -940000 1300000 2530
Notes: Means and standard deviations of characteristics of participants in the lottery
experiment of the final sample.
Table 2.1 presents the sample statistics of sociodemographic variables of the final sample.
The last three rows are of special interest, since we use information on their financial matters
to study the relationship between preferences, traits and financial decision-making. In our ex-
periment we target those households which consist of two adults who live together (married or
unmarried) and in which both household members participate in the survey9. Table 3.8 shows
the descriptive statistics of each of the four treatments. In total, we have a sample of 3,007 in-
dividuals who finished the experiment and our final sample consists of 2825 individuals due to
9This selection was done to investigate couple decision making in a follow up study (Chapter 3 of this thesis)
18
Economic preferences and personality traits on portfolio choice outcomes
missing information and exclusion of some people who made inconsistent choices (as described
next).
From the lottery tasks we counted how many risky choices each respondent made and how
many “impatient" choices they picked that involved an earlier payoff than the alternative. In
table 3.8 we show the proportion of people choosing option B, which is always riskier than
option A. From this table we already see, as expected, that when people go down the list,
they switch from A to B reflecting their risk aversion. However, the preference for immediate
rewards is not easily visible from these proportions and requires more detailed analysis.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Choices
Screen Choice Mean Std. Dev. Screen Choice Mean Std. Dev.
1 1 0.2161 0.4116 3 1 0.1912 0.3933
2 0.2429 0.4289 2 0.1985 0.3989
3 0.4362 0.4960 3 0.2795 0.4488
4 0.6881 0.4633 4 0.5045 0.5001
5 0.8691 0.3374 5 0.8167 0.3870
2 1 0.3401 0.4738 4 1 0.1985 0.3989
2 0.4242 0.4943 2 0.2302 0.4210
3 0.6609 0.4735 3 0.4142 0.4927
4 0.8146 0.3887 4 0.6602 0.4737
5 0.9001 0.2999 5 0.8342 0.3719
Notes: Means and standard deviations of each choice across the four conditions of the experiment.
As is visible from Table 3.8, there is a proportion of the population that chooses the dom-
inated option which is presented in each treatment. This implies that people chose to receive
a lower amount with certainty instead of a higher amount. This could indicate a violation of
monotonicity in preferences. However, we have to take into account the interaction with the
delays in payment. For example, if a person is infinitely impatient, she might prefer the lower
payment because it will be delivered sooner. On the other hand, if that same person later picks
a dominated choice when the lower amount is delivered sooner, this would be clearly inconsis-
tent. Figure 2.2 shows the percentages of the number of dominated choices. More than half of
the sample never picks the dominated choice and approximately 4% of the sample always picks
the dominated choice in each treatment. Dominance errors are not uncommon in the literature
of risk elicitation in multiple price lists of non-student populations (Von Gaudecker et al., 2011;
Charness et al., 2013).
For the rest of the analysis we did not include the 133 people who always picked the dom-
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Figure 2.2: Dominated choices
inated option since they are people who did not understand the task or did not put any mental
effort into it. In Table 2.10 of the Appendix, we show the background characteristics of this
group. We found that on average this sub-sample is significantly older and less educated. Since
this is only 4.42% of the sample we decided to exclude them from the sample along with in-
dividuals for which we do not have data on background characteristics, such as age or level of
education. Our final sample consists of 2825 individuals.
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of responses to the stated subjective preference measures.
We observe that people in our sample assess themselves typically as quite risk averse, with the
distribution skewed to the right. Subjects also claim to be patient with respect to their tendency
to spending money too quickly.
Individual preferences towards risk and time
The results of the estimation of the structural utility model of CARA and exponential discount-
ing function are presented in Table 2.310. The second and third columns present the estimations
without the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity. The last two columns present the complete
model. As shown in the Table, the variances of the unobserved heterogeneity terms are also
10We also experimented with a CRRA utility function with quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic discounting. This
model always gives a worse goodness of fit than the model with CARA preferences.
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Figure 2.3: Stated preferences
significantly different from zero.
We find negative relationship between risk aversion and education and we find that women
are more risk averse than men, on average. This result has been repeatedly reported in the
literature (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Eckel and Grossman, 2008). Older people exhibit more
risk aversion, as also found by (Donkers and van Soest, 1999; Hartog et al., 2002). According
to these, older and lower educated males have a higher propensity to make suboptimal choices.
Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) found the same direction of effects for the error propensity and
Bellemare et al. (2015) also found that males had a higher propensity to make mistakes (at the
10% level).
Table 2.3 also shows the variance and covariance of our preference parameters correspond-
ing to the vector ξ η of unobserved heterogeneity. We find substantial heterogeneity around
the averages. The variances of the unobserved heterogeneity terms are significantly different
from zero (t− test, p < 0.001). We also find that the variance of the unobserved terms is much
greater11. Next, we calculated the correlation coefficients ρη between these preferences at the
individual level. The correlation between the risk aversion coefficient and the time discount rate
is significant but close to zero (ργ,r =−0.1409).
The mean risk aversion parameter γ for the whole sample is 0.0609, the mean error parame-
ter τ is 5.574306 and the mean discount rate r is 0.0736. This is not directly comparable to other
studies since our statistical method and/or functional forms differ. Nevertheless, if we look at
11Variance of (γ ,τ , r) from observed characteristics: (0.0002, 0.2079, 0.000002) against the variance from
unobserved characteristics: (0.0107, 2.6750, 10.3408).
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Von Gaudecker et al. (2011), using an expo-power utility function, we obtain slightly larger
estimates for γ . For time preferences we obtain a lower estimate for the discounting rate than
Andersen et al. (2008) who find it around 10% for the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We
experimented with pure hyperbolic and CRRA utility function but did not find evidence that
these would be a better fit.
Table 2.3: Estimates of Risk and Time Preferences with Exponential Utility
Parameter Std. error Parameter Std. error
γcons 0.0492 0.0007 0.0574 0.0019
γedu -0.0027 0.0005 -0.0035 0.0014
γ f em 0.0199 0.0012 0.0274 0.0038
γage 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
τcons 1.0433 0.0110 0.4195 0.0326
τedu -0.1112 0.0077 -0.1182 0.0232
τ f em -0.0874 0.0197 -0.1783 0.0652
τage 0.0051 0.0007 0.0111 0.0023
rcons -3.8642 0.0513 -6.8203 0.1824
redu -0.1993 0.0338 -0.5267 0.0287
r f em -0.0517 0.0913 -0.0871 0.0645
rage -0.0022 0.0032 0.0029 0.0024
MaxLogL 30807.15577 25765.99
n = 2825
Unobserved heterogeneity No yes
V (ξ γ) 0.0107 0.0003 ρ(γ,τ) -0.7473
V (ξ τ) 2.6750 0.1013 ρ(γ,r) -0.1409
V (ξ r) 10.3408 0.6446 ρ(τ,r) -0.0981
Cov(ξ γ ,ξ τ) -0.1263 0.0048
Cov(ξ γ ,ξ r) -0.0468 0.0033
Cov(ξ r,ξ τ) -0.5162 0.0598
Note: Estimation results of the structural econometric model with CARA utility
and exponential discounting (β = 1)
Table 2.4 shows the predicted parameters γ , τ , r, the number of risky choices that partici-
pants took and whether they switched more than once during a treatment. These subjects were
chosen randomly to illustrate how our predictions relate to the raw choice data. We can observe
that someone who took more risky choices, e.g., subject S4 who chose the risky option in 16
out of 20 choices, has a negative coefficient of risk aversion (implying risk seeking behavior).
This is opposed to what we observe for participant S2500, who only took 2 risky choices and
therefore has a much higher predicted risk aversion coefficient. The higher the coefficient is,
the more curved the respondent’s utility function. The same relationship can be observed by
looking at the discount rate and the number of impatient choices in the experiment.
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Table 2.4: Example Subjects: 4, 5, 100, 2500
Participant Experimental Raw choices
γ τ r Tot risky Tot present Switching
S4 -0.0880 22.8596 0.0113 16 15 yes
S5 0.0119 1.6838 0.0042 11 10 no
S100 0.1277 3.1998 0.0050 9 12 no
S2500 0.1928 2.2376 0.0035 2 7 yes
2.4 Results
Personality traits and economic preferences
The literature in psychology has found many ways in which we can classify different aspects
of human behavior. We focused on the Big-5 because of the overall consensus of the existence
of these five patterns and we can compare our results to previous findings. To incorporate these
personality traits into our analysis of risk and time preferences, we make use of the personality
questionnaire available in the LISS panel. This survey contains 50 questions which are designed
to capture five personality traits (the Big-5) according to Goldberg et al. (2006). These person-
ality traits are the following: Extraversion, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and
Openness/Intellect. We converted the responses into a scale by adding scores assigned to each
question per trait.12
Table 2.5 contains the correlations between our predicted preference parameters and the per-
sonality traits. We observe similar correlation patterns to those of Almulund et al. (2014) and
Becker et al. (2012); risk aversion increases with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness and de-
creases with Intellect/Openness. (Almulund et al. (2014) found an insignificant correlation with
Conscientiousness.) The impatience parameter is negatively correlated with Intellect/Openness.
This is a consistent finding across studies. Stated preferences for risk aversion and impatience
show higher correlations, all in the same direction. The correlation between Neuroticism and
risk aversion or impatience measured in the experiment was insignificant, but we do find a sig-
nificantly negative correlation between Neuroticism and stated risk seeking and a significantly
positive correlation between Neuroticism and stated impatience.
12The exact conversion of responses to scores is explained in the International personality item pool (IPIP)
website: http://ipip.ori.org/newScoringInstructions.htm
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Table 2.5: Pearson’s correlations between traits and preferences
Risk aver Discount Error Risk taking Impatience
Extraversion -0.023 -0.012 0.021 0.172 0.078
(0.238) (0.534) (0.284) (0.000) (0.000)
Agreeableness 0.084 0.005 -0.067 -0.048 -0.022
(0.000) (0.793) (0.001) (0.016) (0.268)
Conscientiousness 0.041 0.004 -0.001 -0.100 -0.267
(0.037) (0.843) (0.968) (0.000) (0.000)
Neuroticism 0.027 0.023 0.024 -0.101 0.127
(0.177) (0.242) (0.226) (0.000) (0.000)
Intellect/Openness -0.033 -0.047 -0.085 0.070 -0.014
(0.093) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.484)
Note: p-values in parentheses.
Recent research in psychology has shown that personality traits can change over time (Sri-
vastava et al., 2003; Roberts and Mroczek, 2008), with the largest changes happening in young
adulthood (20-40 years old). For example, Conscientiousness, which is associated with the
ability to exert control over behavior and impulses, shows the largest change when individuals
are in their twenties – at the start of their professional career. Agreeableness, which reflects the
tendency towards altruism and cooperation, exhibits most changes during a person’s thirties,
which often coincides with the creation of a family. Neuroticism is the only trait of the five that
is consistently higher for women. It may also be the case that education helps to shape some
traits.
We therefore control for age (using brackets of ten years each), gender, and education when
analyzing the relation between the economic parameters and personality traits. The first half
of Table 2.6 shows OLS regressions explaining risk aversion, impatience and error propensity;
in the second half, we show the same specifications explaining stated preferences instead. In
addition to adding age controls, we also ran regressions interacting the first two age brackets
(age<35), with personality traits. However, we do not find these interactions to be significant.
The results largely correspond to the Pearson correlation coefficients. Extraversion, Con-
scientiousness and Neuroticism are much stronger predictors of the stated measures of risk and
time preferences than they are for the experimental measures, but for Agreeableness, we find
the opposite. The relation between Intellect/Openness and risk and time preferences almost
completely disappears when education level is kept constant.
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In columns (3) and (6) we show the regressions for our individual prediction of error propen-
sity; as expected, here we find a negative correlation with Intellect/Openness (even if education
is kept constant). But we also find a negative association with Agreeableness and a positive
association with Extraversion. “Agreeable" respondents make fewer errors, while “extravert"
respondents make more errors than average.
25
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Portfolio choice and financial wealth
The LISS panel collects self-reported financial information of most of our participants. For this
section, we selected three questions from the survey on assets to construct our two financial
outcome variables. These questions are asked to every panel participant, but if the person
answering the question has joint financial wealth or investments with her spouse, then only
one of them answers the question– the household head13. The first question, the ownership
of risky assets, is a binary question which asks each individual whether they have any type of
investments:
Did you own one of the following assets in the previous year? Investments (growth
funds, share funds, bonds, stocks, options, warrants).
Yes / No
We do not have more detailed information on the exact type of financial assets which they
posses, therefore we treated everything as a “risky investment" even though the risk between
these can be quite different. We defined the second variable as financial wealth and we con-
structed it by summing up the total value of their individual investments and the money they
have in their bank statements at the moment. This variable is problematic since many individu-
als claim to have zero financial wealth.
Since these decisions are likely to be at the household level, we only consider the answers
given by the self-reported financial decision maker of the family14. However, we are aware that
because of how the question is constructed, some of the investments or savings declared by the
household head could also be shared with their spouses 15. As shown on Table 2.1, around 14%
of people in our sample has risky investments; when we restrict attention to the answers at the
household level, we find that around 18% of households have risky assets.
To model the relationship between investment decisions and our experimental variables we
define a probit model of the latent propensity to invest in risky financial assets. In this model
we defined as dependent variable the binary decision to invest in risky assets. As explanatory
13If the person who is not the household head has her own financial assets separately, she answers the question
herself.
14We also performed our analysis on the household heads only, but this would leave us with a mostly male
sample (13% of females are household heads). If we consider the financial decision maker of the family, we have
a more gender balanced sample (56% male and 44%female)
15We explore this issue further in the next chapter.
27









0 5 10 15
Financial wealth (€)
Figure 2.4: Financial wealth
variables in our model, we included a vector of characteristics such as age, gender, level of
education (with lower education as base category) and monthly gross income of individuals. In
all specifications, we controlled for family characteristics such as the number of children. To
model the relationship with financial wealth we estimated a tobit model.
Table 2.7 is divided in three parts where we include the same controls. Columns (1) and
(2) show the results of adding only economic preferences as explanatory variables of economic
outcomes. The second part of the Table shows the results of including personality traits only
(columns (3) and (4)). Finally, on the last section of Table 2.7, we show the results of including
both economic preferences and personality traits (columns (5) and (6)).
We find that people who are more risk averse are less likely to own risky assets. Having a
higher propensity to make suboptimal choices (error), is negatively correlated with all financial
outcomes. Higher education, age and income result in a higher likelihood of investment and
women are less likely to have risky investments. We find that the coefficient of the discount rate
is negative but not significant, i.e., people who discount the future more heavily are less likely
to have more money invested in risky assets. Column (2) shows the results of a tobit regression
on financial wealth accumulation. Here, risk aversion and error propensity are negative and
significant at the 1% level. The discounting parameter is significant at the 5% level. The sign
shows that the more impatient people are, the less financial wealth they posses.
In the second section of Table 2.7, i.e., columns (3) and (4), we find a weak effect of Agree-
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Table 2.7: Preferences, traits and financial outcomes of decision makers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invest risky Fin wealth Invest risky Fin wealth Invest risky Fin wealth
Female -0.213** -0.170 -0.168 -0.262 -0.140 -0.217
(0.106) (0.150) (0.108) (0.162) (0.111) (0.162)
Age 0.053** 0.120*** 0.049** 0.115*** 0.054** 0.120***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027)
Age2 -0.000* -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000* -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num kids 0.013 -0.012 0.026 -0.018 0.017 -0.023
(0.048) (0.069) (0.048) (0.069) (0.048) (0.068)
Education
Intermed Voc Ed -0.159 0.334* -0.114 0.409** -0.165 0.317*
(0.132) (0.171) (0.130) (0.169) (0.133) (0.170)
Higher Voc Ed 0.370*** 0.812*** 0.456*** 0.989*** 0.366*** 0.842***
(0.120) (0.175) (0.119) (0.168) (0.123) (0.174)
University 0.645*** 1.069*** 0.743*** 1.284*** 0.644*** 1.137***
(0.149) (0.207) (0.148) (0.207) (0.152) (0.209)
Log income 0.088** 0.060 0.094** 0.065 0.086** 0.068
(0.038) (0.047) (0.039) (0.047) (0.038) (0.047)
Risk aversion -2.346*** -2.648*** -2.273*** -2.904***
-0.693 -1.004 -0.686 -1.01
Error prop -0.025*** -0.030** -0.025*** -0.032***
-0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012
Impatience -0.318 -0.844** -0.329 -0.811**
-0.3 -0.396 -0.309 -0.396
Extraversion -0.036 0.012 -0.027 0.009
(0.071) (0.087) (0.072) (0.086)
Agreeableness -0.241* -0.022 -0.243* -0.016
(0.126) (0.187) (0.126) (0.184)
Consc. -0.031 0.354** -0.024 0.368***
(0.109) (0.143) (0.110) (0.141)
Neuroticism -0.220 -0.042 -0.167 0.011
(0.146) (0.191) (0.145) (0.192)
Intellect -0.002 -0.291 -0.035 -0.349*
(0.150) (0.189) (0.150) (0.188)
Constant -3.113*** 4.928*** -1.581 4.675*** -1.480 4.819***
(0.644) (0.735) (0.992) (1.303) (0.997) (1.292)
Observations 1,182 784 1,182 784 1,182 784
ll -513.2 -1525 -516.2 -1527 -509.9 -1521
Notes: Probit regressions on propensity to own risky investments on columns 1, 3 and 5. Tobit regressions on amount of
financial wealth on columns 2, 4 and 6. Clustered standard errors at the household level ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 2.8: Stated preferences, personality traits and financial outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invest risky Fin wealth Invest risky Fin wealth Invest risky Fin wealth
Female -0.126 -0.179 -0.169 -0.260 -0.044 -0.206
(0.106) (0.146) (0.108) (0.162) (0.112) (0.159)
Age 0.053** 0.113*** 0.051** 0.112*** 0.056*** 0.115***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024)
Age2 -0.000** -0.001*** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.000** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education
Intermed Voc Ed -0.110 0.451*** -0.113 0.408** -0.110 0.448***
(0.133) (0.168) (0.130) (0.170) (0.134) (0.168)
Higher Voc Ed 0.428*** 0.929*** 0.457*** 0.987*** 0.428*** 0.959***
(0.118) (0.162) (0.119) (0.167) (0.120) (0.162)
University 0.692*** 1.149*** 0.744*** 1.284*** 0.689*** 1.209***
(0.147) (0.198) (0.148) (0.207) (0.150) (0.203)
loginc 0.108*** 0.062 0.095** 0.065 0.109*** 0.062
(0.039) (0.045) (0.039) (0.047) (0.039) (0.046)
Risk taking 0.112*** 0.039 0.117*** 0.040
(0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.030)
Impatience -0.065*** -0.186*** -0.068*** -0.184***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.027)
Extraversion -0.036 0.011 -0.090 0.061
(0.071) (0.087) (0.077) (0.087)
Agreeableness -0.239* -0.024 -0.219* -0.044
(0.126) (0.187) (0.129) (0.176)
Consc. -0.030 0.353** -0.096 0.115
(0.109) (0.143) (0.114) (0.138)
Neuroticism -0.221 -0.041 -0.123 0.120
(0.146) (0.191) (0.152) (0.191)
Intellect -0.007 -0.287 -0.011 -0.258
(0.150) (0.188) (0.153) (0.187)
Constant -3.675*** 5.397*** -1.600 4.693*** -1.966** 5.429***
(0.647) (0.716) (0.988) (1.293) (0.989) (1.262)
Observations 1,182 784 1,182 784 1,182 784
ll -503.6 -1505 -516.4 -1527 -499.4 -1504
Notes: Probit regressions on propensity to own risky investments on columns 1, 3 and 5. Tobit regressions on amount of
financial wealth on columns 2, 4 and 6. Clustered standard errors at the household level ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
ableness on investments and a strong effect of Conscientiousness on the amount of financial
wealth. Intellect is weakly correlated to having more financial wealth.
Once we included all preferences and traits, we find that the coefficients on economic prefer-
ences and personality traits change only slightly and do not lose significance except for Intellect.
As mentioned before, the latter trait is correlated with all economic preferences.
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We repeated the analysis on portfolio choice including stated preferences in our regressions
of portfolio decisions. In the previous subsection, we showed that risk taking is correlated
with all Big-5. Table 2.8 shows the results for the same regressions as in previous sections
but with stated preferences. The patterns which arise are very similar to the previous analysis
using experimental measures. The main difference is that none of the traits are significant in
predicting the investment choice when we include economic preferences in the equation. We
find the same results for Conscientiousness, i.e., it is positively correlated to financial wealth
accumulation, keeping economic preferences constant. Intellect does not correlate to financial
wealth, which is opposed to results on Table 2.7 where we controlled for the error parameter
which is also correlated to Intellect.
As part of a sensitivity check, we considered also households with negative or zero financial
wealth and we find a difference in the size of the effects but the relationships (in terms of sign
and significance) remain the same16.
In all specifications we found that the propensity to make suboptimal choices is significant
in explaining the likelihood of investment and the amount of financial wealth. People that make
less mistakes in our experiment are people who are better skilled in mathematical calculations
and in financial literacy. Available in the LISS panel is a measure of probability numeracy
used by Dillingh et al. (2015) and financial literacy similar to the one used in Van Rooij et al.
(2011). We found a correlation of −0.22 between our error prediction and the numeracy index.
The correlation with financial literacy is −0.16. Obtaining individual level predictions of the
tendency to make errors can be useful for researchers who do not have measures of numeracy,
intelligence or financial literacy but would like to control for it in their estimations.
2.5 Summary and conclusion
In this paper we analyzed risk and time preferences of a representative sample of the Dutch pop-
ulation. To measure individual attitudes we proposed a joint lottery task which could identify
both preference parameters and we also modelled the propensity to choose suboptimal options.
The experiment was carried out in the LISS panel, an internet survey. We also elicited alter-
native risk taking and impatience measures qualitatively by means of survey questions. We
constructed Big-5 personality scores for each of our participants for which we had informa-
16See Tables 2.11 and 2.12.
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tion from the panel. The goal of this paper was to study the relationship between economic
preferences and personality.
From our structural model of preferences, we found that women are more risk averse and
discount the future more. This is in line with what other studies have found (Falk et al., 2015;
Dohmen et al., 2010). Higher educated and higher income individuals in turn, are less risk
averse and discount the future less. We find a high degree of heterogeneity in the population,
specially with respect to time preferences. With respect to age patterns, from the experiment
we do not find significant coefficients of age in predicting risk or time preferences. How-
ever, if we look at the stated measures, we observe a negative correlation between age and
impatience. Using information on their personal finances we studied whether our measures
correlate with investments and financial wealth accumulation. We found that risk aversion is
negatively correlated with the probability of owning investments, and the amount invested in
them. The discounting factor is significant in predicting the amount of money that an individual
has accumulated as financial wealth. The negative coefficient implies that people who value
consumption in the future less, have on average also less financial wealth.
A lot of attention has been given in recent years to the relationship between economic pref-
erences and personality traits. Therefore, to explore the relationship between our preference
measures and financial outcomes, we incorporated psychological measures of personality into
our analysis of portfolio choice. We found that some personality traits as measured by the Big-5
are strongly correlated to economic preferences. The discounting parameters are mostly corre-
lated to the Intellect/Openness trait and Agreeableness when we measure discounting experi-
mentally. After controlling for education, the propensity to make suboptimal choices remains
significantly correlated to personality traits.
Once we established the relationship between traits and preferences, we tested whether
the channel through which personality has an effect on financial choices is through economic
preference formation. We find that personality traits cannot explain the likelihood to have risky
assets except for a weak effect from Agreeableness. We found Conscientiousness to be strongly
correlated to financial wealth but not to the individual predictions of economic preferences. This
is in line with a recent study of truck drivers by Rustichini et al. (2016), who failed to find a
connection between experimental measures of preferences and Conscientiousness. This shows
that this trait has a direct effect on real life outcomes. We complement the literature on the
predictive power of this personality traits in a wide range of life outcomes. Conscientiousness
has been found to be the most predictive of the Big Five across outcomes such as education
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outcomes (Almulund et al., 2014). According to their study, this psychological trait has been
shown to predict college grades better than SAT records. Job market outcomes such as job
performance are also best predicted by Conscientiousness of the Big Five, however it is less
predictive than measures of intelligence. This trait also predicts health outcomes, e.g., longevity,
better than intelligence or background.
In summary, we do not find evidence that the mechanism through which personality traits
have an effect on real life decisions is through the formation of economic preferences. We
showed this in two steps, by regressing economic outcomes on preferences and traits alone, and
then adding them both to the analysis. Our results point towards complementarity of economic
preferences and personality traits in explaining economic outcomes.
Future research on preference formation could be directed at studying younger individuals
or children at stages in which both preferences and personality presents the strongest changes.
It would be useful to identify which factors have a strong effect in shaping both preferences
and personality. For example, Deckers et al. (2015) show that socioeconomic status is a strong
predictor of several facets of a child’s personality. Other psychological traits and other measures
could be of interest to modeling economic decisions, e.g., scales such as the Barrett Impatience
Scale in psychology for which some of the questions are in the LISS panel.
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Appendix
Questionnaire for LISS panel
Instructions
The following questionnaire consists of 4 sections in which you are asked for your preference
between two sets of lotteries. The goal of this research is to study how people make choices
when they face some degree of risk and if payments are made at different points in time. You
can earn money in this exercise! Each section has different amounts that you can earn based on
different lotteries. Your final earnings will be based on your choices and some chance. There is
no right or wrong answer, the only thing that we are interested in is your personal preference. Be
sure to always choose the option that you really prefer because at the end of the questionnaire
one of the sections will be selected and one of the questions will be played out for payment with
1/10 chance.
Part 1-Lottery choices
In the following screen you are asked to make a choice between A and B for each question.
You have to tick the box for either A or B according to your most preferred choice. Please note
that payments are either made as soon as possible (with your first LISS payment) or three or six
months later, as indicated at the top of the screen. Once you are finished you can continue to
the next screen.
Part 2- Qualitative questions
Risk aversion questions
1. How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please give a value between 0 and 10, with 0 for "not
at all willing to take risks" and 10 for "very willing to take risks.
2. How would you rate your willingness to take risks concerning financial matters?
3. your willingness to take risks... - in your occupation?
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4. your willingness to take risks... - during leisure and sport?
To each question above, the following was also added in the same screen:
1. How do you see your partner? Is she generally a person who is fully prepared to take
risks or does she try to avoid taking risks?
2. How would you rate her willingness to take risks concerning financial matters?
3. her willingness to take risks... - in her occupation?
4. her willingness to take risks... - during leisure and sport?
Time preference questions:
1. How much do you agree with the following: If I get money I tend to spend it too quickly
(on a scale from 0 strongly disagree to 10 fully agree).
2. What do you think your spouse would respond to the previous question?
3. On a scale from 0 to 10, how patient do you consider yourself to be? (10 being the most
patient value)
4. On a scale from 0 to 10, how patient do you consider your spouse to be? (10 being the
most patient value)
At the end of the survey the following questions are added as standard procedure of the
LISS panel:
Finally; what did you think of this questionnaire?
1 = certainly not
5 = certainly yes
Was it difficult to answer the questions?
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Were the questions sufficiently clear?
Did the questionnaire get you thinking about things?
Was it an interesting subject?
Did you enjoy answering the questions?
Figure 2.5: Screen example
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Table 2.9: Details of the experimental design
Treatment pA $Ah pA $Al EVA pB $Bh pB $Bl EVB EVA-EVB
Timing 6 months 3 months
I 0.15 11 0.85 9 9.3 0.15 23 0.85 0 3.45 5.85
0.3 11 0.7 9 9.6 0.3 23 0.7 0 6.9 2.7
0.5 11 0.5 9 10 0.5 23 0.5 0 11.5 -1.5
0.85 11 0.15 9 10.7 0.85 23 0.15 0 19.55 -8.85
1 11 0 9 11 1 23 0 0 23 -12
Timing 9 months 6 months
II 0.15 15 0.85 10 10.75 0.15 29 0.85 4 7.75 3
0.3 15 0.7 10 11.5 0.3 29 0.7 4 11.5 0
0.5 15 0.5 10 12.5 0.5 29 0.5 4 16.5 -4
0.85 15 0.15 10 14.25 0.85 29 0.15 4 25.25 -11
1 15 0 10 15 1 29 0 4 29 -14
Timing 3 months 0 months
III 0.15 20 0.85 15 15.75 0.15 25 0.85 2 5.45 10.3
0.3 20 0.7 15 16.5 0.3 25 0.7 2 8.9 7.6
0.5 20 0.5 15 17.5 0.5 25 0.5 2 13.5 4
0.85 20 0.15 15 19.25 0.85 25 0.15 2 21.55 -2.3
1 20 0 15 20 1 25 0 2 25 -5
Timing 3 months 6 months
IV 0.15 12 0.85 7 7.75 0.15 22 0.85 0 3.3 4.45
0.3 12 0.7 7 8.5 0.3 22 0.7 0 6.6 1.9
0.5 12 0.5 7 9.5 0.5 22 0.5 0 11 -1.5
0.85 12 0.15 7 11.25 0.85 22 0.15 0 18.7 -7.45
1 12 0 7 12 1 22 0 0 22 -10
Notes: Each treatment consisted of five possible choices. PA,B are the probabilities of choice A,B
with high and low payoff. EVA: Expected value of option A; EVB: Expected value of option B.
The last column shows the difference between EVA and EVB. Each treatment varied in the timing
of the payoffs from 0 to 9 months.
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Table 2.10: Dominated options and demographics
Mean dom std. Mean rest std Difference
Female 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.50 Pr(T > t) = 0.0495
Position 1.65 0.62 1.59 0.67 Pr(T > t) = 0.1540
Age 58.26 12.87 52.01 14.91 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
Civil status 1.40 1.13 1.70 1.47 Pr(T < t) = 0.0092
Income 1737.80 1394.92 2195.76 1913.89 Pr(T < t) = 0.0045
Family income 4101.86 1859.92 4594.95 2876.05 Pr(T < t) = 0.0326
Education cat 3.02 1.49 3.68 1.46 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000
Num kids 0.56 0.87 0.83 1.11 Pr(T < t) = 0.0024
Risk stated 2.95 2.41 3.25 2.31 Pr(T < t) = 0.0765
Money pat 6.34 2.32 6.45 2.02 Pr(T < t) = 0.5358
Obs 133 2874
Notes: the last column presents the p-values of a two sample t-test. Income is stated as
the gross income per month in euros. Mean dom shows the means for the subsample
of people who choose always dominated options. Mean rest shows the means for the
rest of the sample.
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Table 2.11: Preferences, traits and financial outcomes of decision makers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invest risky Fin wealth Invest risky Fin wealth Invest risky Fin wealth
Female -0.213** -2.119*** -0.168 -2.357*** -0.140 -2.120***
(0.106) (0.461) (0.108) (0.481) (0.111) (0.475)
Age 0.053** -0.037 0.049** -0.079 0.054** -0.053
(0.022) (0.090) (0.022) (0.094) (0.022) (0.091)
Age2 -0.000* 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000* 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Num kids 0.013 0.011 0.026 0.061 0.017 0.028
(0.048) (0.207) (0.048) (0.212) (0.048) (0.206)
Education
Intermed Voc Ed -0.159 -0.217 -0.114 0.188 -0.165 -0.242
(0.132) (0.554) (0.130) (0.558) (0.133) (0.552)
Higher Voc Ed 0.370*** 1.401*** 0.456*** 2.235*** 0.366*** 1.401***
(0.120) (0.524) (0.119) (0.520) (0.123) (0.527)
University 0.645*** 2.137*** 0.743*** 3.046*** 0.644*** 2.084***
(0.149) (0.643) (0.148) (0.646) (0.152) (0.655)
Log income 0.088** 0.180 0.094** 0.232* 0.086** 0.202
(0.038) (0.126) (0.039) (0.129) (0.038) (0.124)
Risk aversion -2.346*** -14.118*** -2.273*** -13.955***
(0.693) (3.032) (0.686) (3.051)
Error prop -0.025*** -0.212*** -0.025*** -0.207***
(0.009) (0.039) (0.009) (0.039)
Impatience -0.318 -3.993*** -0.329 -3.893***
(0.300) (1.282) (0.309) (1.267)
Extraversion -0.036 -0.584* -0.027 -0.466
(0.071) (0.309) (0.072) (0.305)
Agreeableness -0.241* 0.035 -0.243* -0.070
(0.126) (0.538) (0.126) (0.521)
Consc. -0.031 1.006** -0.024 1.016**
(0.109) (0.467) (0.110) (0.460)
Neuroticism -0.220 -0.382 -0.167 -0.108
(0.146) (0.647) (0.145) (0.641)
Intellect -0.002 0.894 -0.035 0.648
(0.150) (0.653) (0.150) (0.645)
Constant -3.113*** 4.784** -1.581 -0.402 -1.480 1.118
(0.644) (2.375) (0.992) (4.210) (0.997) (4.094)
Observations 1,182 1,180 1,182 1,180 1,182 1,180
ll -513.2 -2921 -516.2 -2940 -509.9 -2917
Notes: Probit regressions on propensity to own risky investments on columns 1, 3 and 5. Tobit regressions on amount of financial
wealth on columns 2, 4 and 6. Clustered standard errors at the household level ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Complete
sample including observations where wealth = 0.
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Table 2.12: Preferences, traits and financial outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invest risky Fin wealth Invest risky Fin wealth Invest risky Fin wealth
Female -0.126 -2.373*** -0.169 -2.361*** -0.044 -2.321***
(0.106) (0.475) (0.108) (0.481) (0.112) (0.489)
Age 0.053** -0.056 0.051** -0.073 0.056*** -0.069
(0.021) (0.089) (0.022) (0.089) (0.022) (0.089)
Age2 -0.000** 0.001 -0.000* 0.001 -0.000** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Education
Intermed Voc Ed -0.110 0.241 -0.113 0.197 -0.110 0.211
(0.133) (0.559) (0.130) (0.557) (0.134) (0.557)
Higher Voc Ed 0.428*** 2.274*** 0.457*** 2.240*** 0.428*** 2.209***
(0.118) (0.509) (0.119) (0.520) (0.120) (0.516)
University 0.692*** 3.076*** 0.744*** 3.050*** 0.689*** 2.938***
(0.147) (0.629) (0.148) (0.646) (0.150) (0.645)
loginc 0.108*** 0.221* 0.095** 0.232* 0.109*** 0.239*
(0.039) (0.132) (0.039) (0.129) (0.039) (0.130)
Risk taking 0.112*** -0.006 0.117*** 0.008
(0.021) (0.094) (0.022) (0.095)
Impatience -0.065*** -0.255*** -0.068*** -0.210**
(0.021) (0.086) (0.021) (0.089)
Extraversion -0.036 -0.582* -0.090 -0.505
(0.071) (0.309) (0.077) (0.314)
Agreeableness -0.239* 0.043 -0.219* 0.032
(0.126) (0.539) (0.129) (0.535)
Consc. -0.030 1.008** -0.096 0.703
(0.109) (0.467) (0.114) (0.489)
Neuroticism -0.221 -0.385 -0.123 -0.257
(0.146) (0.647) (0.152) (0.655)
Intellect -0.007 0.878 -0.011 0.933
(0.150) (0.655) (0.153) (0.655)
Constant -3.675*** 4.128* -1.600 -0.451 -1.966** 0.584
(0.647) (2.496) (0.988) (4.194) (0.989) (4.277)
Observations 1,182 1,180 1,182 1,180 1,182 1,180
ll -503.6 -2940 -516.4 -2940 -499.4 -2937
Notes: Probit regressions on propensity to own risky investments on columns 1, 3 and 5. Tobit regressions on amount of
financial wealth on columns 2, 4 and 6. Clustered standard errors at the household level ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Complete sample including observations where wealth = 0.
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3 | Risk and Time Preferences and Finan-
cial Decisions of Couples
3.1 Introduction
Many important economic decisions taken at the household level involve a certain degree of
risk. Examples are decisions regarding consumption of durable goods, savings and the compo-
sition of household wealth, insurance, retirement plans, or health care. Many of these decisions
are observed at the household level and result from joint decisions of the adults in the house-
hold. The existing literature shows that financial decisions are significantly affected by how
decision-making power is allocated at home (De Palma et al., 2009). Members of the house-
hold might have different preferences regarding choices that involve risk and time dimensions.
As an example, Browning (1995) states that women might be more inclined to save for old age
since their life expectancy exceeds that of their husbands. If the age difference in the couple
is large, this effect will be even stronger. Studying how different preferences of individuals in
couples affect household decisions (e.g. portfolio choice behavior or wealth accumulation) is
therefore of core economic interest.
Until recently, theoretical and empirical studies focused on the unitary model: expected
utility-maximizing households with pooled resources, assuming a single set of preferences per
household conforming to the axioms of expected utility theory (EUT). This model, however, has
been observed to be inadequate in explaining household decisions when there is more than one
person in the household. The assumptions of the unitary model were challenged by the work
of Chiappori (1988), who modeled utility maximization as a weighted average of the utility of
its members. This led to so-called collective bargaining models, where couples are assumed to
make Pareto efficient decisions that result from some intra-household bargaining process (see,
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e.g. Cherchye et al., 2012).
We contribute to the literature by modeling the relationship between couples’ risk and time
preferences and how these manifest when making portfolio choices in real life. Previous studies
have found a positive correlation between spouses’ risk and time attitudes, which would suggest
positive assortative matching of spouses with regards to preferences (Dohmen et al., 2012), or
no significant correlation (Abdellaoui et al., 2013). We find that the magnitude of this correla-
tion depends on the method of elicitation. We also analyze the household decisions on financial
wealth and whether or not this is invested in risky assets such as stocks or stock mutual funds.
We carried out an experiment to elicit individual risk and time preferences in the LISS
panel.1 The LISS Panel is an ongoing Internet panel covering the adult Dutch population,
including those without internet. We focused on households of at least two adults living together
(whether married or unmarried) as a couple. We find a small significant positive correlation
between spouses’ risk preferences, and an insignificant correlation between their discounting
parameters. The risk aversion correlations appear to be stronger if a couple has been living
together longer. We find that the husband’s risk aversion coefficient is more influential in the
household decision to invest in risky assets than the wife’s. Both time preference parameters
are significant in predicting the level of financial wealth a household has accumulated.
In section 3.2 we briefly discuss the relevant literature helping us motivate our study. In
section 3.3 we present a summary of the experimental design and how we used the experimental
data to estimate individual time and risk preference parameters. We also present descriptive
statistics of the estimated risk and time preference parameters and of the background variables
obtained from the core studies of the LISS panel. Section 3.5 contains the empirical results and
section 3.6 presents the conclusions.
3.2 Related literature
This study is related to the stream of literature on household decision making and individual
risk and time preferences. In order to understand the relevance that individual preferences have
for decisions taken at the family level, we give an overview of the literature on these two topics.
First, we mention the relevant literature on risk aversion and time preferences, specifically those
1See https://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/.
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studies that focus on the elicitation methods and recent applications to household decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. Second, we describe the collective models of household decision making
and some of their recent applications which motivate our analysis of portfolio decision making
and bargaining over risky choices.
3.2.1 Risk attitudes and time preference
An important contribution to the experimental literature on risk aversion is an experiment per-
formed in the field by Binswanger (1980). He designed and implemented a Multiple Price List
methodology to elicit risk preferences of a group of households in rural India. Later this method
became increasingly popular as a result of the seminal paper by Holt and Laury (2002). The
main task consists of subjects making a series of choices involving a safe and a risky option.
When subjects proceed through the task, the probability of the high outcome increases until it
becomes one. In some experiments, subjects are allowed to switch more than once, giving rise
to inconsistencies. Other experiments limit the actions of the individuals and only allow for
one switch. The literature on risk aversion elicitation is very extensive and therefore, we refer
readers to a survey by Charness et al. (2013) which summarizes most of the methods for elicit-
ing risk aversion and their findings. As will be explained in detail in section 3.3, we made use
of modified multiple price list (MPL) lotteries to elicit preferences (risk and time preferences
jointly).
A popular method to elicit time preferences also uses a type of multiple price list, where
instead of binary risky choices, subjects have to choose between receiving an immediate payoff
or a delayed greater payoff in the future. Andersen et al. (2008) fielded both multiple price
lists in a Danish sample in order to construct a structural model of choice under present and
future uncertainty. Tanaka et al. (2010) gave similar tasks to subjects in rural Vietnam in order
to fit prospect theory parameters and study their relation to background characteristics such as
wealth.
There are many studies that look at experimentally elicited preferences and investigate how
they differ when elicited in a group as opposed to individually. Charness and Sutter (2012) show
that groups make decisions which are in line with predictions of game theory, i.e., exhibit less
behavioral biases than individuals. However, the group on which we focus our study is a couple
which may have different characteristics than groups consisting of strangers. For example, cou-
ples might be more inclined to share information or share resources in the household. Bateman
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and Munro (2005) found that joint choices of couples typically are more risk averse than choices
made by individuals. They also observed that couples had the same departures from expected
utility theory as individuals do (e.g. the common ratio and common consequence effects). De
Palma et al. (2009) studied how preferences of spouses can be aggregated and concluded that
the decision making process is dynamic: men initially have more decision making power than
women but this effect is reversed gradually as time passes by during the experiment. Abdel-
laoui et al. (2013) examined risk and time preferences of couples, inferred by eliciting certainty
equivalents and present values. Decisions were studied separately and jointly. For decisions un-
der risk, probabilistic risk attitudes of individuals and couples showed similar judgment biases
and were compatible with an S-shaped probability weighting function. Couple’s probabilistic
risk attitudes were found to be a mix of the partners’ attitudes (within the boundaries of each
partner’s individual attitude). They found that correlations between risk attitudes within couples
are rather weak, not supporting the notion of assortative matching within the couple.
The studies mentioned so far gather revealed preferences with sample sizes limited to ap-
proximately 70 couples and data that do not give access to information on the households’
finances or family background. In our current study, we recruited 1,188 couples for which we
have background characteristics like age and education. A large fraction of this sample also
includes financial controls.2.
Another type of elicitation procedure is based on qualitative survey questions. An example
is the research by Dohmen et al. (2012) who investigate the process of transmission of risk and
trust attitudes across generations. Our survey has very similar questions (making our results
comparable with the existing literature), described in detail in the next section. Dohmen et al.
find a strong positive correlation between responses of spouses’ attitudes towards risk taking,
supporting the notion of assortative mating. This contrasts the findings of Abdellaoui et al.
(2013). Also using qualitative survey questions, research by Bacon et al. (2014), shows that
correlation among spouses can be due to a component of assortative matching and a socializa-
tion component. They looked at correlations of the individual effects of the two partners and
they allowed for shocks to be correlated among spouses.
2Since we use self-reported data from the LISS panel, there tends to be some degree of noise and missing
information.
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3.2.2 Household decision making
In the past decades economists have started looking at households not as single decision mak-
ing units but as an interaction of its members, each with their own preferences. This is what
the collective models of intra-household bargaining propose (going against what was typically
assumed, that households can be modeled as if they were single agents). Vermeulen (2002) lays
out the main ideas behind these types of models in a survey. To understand the importance of the
contribution of each member to financial decisions that concern the welfare of the household,
we take account of individual preferences and indexes of the bargaining of each partner.
So far, the literature on collective models of household decision making has mainly focused
on consumption and labor supply decisions. There are few studies which consider couples’ de-
cisions involving a certain degree of financial risk, such as decisions to invest in stocks, bonds
or other risky assets. Attanasio and Lechene (2002) used data from the Mexican Progresa con-
ditional cash transfer program to investigate intra-household decision making. Their results
indicate that a shift of resources towards women tends to increase the weight that women have
in the decision process: in households where women received a Progresa grant, women more
often claim that they take important expenditure decisions. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (2008)
investigated whether the relative bargaining power of spouses plays a role in explaining house-
hold financial risk taking. Their results support pooled-resource models, rather than bargaining
models of household financial decision making. They found that household wealth allocated
to risky assets and stated financial risk-taking preferences do not vary significantly with the
relative bargaining power of spouses. Euwals et al. (2004) investigated whether husband and
wife have different preferences for saving for old age, and how these preferences mattered for
determining savings and portfolio behavior. They found that spouses’ attitudes increase with
their contribution to the income of the household.
One of our goals is to identify the possible existence of bargaining regarding financial de-
cisions of the household and link this to the bargaining power of husbands and wives. We
estimate reduced form models of household investments and savings to draw conclusions on
the role of intra-household bargaining and how risk and time preferences of both partners drive
household level decisions. In this sense our study is similar in methodology to that of Euwals
et al.; the individual (risk and time) preferences we consider, however, are very different. They
investigate the importance of attitudes of spouses towards household savings for old age with
respect to household wealth and portfolio choice. They do so by constructing a reduced form
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model with the attitudes for saving for old age weighed by their relative incomes. The main dif-
ference between their work and ours is that instead of accounting for attitudes for saving for old
age (they use a survey question with a 7-point scale), we use different measures which relate to
patience and risk taking (based on lottery experiments). We construct a similar reduced model
of investments and financial wealth, which depend on both spouses’ measures of preferences
and other observed characteristics.
3.3 The Experiment and Individual Parameters
In order to elicit risk and time preferences we used a modified Multiple Price List experiment,
consisting of four treatments in the gains domain with five choices in each treatment. In each
treatment, each individual was asked five times to choose between two lotteries. Within each
treatment, the lotteries in the five choices varied in the probabilities of low and high payoff, but
not in the payoff levels or the timing of the payoff.
To identify risk aversion and time preference, payoffs and timing of payment did vary across
the four treatments. Details can be found in the Appendix; in particular, Table 4.7. The timing
of the payoffs varied between immediately, 3, 6 or 9 months. The idea was to capture risk and
time preferences with a single task. Since risk and time preferences have been previously found
to be correlated and since we aim to use these measures to explain real life choices, we decided
to construct a new way of eliciting both jointly. This has the advantage of both minimizing
the participants’ mental burden and reducing the time of the elicitation procedure, limiting the
burden on the respondents and the costs of the experiment.
At the end of the experiment the computer randomly picked one of the individual’s choices,
and individuals all had a 10% probability to be selected for payment. The complete payoff
procedure was explained in the instructions. The experiment was incentivized with real money
(euros) which were transferred to the participant’s bank account at the time corresponding to
the choice they made in the decision problem selected for real payment (e.g., almost immedi-
ately after the experiment was administered (“direct payment”), or approximately three months
later (“Payment in three months”). The average payoff (without the participation fee) was 14
euros with a standard deviation of 7 euros and the median duration of the experiment was 9.35
minutes.
We tried to simplify the tasks as much as possible since they would be answered by a
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representative sample of the Dutch population. Following Von Gaudecker et al. (2011), we
included pie charts to help participants understand probabilities. We also used different colors
to indicate the different time periods of payment. An example of a choice in our experiment is
depicted in Figure 3.1. The order of the screens was randomized. We also allowed participants
to jump to past screens if they desired to do so and we did not enforce a single switching point
per screen. Enforcing one switch point could reduce the noise in our data, but since we were
actually also interested in capturing the heterogeneity in quality of the responses, we would
have lost valuable information regarding mistakes or inconsistencies which are common in the
literature (see, e.g., Moffatt, 2016). In fact, in addition to individual specific parameters for risk
aversion and time preference, our design also allows us to identify a third individual specific
parameter - the individual’s error propensity, an index for the tendency to make suboptimal or
inconsistent decisions.
Figure 3.1: Choice example
A Random Coefficients Model
To obtain a prediction of individual specific parameters of risk aversion, time preference, and
error propensity, we used the experimental data to estimate a structural model, following the
empirical strategy similar to that of Von Gaudecker et al. (2011). Our aim was to estimate a
parametrization of the utility function which would capture behavior and therefore included pa-
rameters of utility curvature, risk aversion, and time preference parameters from an exponential
discount function. We allowed for heterogeneity in the tendency to make suboptimal decisions
by including Fechner errors with a variance that varies across participants. The specification we
used is as follows:
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where γ ∈ R is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The monetary payoff of a lottery is
denoted by z ∈ R.
Discounting factor:
D(r, t) = e−rt (3.2)
where r is the discount rate and t indicates the time delay being discounted. Note that when
t = 0 this term is equal to 1. We also estimated different utility and discounting specifications,
namely CRRA utility (power utility) and quasi-hyperbolic and pure hyperbolic discounting.
The exponential and quasi-hyperbolic specifications fit the data better than the pure hyperbolic
function. Initial estimation results showed that the estimated present bias parameter β was not
significantly different from one. Therefore, we focus on the model with exponential discount-
ing.
Discounted expected utility function:
DEU = D(r, t)∗U(γ) (3.3)
In addition to people choosing the lottery which maximizes their discounted expected utility
(DEU), we introduce Fechner errors to model the choices. Therefore a subject will choose
lottery B if:
DEUB + τεB > DEUA + τεA (3.4)
The ε’s follow a type I extreme value distribution and are independent of each other and
the difference of the errors ε = εA− εB follow a logistic distribution. The parameter τ can
be interpreted as determining the size of the probability of making a mistake when choosing
between A and B.
The individual specific parameters (risk aversion, discounting, and error propensity) are
specified using a random coefficients model with vector of parameters ηi = (γi, ln(ri), ln(τi))′
and with ηi = XiΠ + η̃i. For each respondent i with given observed characteristics Xi, we
assume η̃i ∼N ([0,0,0]′, Σ), independent of Xi. The model parameters to be estimated are the
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K by 3 matrix Π (where K is the dimension of Xi) and six parameters determining the positive
semi-definite 3 by 3 matrix Σ.
Let us denote the difference between the DEU of option A and the DEU of option B for
individual i in choice problem j as:
∆DEUi j = DEUBi j−DEUAi j (3.5)
If an individual chooses option B, Yi j = 1 and it is zero otherwise. Then:
Yi j = I{∆DEUi j > τiεi j} (3.6)
Using the estimated model parameters and the individual choices Yi j, the (“posterior”) dis-
tribution of the random coefficients ηi given Xi and the Yi j can be determined using Bayes rule





Here l(yi,Xi) is the likelihood contribution of individual i, integrating out the unobserved het-
erogeneity parameters. k(η ,Xi) is the estimated density of the “prior” distribution of ηi given Xi,
which we assumed to be multivariate normal. P(yi|η ,Xi) is the probability of observing choice
sequence yi given η ,Xi. The mean of the posterior distribution gives the vector of predicted in-
dividual level parameters. In the empirical analysis below, these predicted parameters are used
as indicators of risk aversion, time preference, and error propensity for each individual.
3.4 Data
The experiment was administered to participants of the LISS panel, managed by CentERdata at
Tilburg University; see, e.g., Scherpenzeel (2011). The panel is based upon a random sample of
Dutch private addresses. If an address is selected, all household members of age 16 or older are
invited to participate. The panel is broadly representative for the Dutch non-institutionalized
population and contains approximately 8,000 individuals. Panel participants are asked to an-
swer different types of survey questions each month. The surveys are administered via the
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Internet; respondents without a computer or Internet access are equipped with a user-friendly
personal computer with limited functionality ("simPC") and with broadband internet. The LISS
panel contains rich information on demographics, the economic and financial situation of the
household and its members, and many other topics on which data have been collected in the
past.
In our experiment we targeted households consisting of two adults who live together (mar-
ried or unmarried) and in which both household members answer the survey on a regular basis.
We invited a total of 3671 people and from these, we had a response rate of 82%, which means
that 3012 people participated in our study and 3007 finished the tasks completely. We observed
20 households composed of same-sex partners and excluded them from our sample since their
characteristics in terms of household formation or bargaining behavior might be different from
those in other partnerships (and, their sample size is not big enough to make a separate analysis).
We also excluded two couples who live together as roommates.
As mentioned in Section 3, respondents faced a dominated option at the end of each treat-
ment. This option consisted of a 100% chance to receive a high amount if option B was chosen,
versus a 100% chance of a low payment if option A was chosen. We observed that a propor-
tion of people picked the dominated option multiple times. From these, we excluded a total
of 133 people who chose the dominated option for each treatment. Our final sample consists
of 2825 individuals. If we aggregate information at the household level (counting complete
couples only), we end up with 1,188 couples for whom we have complete information, also on
background characteristics like age and education. To our knowledge this is the largest study
which is aimed at investigating couples’ time and risk preferences with experimental data.
At the end of our experiment we also included qualitative questions to elicit preferences in
an alternative way. To measure the respondents’ attitudes towards risk, we asked the following
questions taken from the literature (Dohmen et al., 2011; Charness et al., 2013; Falk et al.,
2016):
• How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please give a value between 0 and 10, with 0 for "not
at all willing to take risks" and 10 for "very willing to take risks".
– How would you rate your willingness to take risks concerning financial matters?
– your willingness to take risks... - in your occupation?
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– your willingness to take risks... - during leisure and sport?
To obtain a qualitative measure of time preference, we included two questions from the
literature on time discounting. The first question was first used by Charness and Viceisza (2015)
in an experiment in rural Senegal. The second question relates to impulsiveness and impatience
and was taken from Jamison et al. (2012). The questions were the following:
• On a scale from 0 to 10, how patient do you consider yourself to be? (10 being the most
patient value)
• How much do you agree with the following: If I get money I tend to spend it too quickly
(on a scale from 0 to 10).
Since our analysis focuses on financial decisions, we will use questions that specifically
refer to financial matters in our analysis: the first question on risk attitudes, and the second
question on time preference. These also appear to be the questions that have the largest cor-
relation to actual financial decisions. In particular, the self-assessed willingness to take risks
concerning financial matters is positively correlated with holding risky assets, and the self-
reported tendency to spend money too quickly has a significantly negative correlation with the
amount of financial wealth.
Table 3.1 shows some descriptive statistics of background variables and financial assets. In
the analysis, we include household level variables such as household size, a binary indicator
which is 1 if the household (or one of its members) invests in risky financial assets, and the
amount of financial wealth of the household. The latter two variables combine both partners’
assets if they have separate accounts, and are based upon the joint value of their financial assets.
The table also shows the average individual characteristics of spouses such as their ages, level
of education, gross monthly income, employment status and financial literacy. The level of
education includes six categories defined by Statistics Netherlands and the financial literacy
index is constructed from the answers to four questions regarding financial concepts.3
The summary statistics of our individual specific parameters, as predicted using the struc-
tural model and the experimental decisions described in the previous section, are shown in Table
3.2. We observe that women are significantly more risk averse than men, are less likely to make
3These survey questions are taken from the study “financial literacy”; see www.lissdata.nl.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Household size 2.813 1.096 1188
Children living at home 0.799 1.088 1188
Household investments .2066 0.405 1142
Household financial wealth 47196.81 108685.5 1028
Characteristics husband
Age 53.857 14.877 1188
Level of education 3.83 1.456 1188
Financial literacy 2.637 1.004 730
Monthly income 3040.883 2202.035 1122
Civil servant 0.008 0.087 1173
Work 0.527 0.499 1188
Self employed 0.067 0.251 1188
Decision making 3.095037 0.648 947
Share hh income 0.700 0.201 1,109
Characteristics wife
Age 51.348 14.834 1188
Level of education 3.481 1.458 1188
Financial literacy 2.15 0.977 720
Monthly income 1352.071 1207.697 1140
Civil servant 0.006 0.077 1174
Work 0.451 0.498 1188
Self employed 0.038 0.191 1188
Decision making 2.941922 0.682 947
Share hh income 0.300 .201 1,109
Notes: Means and standard deviations for household characteristics. Characteris-
tics of men and women reported separately. Decision making is defined in Section
3.5 as the way in which spouses decide who takes care of the financial decisions.
mistakes, and are significantly more impatient than men. In the following section we will ex-
plore these differences further and analyze how these preferences influence household financial
decision making.
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the three parameters for men and women in our sample.
The parameters reflecting impatience and the tendency to make the wrong decision have skewed
distributions. The very high values of error and time preference reflect that a small group of
respondents have a high likelihood of making mistakes and high impatience with money. In the
analysis, we will use the log of these parameters to reduce the effect of outliers.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of individual specific parameters
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Table 3.2: Individual Specific Parameters
(a) Husband
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Risk aversion 0.045 0.085
Error 6.385 9.206
Time preference 0.136 0.738
Risk stated 3.684 2.330
Impatience money 3.479 2.489
N 1408
(b) Wife
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Risk aversion 0.072 0.089
Error 5.459 7.756
Time preference 0.21 0.979
Risk stated 2.762 2.163
Impatience money 3.65 2.540
N 1413
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Correlation between spouses
Table 3.3 presents the correlation coefficients between spouses’ predicted individual measures
for risk, time, and the (error) propensity to make suboptimal choices. The table shows that
the correlation between the experimental measures of risk aversion of husband and wife is
small but significantly positive. For the experimental time preference parameter, we do not
find a significant correlation between spouses. Spouses’ tendencies to make decision errors are
positively correlated. Table 3.3 (b) shows the correlations between spouses when preferences
are elicited qualitatively. Here we observe significant positive correlations for both risk and
time preferences.
Table 3.3: Correlations between spouses
(a) experimental measures (b) stated measures
woman man man
risk aversion impatience error prop. risk aversion impatience
risk aversion 0.0807 -0.0086 -0.0375 0.2211 0.0719
(0.0054) (0.7665) (0.1967) (0.0000) (0.0131)
impatience 0.0515 -0.0006 0.0401 0.091 0.1959
(0.0763) (0.9822) (0.1668) (0.0017) (0.0000)
error prop. -0.012 0.0479 0.1538
(0.6799) (0.0988) (0.0000)
Notes: Correlation coefficients between measures for men and women; (a) experimental
measures and (b) stated preferences. p-value in parentheses.
We observe higher correlations between both spouses’ risk and time preference parameters
when these are measured qualitatively. This result is in line with what Dohmen et al. (2011)
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find when using domain specific elicitation of risk preferences. To validate the significance of
the stated choice elicitation with respect to actual risky behavior, they look at the correlation
with a lottery task. In a similar way, we found a correlation between our experimental variables
and the qualitative ones: For the measures of risk aversion we find a correlation of 0.1807 for
men and of 0.1881 for women. On the other hand, we find no significant correlation between
our experimental and qualitative measures of impatience.
To analyze the spouses’ attitudes and the correlation between them, we considered some
regressions on demographic variables which have been previously found to be correlated to
risk attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2012; Von Gaudecker et al., 2011; Noussair et al., 2014). These
studies typically find that there are significant associations between preferences and observed
demographics, although the demographics do not have a lot of predictive power. Demographics
may also capture (part of) the correlations between spouses. For example, people of similar ed-
ucational level or of similar age or income background tend to marry. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 in the
appendix present the results for bivariate models, SUR models for the continuous experimental
measures, and ordered probits for the stated preferences. The explanatory variables included in
the model were level of education, number of children, individual monthly gross income and
age.
Table 3.9 shows that for the three preference parameters, there exists a correlation in the
error terms between spouses for each parameter. The correlation between the error terms of
men and women for risk aversion and error propensity is significant. However, for impatience,
we cannot reject that their errors are uncorrelated. The correlations of the error terms are very
similar in size to the correlations displayed in Table 3.3. In line with existing studies, we
find that higher educated individuals are less impatient and less risk averse, though the latter
association is only marginally significant for men and weakly significant for women. On the
other hand, for women we do find a negative correlation between impatience and personal
income. Age and the number of children are not significantly associated with either risk aversion
or impatience. We find strong associations with the error propensities: lower educated and older
respondent have a much larger tendency to make suboptimal choices in the experiment, in line
with the findings in Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) and Tanaka and Munro (2014). Table 3.10
contains a bivariate ordered probit model of stated preferences for risk and impatience. Risk
taking is positively correlated to higher education for men and weakly correlated for women.
Impatience is significantly negatively correlated to age for women; older women state to be
more patient. This is in line with what Falk et al. (2015) find for gender and age effects on a
55
Risk and Time Preferences and Financial Decisions of Couples
measure of patience.4
A positive correlation between preferences of spouses may be due to positive assortative
matching in the marriage market or to convergence over time. With the cross-section data we
have, we cannot study convergence by following couples over time. However, an alternative
way test for convergence is to use information on the duration of the relationship (number of
years married or living together), available in the LISS panel.5 For this purpose, we split the
sample according to the numbers of years they have lived together; the sample median of 26
years. The results are shown in Table 3.11 in the Appendix. We find that there is a stronger
correlation of risk preferences of spouses in the subsample of couples who have lived together
for a longer time period, according to both the experimental and the stated measure. This
difference is not significant. For time preferences, we find virtually no relation with duration of
the partnership.
To summarize, this section shows that the correlation between spouses with respect to risk
is significant whether we look at either revealed or stated preferences. The correlation between
spouses with respect to time preferences is not significant for the experimental measure but it
is significant for stated preferences. This does not really change if we control for observed
demographics like age, education level and gender and consider correlations between the un-
observable parts only. It seems most of the correlation of time preferences is due to assortative
matching since we hardly find evidence of within-couple convergence in preferences over time.
3.5.2 Household financial wealth and portfolio choice
Spouses preferences might differ and also their relevance in financial decisions of the house-
hold.
We try to capture bargaining with respect to risk aversion and discounting preferences. With
our measures of preferences and no weights, we can study the relationship between these mea-
sures and financial outcomes. However, if we weigh them by a bargaining proxy, we make their
effect depend the size of their bargaining power. The weighting of preference parameters is
done in a model by Euwals et al.(2004), which is based on the theory of bargaining between
spouses (Chiappori, 1988, 1992); specifically on the collective models. In these models, bar-
4The measure presented by Falk et al. (2015) is constructed using one question from an experiment and one
survey question. They weight the importance of the two to construct the level of patience.
5Module: family and relationships
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gaining power is assigned as a weight of the utility of each member. However, collective models
have been mostly applied in the context of labor and consumption decisions of (riskless) goods.
We first investigate the role of spouses’ attitudes for risk and time preference in determining
household ownership of risky financial assets. The dependent variable Yi for household i is
equal to 1 if at least one partner reports that he, she, or the household owns some type of risky
financial assets and 0 otherwise (see Section 3.4). We specify the following probit model, in
which y∗i can be interpreted as the propensity to hold any risky financial assets for household i:
y∗i = X
f






























0 if y∗i ≤ 0 (does not own risky financial assets),
1 if y∗i > 0 (owns risky financial assets).
Here the vectors X f , Xh and Xw consist of family, husbands’ and wives’ characteristics respec-
tively. Scalars (whi ,w
w
i ) denote the weights which multiply the individual attitudes and (µh,µw)
denote the parameters of the effect of attitudes on the probability of holding a risky asset. We
constructed the weights in two ways: as the share of contributed household income and as the
stated relative decision power.
For the first specification of the weights, we define w j as the ratio of own income divided






For the second specification, we constructed weights based upon the responses to a survey
on financial decision making in the household.7 Specifically, we focus on the answers to a
question on the distribution of tasks regarding financial decisions:
6Household income inc f is composed of the sum of the incomes of the partners; weights add up to 1. As
shown in Table 3.1, on average men provide 70% of household income, while women provide 30%.
7These survey questions are taken from the core study "assets"; see www.lissdata.nl. Table 3.1 shows the
average response to this question by men and women.
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Here are five descriptions of how financial decisions may be taken in a household. Which of these
best describes how financial decisions are taken in your household?8
1 my partner generally takes all the decisions concerning financial affairs
2 my partner decides about financial affairs more often than I do
3 my partner and I generally decide together about financial affairs
4 I generally decide about financial affairs more often than my partner
5 I generally take all the decisions about financial affairs
We map the responses to relative weights of men and women such that wh +ww = 1. How-
ever, spouses disagree with each other in this question in approximately 25% of the cases, we
take the average of the spouses responses to construct the decision making weights. For the case
of men, if the average answers are {1,1.5,2,2.5,3,3.5,4,4.5,5} we attach the corresponding
percentage of decision making power w ∈ {0,0.125, ...,0.875,1}. The decision making power
for women is defined as 1−w. To better understand how we assigned the weights ,consider for
example, if a man answers 1 and his partner answers 5, they both agree and the weights are 0
and 1, respectively. If another man would answer 4 and his partner 3, we take the average 3.5
and assign him a value of 0.625 as weight. Separately, in a sensitivity analysis we take men’s
or women’s answers only to construct the weights.
We depict the distributions of women’s weights in Figure 3.3. Income weights of women
reflect the fact that men are the main income earners. Weights according to the survey question
are mostly concentrated in the middle, with a median of 0.5, representing equal decision power.
The correlation between these two measures of bargaining is ρ = 0.1042 (p =0.0019).
We expect that people who take financial decisions jointly and who share their resources
have most interaction in terms of bargaining since they have to agree on how to spend and
invest their money. The percentage of people stating shared decision making power in financial
affairs is around 66.21% and around 58.61% state that they manage their finances together with
no separate reserves.
In a study of household decision making, Carlsson et al. (2012) show that for Chinese
households, husbands have stronger influence on joint decisions than wives in around 99%
of their sample. However, they do not find many factors which influence this decision power,
except for the husband’s parents living in the same household. Other studies have found income
to be a big determinant in increasing women’s bargaining position, such as by Attanasio and
8We will refer to this question in the remainder of the text as “DM"
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of women’s bargaining weights
Lechene (2002), already mentioned in Section 3.2. To see how stated decision power is related
to individual and household characteristics, we explain the male partner’s decision power as
measured by the categorical variable DM from characteristics such as age, education, income,
financial literacy, and marital status.
Table 3.4 shows the estimates of some ordered probit models, where the regressors are dif-
ferences in individual characteristics between male and female partner (age, level of education,
income, financial literacy) as well as levels of household characteristics (number of kids, mari-
tal status)9. We find that a higher education level, income or financial literacy score, increases
the likelihood of having more decision making power, in line with what we would expect (Cher-
chye et al., 2012; Van Rooij et al., 2011). The variable which is negatively correlated to DM is
the dummy married. The probability of belonging to category 4 or 5 ("I decide more often than
my partner" or "I generally take all decisions") decreases for men if the couple has a marriage
contract. The number of kids is only weakly correlated to their decision style. Finally, a higher
financial literacy compared to the partner increases the likelihood of having more financial de-
cision making responsibilities.
For comparison, the right-hand panel of the table shows similar estimates for the weights
9We calculate the differences (husband - wife) of age, level of education, income and financial literacy score.
The financial literacy score is based upon the answer to four LISS questions available in the LISS panel, from the
’Financial Literacy’ project.
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Table 3.4: Determinants of weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DM Men DM w. DM w. DM w. Inc. w. Inc. w Inc. w.
Age dif -0.004 0.007 0.003 0.197 0.297* 0.269
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.133) (0.175) (0.175)
Education dif 0.180*** 0.161*** 0.184*** 3.346*** 2.681*** 2.911***
(0.028) (0.036) (0.036) (0.405) (0.538) (0.526)
Income dif / 100 0.006*** 0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of kids 0.021 0.032 0.048 2.369*** 1.841** 1.932**
(0.041) (0.060) (0.060) (0.601) (0.867) (0.868)
Married -0.311** -0.467*** -0.448** 5.190*** 5.689** 5.805**
(0.122) (0.177) (0.176) (1.797) (2.671) (2.677)
Duration partnership -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.152*** 0.118* 0.114*(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.046) (0.063) (0.063)
Financial literacy 0.157*** 1.389**(0.047) (0.696)
Constant 58.202*** 59.491*** 60.086***
(1.655) (2.749) (2.739)
LR test 11.43(0.0007)
Observations 874 541 541 1,073 620 620
R-squared 0.108 0.084 0.078
Notes: Ordered probit estimates of DM weights in Model 1,-3. Model 2 contains an index for finan-
cial literacy index differences between spouses. Age, Education and Income depict the differences
between spouses. LR test shows the corresponding chi2(1) and p-value. OLS estimates of income
weights in Model 4-6.
based upon personal income shares, now using a linear regression model. As we expected,
higher education increases the relative contribution to the household budget. The number of
kids is positively correlated with the husband earning more, which is in line with empirical
evidence in the Netherlands; women tend to work part-time after having children Euwals et al.
(2007).
We present in Table 3.5 the results of the probit model defined in equation 3.8. The first
part of the panel contains three specifications that correspond to having no weights or different
weights or preferences. The second part of the panel replicates the same models but allows for
different sample sizes; the missing information on the decision making style or income makes
our sample smaller. Models 1 and 4 show specifications where wh = 1 and ww = 1 are the
attitudes’ weights. Models 2 and 5 show specifications whose weights are constructed with
their relative incomes (weights were defined in equation 3.9). Models 3 and 6 show results for
specifications where the weights are those stated by the survey question. Because of missing
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observations we also present results of those households who have answered all the relevant
questions in the last three columns of Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Probit estimations of household investments in risky assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no weights income w stated w no weights income w stated w
Men
Risk aversion -1.240* -2.452** -1.546 -1.296* -2.323** -1.546
(0.742) (1.019) (1.321) (0.709) (0.965) (1.321)
Error propensity -0.016** -0.021** -0.020 -0.016** -0.022** -0.020
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
Impatience -0.038 -0.076 -0.073 -0.059 -0.097 -0.073
(0.083) (0.092) (0.180) (0.084) (0.096) (0.180)
Women
Risk aversion -0.331 0.460 -2.372* -0.788 -1.924 -2.372*
(0.708) (1.897) (1.300) (0.655) (1.776) (1.300)
Error propensity -0.009 -0.016 -0.039** -0.011 -0.027 -0.039**
(0.009) (0.026) (0.018) (0.008) (0.024) (0.018)
Impatience -0.052 -0.453 -0.113 -0.074 -0.540** -0.112
(0.070) (0.293) (0.140) (0.070) (0.272) (0.140)
Loglikelihood -405.4 -404.3 -404.6 -492.1 -490.9 -404.6
Observations 886 886 886 1,069 1,067 888
Notes: Dependent variable: Ownership of risky assets(binary variable). Columns 1 and 4
show the results with w = 1. Columns 2 and 5 show results with relative income weights.
Columns 3 and 6 show results with stated decision making power. The differences between
1-4, 2-5 and 3-6 are the number of observations included in the estimations. In the first
three columns we restrict the sample to have the same number of observations in all spec-
ifications. This makes the models’ likelihood contributions comparable. The next three
columns contain all observations possible for each specification. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
A greater curvature of the utility function as predicted by the risk aversion coefficient of
husbands and wives decreases the probability that a household owns risky investments. When
we include the relative incomes as weights for individual preferences (Model 2 and 5), we see
an increase in the effect of the husband’s risk attitudes. Specifications 3 and 6 show the results
for modeling the weights according to their responses to a survey question. Here, we observe a
shift in the significance of risk aversion from men towards women.
The propensity to make mistakes is significant for men in the first two specifications. Again,
as with risk aversion, once we weigh preferences by the stated measure DM, women’s propen-
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sity to make suboptimal choices become significant. Model 5, which includes a higher number
of observations, shows an effect of women’s impatience on the propensity to invest. This effect
could be explained by women being more interested in present consumption, for example, on
household expenses or on children’s expenses as found in Lundberg et al. (2015). In Table 3.12
in the Appendix we show that across models, controls like higher vocational education and Uni-
versity education of husbands are highly significant in predicting the probability of investment
as compared to having (less) than a high school degree.
As a comparison between experimental and survey measures, Table 3.13 in the Appendix
presents the results for the analysis with stated preferences instead. The positive signs on the
risk parameters reflect the willingness to take risks. Therefore, more willingness to take risk
increases the probability of investment on average of both men and women. In this case, the
stated willingness to take risks for women is weakly significant across different specifications.
Stated impatience towards spending money is negatively correlated to investments for men.
The question regarding impatience might reflect the impulse of spending money whereas the
discount rate might have different components aside from impulse. This implies that in real life,
this characteristic captures financial behavior well.
Next, we define financial wealth as the sum of financial assets and money currently accumu-
lated in their bank accounts. We expected more impatient people to have less financial wealth
since they would tend to be less forward looking and discount the future more heavily than
those who are less impatient. We analyzed the relationship between the amount of financial
wealth and the predicted risk and time preferences of husbands and wives with a tobit model
since there is a significant amount of households who state to have zero financial wealth.
In all specifications of Table 3.6, we find that husbands’ risk and time preferences are sig-
nificantly correlated to the amount of financial wealth of the household. Conversely, we see
that only in the Model 3, with stated weights, wives risk and time preferences are significant in
predicting the amount of wealth accumulated by the household. The sign of the effect of the
time preference parameter is negative in all cases. Therefore, the more impatient men or women
are, the lower is the amount of financial wealth that is accumulated.
If we instead use the stated preferences to predict the amount of financial wealth, we find
that impatience of men is the most significant predictor among the individual preferences. This
result is significant in each bargaining specification. Only in the last specification, the parame-
ters of risk aversion are weakly significant for women.
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Table 3.6: Tobit estimations of household financial wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log savings unweighted income w stated w unweighted income w stated w
Men
Risk aversion -7.978*** -10.309*** -11.092** -5.266** -4.864 -11.806**
(2.689) (3.624) (4.875) (2.602) (3.489) (4.879)
Error prop. -0.096*** -0.119*** -0.148*** -0.086*** -0.088** -0.153***
(0.027) (0.036) (0.049) (0.026) (0.034) (0.049)
Impatience -1.115*** -1.408*** -2.149*** -1.132*** -1.400*** -2.166***
(0.267) (0.327) (0.554) (0.278) (0.342) (0.556)
Women
Risk aversion -2.130 3.765 -9.385** -3.772 -4.691 -9.536**
(2.519) (6.750) (4.492) (2.455) (6.334) (4.503)
Error prop. -0.024 -0.103 -0.107* -0.048 -0.221*** -0.104*
(0.030) (0.081) (0.055) (0.030) (0.080) (0.055)
Impatience -0.416** -0.969 -0.997** -0.383** -1.013 -0.938**
(0.189) (0.720) (0.389) (0.182) (0.677) (0.389)
Loglikelihood -2307.06 -2307.07 -2307.99 -2753.39 -2748.56 -2313.78
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 872 872 872 1,047 1,045 874
Notes: Dependent variable: Financial wealth in euros. Column 1 shows the results with w = 1.
Columns 2 shows results with relative income weights. Column 3 shows results with stated
decision making power.
The role of income for bargaining power has been found by other studies to be significant
in the household bargaining context. For example, Cherchye et al. (2012) find that bargaining
weights vary with wages as well as non-labor income. In a more recent study by Cherchye et al.
(2016), on intra-household allocation, they find (again) that when the wife’s relative income
goes up, her intra-household bargaining position improves. In our specifications where we take
into account relative income as bargaining weight, we obtain more precise estimates of the
coefficients on the risk aversion parameter and an improvement in the value of the likelihood
function of regressions which explain the investment decision of households. However, we do
no observe an improvement in the model when we analyze financial wealth of households.
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3.6 Summary and conclusion
In summary, we studied the relationship between risk and time preferences between spouses
from a representative sample of the Dutch population. We first elicited preferences by means
of lottery choices and qualitative questions implemented in an Internet experiment. We esti-
mated parameters of risk aversion, discounting and propensity to make suboptimal choices. We
estimated a structural model with simulated maximum likelihood (SMLE) and calculated pre-
dictions using Bayes rule to compute posterior distributions at the individual level. We show
that with our experimental design and structural modeling of preferences, we are able to capture
preferences which are correlated to actual decision making of couples.
We found a weak positive correlation between spouse’s predictions of risk aversion and no
significant correlation between their time preference parameters. Conversely, when we looked
at their stated preferences, we found stronger correlations for both dimensions. This could be
the result of noise coming from the lottery tasks due to its complexity. It is also likely that the
qualitative question related to impatience with money is capturing other aspects of intertemporal
decision which are correlated between spouses.
Our findings on the analyses of portfolio decisions of households are summarized as fol-
lows. The majority of couples in our sample, claim to make joint financial decisions and share
most of the resources. Based on this information we expected to observe some type of bargain-
ing with respect to risk driven by their individual tastes. First, we constructed a model which
incorporates both characteristics of spouses and household level characteristics. We found pref-
erences for risk to be significant in predicting the likelihood of investing in risky assets; i.e,
more risk averse individuals are less likely to invest in risky assets. When we analyzed the
amount of financial wealth, we found the parameters of time preference to be highly significant
in predicting the level of savings of the household.
To study whether introducing measures for bargaining power would improve our household
decision making model, we introduced two types of bargaining weights to their corresponding
preferences. Without controlling for bargaining power, we see that only the husbands’ prefer-
ences are represented in the household variable of investment in risky assets. However, once we
weighed preferences, we found that the wives’ preferences also appear to be significant. The
model with the best likelihood is the one with the weights corresponding to the share of income
contributed to the household. We can conclude that given the structure of decision making,
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both spouses’ preferences are behind risky decision making once we control for their bargain-
ing power. Nevertheless, results are sensitive to the exact measure of bargaining power which
is used. The role of income on bargaining power has been found by other studies to have a
significant impact in the household bargaining context. For example, Cherchye et al. (2012)
find that bargaining weights vary with wages as well as non-labor income. In a more recent
study by Cherchye et al. (2016), on intra-household allocation, they find (again) that when the
wife’s relative income goes up, her intra-household bargaining position improves.
Finally, we studied households’ financial wealth and found that our predicted discount rate
of men and women are negatively correlated to their financial wealth accumulated. However,
including measures of bargaining to preferences does not improve our likelihood values.
Our study shows how experimental data of risk aversion and time preference can be used
to understand household financial decision making. We observe that couples have similar risk
attitudes. We show that if bargaining power stems from the relative income contribution, men’s
preferences are more likely to influence financial decisions since they are the primary earners in
our sample. This is an important insight to policy makers that aim to increase female participa-
tion in financial markets. It means that increasing female labor participation, and wages, would
translate to more power in the household. However, as we showed, other mechanisms matter
for increasing bargaining power, such as financial literacy and education differences among
spouses. Further research should be directed at understanding how risk and time preference in-
teract among spouses in a bargaining context, allowing for different ‘types’ of couples to differ
in their bargaining styles.
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Appendix
The lottery experiment consisted of four treatments in the gains domain with five choices in
each treatment. In each treatment each individual must decide between two lotteries which vary
in probability throughout the treatment but do not vary in payoffs. The lottery A had a lower
variance than lottery B and the expected payoff became larger as one proceeds down the list, but
the expected value of lottery B grows larger relative to that of lottery A. Each screen contains
five choices and pie charts illustrating the probabilities. Thus each subject has to choose in total
20 times and these choices will be used to estimate their preferences.
The treatments differed in terms of the amounts in euros that could be earned, and in terms
of the time periods in which these payments would take place. Table 4.7 shows the experimental
design in more detail (the probabilities and quantities used to elicit preferences). This table also
shows the expected value of each lottery and which choice a risk neutral individual would take.
The subject chooses A or B in each row and one of these is at the end selected at random for
actual payment. We tell the subjects at the beginning of the experiment that they have a 1/10
probability of getting paid and at the end they know whether they were selected or not. This
has been seen in the literature as a good strategy to keep the tasks incentive compatible while
keeping the costs for the experimenter low (Dohmen et al. (2010)). The average payoffs were
13.4 euros with a standard deviation of approximately 7 euros.
In Figure 3.4 we present an example of a screen that subjects faced during one of the treat-
ments.
We designed the choice lists with enough variation in its different dimensions such that we
would be able to identify individual preferences. Before taking the experiment to the field, we
ran simulations assuming a structural form of the utility function and parameters to ensure the
identifiability of the preference parameters.
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Figure 3.4: Screen shot example
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Table 3.7: Details of the experimental design
Treatment pA $Ah pA $Al EVA pB $Bh pB $Bl EVB EVA-EVB
Timing 6 months 3 months
I 0.15 11 0.85 9 9.3 0.15 23 0.85 0 3.45 5.85
0.3 11 0.7 9 9.6 0.3 23 0.7 0 6.9 2.7
0.5 11 0.5 9 10 0.5 23 0.5 0 11.5 -1.5
0.85 11 0.15 9 10.7 0.85 23 0.15 0 19.55 -8.85
1 11 0 9 11 1 23 0 0 23 -12
Timing 9 months 6 months
II 0.15 15 0.85 10 10.75 0.15 29 0.85 4 7.75 3
0.3 15 0.7 10 11.5 0.3 29 0.7 4 11.5 0
0.5 15 0.5 10 12.5 0.5 29 0.5 4 16.5 -4
0.85 15 0.15 10 14.25 0.85 29 0.15 4 25.25 -11
1 15 0 10 15 1 29 0 4 29 -14
Timing 3 months 0 months
III 0.15 20 0.85 15 15.75 0.15 25 0.85 2 5.45 10.3
0.3 20 0.7 15 16.5 0.3 25 0.7 2 8.9 7.6
0.5 20 0.5 15 17.5 0.5 25 0.5 2 13.5 4
0.85 20 0.15 15 19.25 0.85 25 0.15 2 21.55 -2.3
1 20 0 15 20 1 25 0 2 25 -5
Timing 3 months 6 months
IV 0.15 12 0.85 7 7.75 0.15 22 0.85 0 3.3 4.45
0.3 12 0.7 7 8.5 0.3 22 0.7 0 6.6 1.9
0.5 12 0.5 7 9.5 0.5 22 0.5 0 11 -1.5
0.85 12 0.15 7 11.25 0.85 22 0.15 0 18.7 -7.45
1 12 0 7 12 1 22 0 0 22 -10
Notes: Each treatment consisted of five possible choices. PA,B are the probabilities of choice A,B
with high and low payoff. EVA: Expected value of option A; EVB: Expected value of option B.
The last column shows the difference between EVA and EVB. Each treatment varied in the timing
of the payoffs from 0 to 9 months.
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Table 3.8: Summary Statistics of Choices
Choice Mean Std. Dev.
choice1 t1 0.216058 0.411625
choice2 t1 0.242936 0.428931
choice3 t1 0.436251 0.496005
choice4 t1 0.688146 0.46333
choice5 t1 0.869056 0.337397
choice1 t2 0.34011 0.473828
choice2 t2 0.42419 0.494305
choice3 t2 0.660924 0.473477
choice4 t2 0.814611 0.38868
choice5 t2 0.900069 0.29996
choice1 t3 0.191247 0.393351
choice2 t3 0.198484 0.398927
choice3 t3 0.279462 0.448812
choice4 t3 0.50448 0.500066
choice5 t3 0.816678 0.386997
choice1 t4 0.198484 0.398927
choice2 t4 0.230186 0.421024
choice3 t4 0.414197 0.492668
choice4 t4 0.660234 0.473711
choice5 t4 0.834252 0.371918
Notes: Means and standard devia-
tions of each choice.
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Table 3.9: SUR regressions of individual attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk men Risk wom Error men Error wom Impat. men Impat. wom
Age
25-34 -0.009 -0.015 3.103 2.042 0.031 0.028
(0.026) (0.017) (2.739) (1.419) (0.223) (0.187)
35-44 0.006 -0.004 3.617 1.361 0.046 -0.078
(0.026) (0.017) (2.729) (1.433) (0.223) (0.188)
45-54 0.010 -0.000 3.976 1.723 0.119 -0.074
(0.026) (0.017) (2.721) (1.396) (0.222) (0.184)
55-64 0.004 0.008 4.693* 2.707** 0.128 0.119
(0.026) (0.016) (2.684) (1.349) (0.219) (0.177)
>65 0.009 -0.018 5.070* 5.621*** 0.145 -0.065
(0.026) (0.016) (2.668) (1.373) (0.218) (0.180)
Education
Intermed Voc -0.007 -0.012* -1.476** -0.190 -0.144*** -0.207***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.676) (0.589) (0.055) (0.078)
Higher Voc -0.019*** -0.007 -2.363*** -1.871*** -0.198*** -0.312***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.691) (0.598) (0.056) (0.079)
University -0.009 -0.015 -4.194*** -2.712*** -0.227*** -0.252**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.915) (0.900) (0.075) (0.118)
Number of kids -0.000 -0.000 -0.191 -0.191 0.002 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.310) (0.262) (0.025) (0.034)
Log of income -0.004 0.000 0.169 -0.112 -0.001 -0.024**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.295) (0.086) (0.024) (0.011)
Constant 0.081** 0.083*** 2.384 4.024*** 0.146 0.503***
(0.032) (0.016) (3.315) (1.361) (0.270) (0.179)
Correlation 0.0718 0.1015 -0.036
Breusch-Pagan 5.726 11.442 1.658
Observations 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111
R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.039 0.085 0.022 0.034
Notes: Level of education is included as a categorical variable which ranges from 1 (primary) to 6
(university). Age categories are split into 6 groups. Income is transformed as the natural logarithm
of the monthly gross individual income.
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Table 3.10: Bivariate ordered probit of stated preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk men Risk women Impat. men Impat. women
Education
Intermed Voc 0.025 0.015 -0.069 0.107
(0.078) (0.081) (0.079) (0.082)
Higher Voc 0.233*** 0.156* -0.065 0.013
(0.079) (0.082) (0.081) (0.083)
University 0.227** 0.156 -0.280*** -0.271**
(0.105) (0.123) (0.107) (0.125)
Age
25-34 -0.109 0.004 -0.102 -0.423**
(0.312) (0.194) (0.318) (0.197)
35-44 -0.245 -0.013 -0.353 -0.460**
(0.312) (0.197) (0.317) (0.199)
45-54 -0.280 0.070 -0.444 -0.691***
(0.311) (0.192) (0.317) (0.194)
55-64 -0.310 -0.083 -0.563* -0.933***
(0.306) (0.185) (0.312) (0.188)
>65 -0.244 -0.184 -0.699** -1.101***
(0.305) (0.189) (0.311) (0.192)
Number of kids 0.015 -0.020 0.009 0.014
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Log of income 0.005 0.010 0.059* 0.014





Observations 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111
Notes: Level of education is included as a categorical variable with base
level as primary and secondary education. Age categories are split into 6
groups of ten years each. Income is transformed as the natural logarithm of
the monthly gross individual income.
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Table 3.11: Correlation of preferences and duration of partnership
men risk aversion impatience
women dur < 26 dur > 26 dur < 26 dur > 26
risk aversion 0.0657 0.0823 impatience -0.0172 -0.0030
pval 0.1245 0.0422 pval 0.6872 0.9405
obs 548 609 obs 548 609
men risk stated impatience stat.
women dur < 26 dur > 26 dur < 26 dur > 26
risk stated 0.1905 0.2447 impatience stat. 0.1719 0.1770
pval 0.0000 0.0000 pval 0.0001 0.0000
obs 548 609 obs 548 609
Notes: Correlation coefficients are displayed with corresponding p-values and number of
observations. There are 31 observations for people with marriage duration = 26 years.
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Table 3.12: Investment decisions and revealed preferences
hh investments no weights income w stated w no weights income w stated w
Men
25-34 -0.646 -0.648 -0.665 -0.008 -0.002 -0.665
(0.715) (0.711) (0.715) (0.680) (0.687) (0.715)
35-44 -0.134 -0.138 -0.161 0.153 0.158 -0.161
(0.749) (0.744) (0.750) (0.718) (0.725) (0.750)
45-54 -0.505 -0.521 -0.522 -0.106 -0.107 -0.522
(0.804) (0.800) (0.803) (0.750) (0.757) (0.803)
55-64 -0.158 -0.189 -0.184 0.145 0.130 -0.184
(0.818) (0.815) (0.817) (0.767) (0.775) (0.817)
>65 -0.418 -0.445 -0.437 0.001 -0.020 -0.437
(0.837) (0.834) (0.835) (0.785) (0.791) (0.835)
Intermed Voc Ed -0.053 -0.051 -0.051 -0.009 0.001 -0.051
(0.140) (0.141) (0.140) (0.128) (0.128) (0.140)
Higher Voc Ed 0.455*** 0.452*** 0.445*** 0.410*** 0.413*** 0.445***
(0.143) (0.143) (0.141) (0.130) (0.129) (0.141)
University 0.684*** 0.667*** 0.674*** 0.598*** 0.595*** 0.674***
(0.204) (0.204) (0.202) (0.169) (0.169) (0.202)
Risk aversion -1.240* -2.452** -1.546 -1.296* -2.323** -1.546
(0.742) (1.019) (1.321) (0.709) (0.965) (1.321)
Error propensity -0.016** -0.021** -0.020 -0.016** -0.022** -0.020
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
Impatience -0.038 -0.076 -0.073 -0.059 -0.097 -0.073
(0.083) (0.092) (0.180) (0.084) (0.096) (0.180)
Log income 0.212 0.238* 0.210* 0.132 0.126 0.210*
(0.129) (0.144) (0.127) (0.090) (0.099) (0.126)
Women
25-34 -0.098 -0.098 -0.060 -0.182 -0.183 -0.060
(0.453) (0.458) (0.458) (0.412) (0.422) (0.458)
35-44 0.158 0.159 0.192 0.285 0.283 0.192
(0.504) (0.508) (0.509) (0.458) (0.466) (0.509)
45-54 0.504 0.525 0.530 0.428 0.439 0.529
(0.572) (0.577) (0.574) (0.506) (0.514) (0.574)
55-64 0.684 0.706 0.734 0.731 0.747 0.733
(0.597) (0.603) (0.599) (0.530) (0.540) (0.599)
>65 0.699 0.727 0.742 0.687 0.714 0.742
(0.621) (0.626) (0.622) (0.556) (0.565) (0.622)
Intermed Voc Ed 0.016 0.016 0.010 -0.018 -0.013 0.011
(0.136) (0.135) (0.135) (0.126) (0.126) (0.135)
Higher Voc Ed -0.058 -0.066 -0.063 -0.021 -0.018 -0.063
(0.143) (0.144) (0.143) (0.131) (0.131) (0.143)
University 0.092 0.119 0.084 0.198 0.220 0.084
(0.233) (0.232) (0.232) (0.191) (0.192) (0.232)
Risk aversion -0.331 0.460 -2.372* -0.788 -1.924 -2.372*
(0.708) (1.897) (1.300) (0.655) (1.776) (1.300)
Error propensity -0.009 -0.016 -0.039** -0.011 -0.027 -0.039**
(0.009) (0.026) (0.018) (0.008) (0.024) (0.018)
Impatience -0.052 -0.453 -0.113 -0.074 -0.540** -0.112
(0.070) (0.293) (0.140) (0.070) (0.272) (0.140)
Log income 0.086*** 0.078*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 0.086***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023)
Constant -3.127*** -3.316*** -3.067*** -2.807*** -2.823*** -3.069***
(1.097) (1.166) (1.081) (0.875) (0.906) (1.077)
Observations 886 886 886 1,069 1,067 888
Loglikelihood -405.4 -404.3 -404.6 -492.1 -490.9 -404.6
Notes: Dependent variable: observed investment binary. The base category in education level is pri-
mary. Wealth = savings balance, value of investments, value of loans. The weights consist of the share
in total income of each spouse. Column 2 and 4 contain preferences weighted by their share of income.
Age is a categorical variable (1-6) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.13: Household investments and stated preferences
(1) (2) (3)
hhinv unweighted income w stated w
Men
Risk stated 0.109*** 0.148*** 0.219***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.040)
Impatience -0.066*** -0.110*** -0.102**
(0.024) (0.034) (0.045)
Women
Risk stated 0.046* 0.172** 0.083*
(0.025) (0.068) (0.047)
Impatience -0.021 0.018 -0.067
(0.024) (0.063) (0.045)
Loglikelihood -2532 -2488 -2487
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 935 935 935
Notes: Preferences for risk and patience are measured
according to the survey questionnaire.
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Table 3.14: Financial wealth and revealed preferences
logfinwealth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (11)
Men no weights income w stated w no weights income w stated w
25-34 0.702 0.854 0.646 1.550 1.556 0.770
(2.554) (2.561) (2.554) (2.102) (2.103) (2.559)
35-44 2.424 2.488 2.255 3.128 3.174 2.166
(2.666) (2.674) (2.667) (2.249) (2.248) (2.674)
45-54 2.602 2.596 2.447 3.104 3.079 2.336
(2.756) (2.761) (2.757) (2.341) (2.339) (2.765)
55-64 4.356 4.330 4.173 4.982** 4.963** 4.089
(2.835) (2.838) (2.837) (2.438) (2.436) (2.845)
>65 4.611 4.505 4.492 5.448** 5.297** 4.379
(2.896) (2.898) (2.898) (2.510) (2.506) (2.906)
Intermed Voc Ed -0.014 0.005 0.065 0.234 0.312 0.036
(0.481) (0.480) (0.479) (0.463) (0.462) (0.481)
Higher Voc Ed 0.507 0.579 0.578 0.609 0.754 0.555
(0.504) (0.502) (0.503) (0.491) (0.491) (0.501)
University 0.541 0.603 0.647 1.040 1.151* 0.675
(0.727) (0.728) (0.726) (0.669) (0.670) (0.724)
Risk aversion -7.978*** -10.309*** -11.092** -5.266** -4.864 -11.806**
(2.689) (3.624) (4.875) (2.602) (3.489) (4.879)
Error prop. -0.096*** -0.119*** -0.148*** -0.086*** -0.088** -0.153***
(0.027) (0.036) (0.049) (0.026) (0.034) (0.049)
Impatience -1.115*** -1.408*** -2.149*** -1.132*** -1.400*** -2.166***
(0.267) (0.327) (0.554) (0.278) (0.342) (0.556)
Log income 0.649*** 0.764*** 0.636*** 0.554*** 0.532** 0.554**
(0.242) (0.275) (0.243) (0.194) (0.230) (0.218)
Women
25-34 -2.427* -2.426* -2.254 -2.245* -2.356* -2.000
(1.419) (1.425) (1.422) (1.294) (1.298) (1.418)
35-44 -3.199** -3.206** -2.972* -3.148** -3.250** -2.731*
(1.594) (1.598) (1.597) (1.474) (1.478) (1.594)
45-54 -2.499 -2.424 -2.296 -2.478 -2.473 -2.083
(1.732) (1.736) (1.736) (1.608) (1.611) (1.732)
55-64 -3.648** -3.609* -3.366* -3.404* -3.474** -3.153*
(1.847) (1.850) (1.854) (1.735) (1.736) (1.852)
>65 -2.128 -1.893 -1.903 -1.708 -1.539 -1.682
(1.936) (1.940) (1.940) (1.832) (1.834) (1.939)
Intermed Voc Ed 0.161 0.214 0.088 0.381 0.447 0.080
(0.501) (0.499) (0.501) (0.482) (0.479) (0.502)
Higher Voc Ed 0.998* 0.952* 0.914* 0.908* 0.961* 0.908*
(0.528) (0.527) (0.527) (0.504) (0.502) (0.528)
University 1.839** 1.839** 1.722** 1.020 1.160 1.637*
(0.865) (0.862) (0.865) (0.778) (0.775) (0.865)
Risk aversion -2.130 3.765 -9.385** -3.772 -4.691 -9.536**
(2.519) (6.750) (4.492) (2.455) (6.334) (4.503)
Error prop. -0.024 -0.103 -0.107* -0.048 -0.221*** -0.104*
(0.030) (0.081) (0.055) (0.030) (0.080) (0.055)
Impatience -0.416** -0.969 -0.997** -0.383** -1.013 -0.938**
(0.189) (0.720) (0.389) (0.182) (0.677) (0.389)
Log income 0.046 -0.005 0.048 0.043 0.090 0.041
(0.070) (0.085) (0.070) (0.068) (0.082) (0.069)
Constant 2.145 1.082 2.228 1.573 1.010 2.831
(2.932) (3.035) (2.933) (2.338) (2.456) (2.842)
Observations 872 872 872 1,047 1,045 874
Notes: Dependent variable: Financial wealth. The base category in education level is secondary or less.
Age is represented in age bracket dummies, 18-24 is the base category.
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Table 3.15: Household savings choices and stated preferences
(1) (2) (3)
Log savings unweighted income w stated w
Men
Risk stated 0.062 0.042 0.225
(0.084) (0.109) (0.146)
Impatience -0.156** -0.217** -0.248*
(0.077) (0.104) (0.146)
Women
Risk stated -0.078 0.035 -0.312*
(0.090) (0.244) (0.168)
Impatience 0.036 -0.079 -0.041
(0.078) (0.204) (0.144)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 905 905 905
Notes: Tobit regression of the natural logarithm of
financial wealth at the household level. Explana-
tory variables are stated risk taking and impatience.
We control for age category dummies, education
level dummies and log gross individual income.
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4 | Stability of Risk and Time Preferences
of Individuals and Couples
4.1 Introduction
The vast literature on the analysis of individuals’ risk and time preferences has mainly focused
on cross-sectional analysis. Less is known regarding the stability of these preferences. Do pref-
erences change over time, and, if so, how? Do they vary in response to, for example, economic
or health shocks? Economists traditionally assume that preferences are economic primitives
that are stable over time. This helps to identify the causal effects of shocks (i.e., changes in
budget constraints or prices) on observed behavior. If preferences and the environment are
changing simultaneously, it would be much less straightforward to identify such causal effects.
So far, the literature seems to point towards a limited degree of stability of risk and time
preferences (Wölbert and Riedl, 2013; Meier and Sprenger, 2015; Baucells and Villasís, 2010;
Harrison et al., 2005). A few studies have found low degrees of correlation between preferences
elicited through experimental procedures at different points in time (Chuang and Schechter,
2015), especially compared to stated measures of the same preferences. There might be several
reasons why researchers in the past have found such a low degree of correlation. One of them
rests on the importance of measurement errors, which could be caused by low cognitive skills.
It could also be that temporary changes in preferences play a large role, due to different types
of shocks, such as health shock, job loss, a financial shock, etc.
Most of the existing studies focus their attention on stability of individual preferences. If,
however, individuals live in a multi-person household, then shocks to one member might also
have an effect on the rest of the family. In fact, previous research has shown that when studying
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decision making, preferences among household members are positively correlated among them
(Abdellaoui et al., 2013).
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the correlation between preferences elicited in
two separate choice experiments that were conducted 18 months apart among a representative
sample of Dutch couples. We first focus our attention on stability at the individual level, but also
study possible cross-spousal effects in couples. The experiments consisted of choice problems
designed to elicit risk as well as time preferences at the individual level. Using this choice
data, we calculated individual predictions of risk aversion and time preference parameters fore
each wave. Moreover, our econometric model incorporates the individual’s tendency to make
suboptimal choices. We study the associations between shocks to health, employment, and
(current and expected) financial situation and changes in preferences between the two time
periods. Finally, we also study the relationship between such shocks and changes in preferences
of the spouse. To our knowledge this is the first analysis of this type with experimental data and
a detailed set of socioeconomic variables for a large representative panel of couples.
We find that there are a few individual shocks that are associated with the variability of
preferences. These characteristics are mainly those related to employment status. We distin-
guished between types of non-employment (job seeker, work disability, etc.) and find a negative
correlation between a transition to unemployment with active job search and risk aversion. We
also found that people who become homemakers on average also become more patient. More-
over, health changes are associated with a qualitative measure of impatience, but not with the
experimental measure.
Our findings also point towards a cross-couple effect of women’s unemployment, specifi-
cally when going into work disability, on risk aversion and time preferences of men. The only
cross-effect that we observe on women is caused by a change in the financial satisfaction on
men. Women make significantly less mistakes in the experiments when men claim to be better
off financially. On the other hand, if we look at stated preferences, we find that as women’s
economic expectations worsen, men become more risk averse.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 we summarize briefly
the findings of the literature so far. Section 4.3 presents the description of the experimental
methodology and summary statistics of the data. Next, we show our results in Section 4.4.
Finally, section 4.5 summarizes and concludes.
78
Stability of Risk and Time Preferences of Individuals and Couples
4.2 Related literature
In recent years several studies on stability of preferences have appeared, thanks to the availabil-
ity of repeated experiments or survey measures. This concerns, to name a few, preferences for
risk taking and intertemporal decisions. The literature can be organized according to the time
periods which they consider for stability and whether the elicitation of preferences is a result of
qualitative or experimental measures.
Some studies which study risk and time preferences with experimental measures have found
that changes in these can be correlated to some observed sociodemographic variables and to
measurement errors. For example, Andersen et al. (2008) analyze risk preferences elicited
through lottery experiments and look at changes in risk preferences during a 17 month period
for a sample covering the Danish population. They find that preferences are rather stable, but
subject to changes due to the subject’s state of personal finances. We will show that instability
in risk attitudes of the adult Dutch population is mostly driven by changes in their employment
status and associated with changes in their satisfaction with the economic environment. An-
other study which also takes place within a short time window, is the one by Wölbert and Riedl
(2013) who show the importance of testing the reliability of measures before establishing cor-
relations between time periods. This is done to ensure that the changes are not caused solely by
measurement errors. They find rather reliable measures of risk aversion and time preferences
which are highly correlated in a period of 5 weeks.
Other studies elicit preferences with survey questions, such as Dohmen et al. (2016) who
re-test their measures of preferences 20-53 days after the first elicitation. They report a corre-
lation of 0.62 between stated measures of risk taking which remains stable at later periods in
time; suggesting measurement error. In our study, we do not have information on preferences
soon after the first elicitation, therefore we cannot distinguish directly the size of the measure-
ment error. However, as will be shown in the next Chapters, we find similar correlations for
stated risk taking. Dohmen et al. (2015) investigates changes in risk attitudes across the life
course. They use qualitative survey measures collected over a large period of time for adults
in Germany. They find that the stated willingness to take risks decreases over the life course.
Their work shows that this type of survey questions is very powerful in getting information of
risk preferences. We will compare the stability of stated preferences and experimental measures
across time for a representative sample of the Dutch population.
79
Stability of Risk and Time Preferences of Individuals and Couples
Literature which studies longer time periods typically uses hypothetical questions. Brown
et al. (2017); Perez-Padilla (2012) find that an (exogenous) increase in crime in Mexico has
lead to an increase in the average level of risk aversion of those areas in which crime increased
steeply. Their results point towards a possibility of environmental factors being responsible for
changes in individual preferences. The literature on changes in preferences due to exceptional
shocks such as natural disasters or war outbreaks is also extensive1.
With respect to stability of time preferences, Meier and Sprenger (2015) find high corre-
lations over time of parameters of a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function, reflecting present
bias, discount rate, the propensity. They do so by estimating a quasi-hyperbolic discount func-
tion with data from an experiment among 250 people who participated twice. They observe
instability for some individuals and find no correlation between preference instability and so-
ciodemographic variables.
In a different context, Bacon et al. (2014) study the correlation of stated risk preferences
between spouses over time. They estimate a bivariate panel ordered probit model, disentangling
assortative mating from couple random shocks. They study multiple waves of the German
SOEP regarding stated risk preferences. They find that couples have similar risk attitudes and
react similarly to shocks. In this paper we will focus on shocks regarding employment, health
and economic expectations and look at the cross-couple effects.
Chuang and Schechter (2015) review the literature so far on stability of risk, time, and social
preferences. In addition, they perform their own analysis with data from Paraguay. They find
that stability of preferences measured with qualitative survey questions are more stable than
those measured quantitatively with experiments, in line with Dohmen et al. (2015).
In summary, previous research has found positive correlations between preferences elicited
at different points in time. Most of these studies analyze small samples in the case of experi-
mental studies. In the case of survey questions, the samples tend to be somewhat larger. Except
for Chuang and Schechter (2015), studies focus on one preference only, whereas we will ana-
lyze risk and time preferences jointly. When people do not make the same decisions in repeated
experiments, this can be due changing preferences but also to changes in the tendency to make
suboptimal decisions, modeled through, for example, errors added to the difference in utility of
the choice options before making a choice (Fechner errors, see, e.g., Loomes (2005)). In our
analysis, we model the tendency to make such errors as a third individual specific parameter
1See literature overview in Perez-Padilla (2012)
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and analyze its stability over time jointly with that of the risk and time preference parameters.
4.3 Experimental setup and data description
4.3.1 The experiment
In order to elicit preferences we conducted two waves of a modified Multiple Price List (MPL;
see Holt and Laury (2002)) lottery choice experiment. The experiments were carried out in
the LISS Panel, an ongoing Internet panel covering the adult Dutch population, including those
without Internet. This panel is representative of the Dutch population ages 16 and older in
terms of observable background characteristics. Panel members routinely answer questions on
a variety of topics every month.2 The LISS panel has been used several times to carry out
incentivized economic experiments among a representative sample of a broad population; see,
e.g., Noussair et al. (2013) and Noussair et al. (2014).
The first wave of our experiment was conducted in May 2014. The second wave took
place in November 2015 under the same experimental conditions. Each experiment consisted
of choices between two lotteries with varying means and variances. Subjects faced five choices
per screen and were asked to make 45 choices in total. In order to make the experiment eas-
ier, we included pie charts to help people understand and picture probabilities, following Von
Gaudecker et al. (2011). See Appendix A for details of the experimental design and an example
of a screen shown to the respondents.
One of the lotteries is selected and resolved at random at the end for actual payment. We
informed the subjects at the beginning of the experiment that they have a 1/10 probability of
actually getting paid and at the end on whether they were selected for payment or not. This has
been seen in the literature as a good strategy to make the tasks incentive compatible at limited
costs for the experimenter (Dohmen et al. (2010)). The average payoffs were 13.4 euros with a
standard deviation of approximately 7 euros. The procedure was the same in both waves.
The choices made by the respondents provide information on the curvature of their utility
functions (i.e., their risk aversion) and their preferences for earlier (or later) payment (i.e., their
subjective discount parameters). Moreover, internally inconsistent choice sequences point at
2See https://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/
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optimization errors, so that the choice sequences are also informative about the tendency to
make mistakes.
After the lottery tasks we included some survey questions to gather self-reported measures
of risk taking and patience. The risk questions are standard in the literature:3
• How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please give a value between 0 and 10, with 0 for "not
at all willing to take risks" and 10 for "very willing to take risks".
– How would you rate your willingness to take risks concerning financial matters?
– your willingness to take risks... - in your occupation?
– your willingness to take risks... - during leisure and sport?
To measure stated time preference or discounting, we included the following questions 4:
• On a scale from 0 to 10, how patient do you consider yourself to be? (10 being the most
patient value)
• How much do you agree with the following: If I get money I tend to spend it too quickly
(on a scale from 0 strongly disagree to 10 fully agree).
4.3.2 Structural parameters of risk, error and time preference
To obtain a predicted index of risk aversion and time preference for each subject at each point
in time, we follow an empirical strategy similar to that of, for example, Von Gaudecker et al.
(2011). Using the information on all participants in the lottery experiment, we estimated a
structural utility model that incorporates individual specific parameters for these two attitudes.
To take account of possible errors in decision making, we incorporate Fechner errors. To allow
3For the analysis we inverted this scale in order to simplify comparing with the experimental measure – an
increasing rate reflects increasing risk aversion.
4The first question is taken from a field experiment by Charness and Viceisza (2015) which was performed
in rural Senegal (the aim of their experiment however, was to compare three risk elicitation procedures). The
second question relates to impulsiveness and impatience and was taken from Jamison et al. (2012) where they also
analyze possible qualitative questions. Perhaps not surprisingly, and as we will later mention, the question which
most predicts economic outcomes is the one related to money.
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for different tendencies to make suboptimal decisions, the variance of these errors is allowed to
vary across respondents.
The three individual specific parameters for risk aversion, time preference, and error ten-
dency, are specified using a random coefficients model. They are assumed to remain constant
during the experiment. On the other hand, we estimate this model separately for wave 1 and
wave 2 of the experiment and do not impose any restrictions on how the three parameters vary
over time. The three parameters can vary with a small set of observed individual characteristics
(“observed heterogeneity”) but also contain an unobserved component (“unobserved hetero-
geneity”).5 The three unobserved components are allowed to be correlated.
More specifically, we assume a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function for
the gains domain and exponential discounting. We also estimated a CRRA utility function, but
the CARA specification gave the best fit. We also experimented with pure hyperbolic and quasi-
hyperbolic discounting specifications, but found hardly any evidence of hyperbolic discounting
for the average respondent. Given the computational burden of the quasi-hyperbolic model
(with a fourth individual specific parameter), we decided to use the exponential specification







D(r, t) = e−rt (4.2)
Discounted utility of a given lottery:
DEU = D(r, t)∗U(γ,z) (4.3)
We assume respondents choose the lottery which maximizes their discounted expected util-
ity (DEU) plus Fechner error τε . Therefore a subject will choose lottery B if:
DEUB + τεB > DEUA + τεA (4.4)
5Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) found that unobserved heterogeneity explains a much larger part of the variation
in preferences than observed heterogeneity.
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We assume that the ε’s follow a type I extreme value distribution and are independent of
each other. The difference of the errors ε = εA− εB then follows a logistic distribution. The
parameter τ can be interpreted as the tendency of making a suboptimal choice.
The three random coefficients are captured by a vector ηi = (γi, ln(ri), ln(τi))′. For re-
spondent i with given observed characteristics Xi, we assume ηi is drawn from a three-variate
normal distribution with arbitrary covariance matrix and means that are linear combinations of
the components of Xi.
Let us denote the difference between the DEUs of options A and B in choice problem j for
subject i as:
∆DEUi j = DEUBi j−DEUAi j (4.5)
where DEUi j depends upon i through the random coefficients ηi. If the subject chooses option
B, Yi j = 1, and Yi j = 0 otherwise. Then:
Yi j = I{∆DEUi j > τε} (4.6)
If ηi is given, the choices are independent of each other, because of the independence as-
sumption on εi j. If ηi is not given, however, this is no longer the case, since the same realization
of ηi drives all choices of respondent i in one wave of the experiment.
We estimated the model with simulated maximum likelihood (SMLE), separately for the
two waves of the experiment. For details on the experimental and estimation procedure we
refer the reader to Appendix 4.5.
Once we have the estimates of the model parameters, we know the estimated distribution of
the random coefficients ηi given Xi. Together with the individual’s choices, this gives predic-
tions of ηi at the individual level using Bayes rule: the (posterior) distribution of ηi given Xi





where l(yi,Xi) is the likelihood contribution of individual i, k(η ,Xi) is the density of the
((prior) multivariate normal distribution of ηi given Xi, and P(yi|η ,Xi) is the probability of ob-
serving choice sequence yi given ηi,Xi). We calculate the mean of these posterior distributions
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for each respondent i; this gives the predicted vector of individual level parameters. 6
In Figure 4.1 we show the sample distributions of the three predicted parameters for both
waves. The figure suggests that the distributions in waves 1 and 2 are quite similar. A simple
t-test comparing the means marginally reject the null that the mean risk aversion parameters are
equal (p = 0.0187) and suggests that risk aversion in the second period is higher. On the other
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In Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 in the Appendix we present the summary statistics for both waves,
in total we have around 72% percent re-contact rate which is very high for these type of ex-
periments (for example, Meier and Sprenger (2015) have a rate of around 28%). Around 320
people from our past sample were no longer LISS Panel participants, therefore, to compensate
for the loss of observations, we sent invitations out to other participants. In total 2825 people
are part of the first wave and 2224 people are part of the second wave. We will use this sample
for the first two sections for our analysis at the individual level.
Apart from making use of all of our sample to analyze the stability of preferences, we will
also construct a subsample in order to study the cross-spousal effect. For this purpose, we
6The same procedure to predict parameters at the individual level if followed by, among others, Von Gaudecker
et al. (2011). An alternative would be to estimate a separate model for each individual, avoiding the distributional
assumption on ηi. With a relatively small number of choices for each individual, however, this leads to inaccurate
parameter estimates, many outliers, and convergence problems (with parameters converging to−∞ or +∞). Again,
we did this separately for each wave, using the choices and model estimates for either wave 1 or wave 2. We
therefore get separate predictions for each respondent in each wave.
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aggregate the data at the household level and focus our attention specifically on couples7. To
study the cross-spousal effect, we look at complete couples (we keep those observations in
which both spouses in a household answered the survey) which are observed in both periods.
The total number of couples we observe are 765. If we compare the summary statistics of
the reduced sample of couples and the complete sample on Table 4.1, we observe that they
do not significantly differ in their observed characteristics. The first two columns show the
characteristics of the subsample (N=1530) and the last two columns the characteristics of the
whole sample (N=2825), both of the first wave of the experiment.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of reduced and complete sam-
ple, wave 1
Reduced sample Complete sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 54.8 14.4 52 14.9
Level of educ 3.624 1.442 3.686 1.464
High educ 0.329 0.468 0.345 0.476
Married 0.854 0.354 0.804 0.397
Number of kids 0.714 1.049 0.824 1.098
Self employed 0.048 0.213 0.055 0.227
Monthly gross income 1377 1825 1506 2029
Investments 0.128 0.332 0.140 0.347
Risk aversion 0.059 0.087 0.058 0.088
Time preference 0.076 0.285 0.081 0.297
Fechner error 1.389 0.988 1.392 0.984
Risk stated 3.140 2.228 3.221 2.294
Money patience 3.321 2.493 3.564 2.516
N 1530 2,825
Notes: Means and standard deviations for the first wave of the experiment. The reduced
sample consists of all complete couples and is used when analyzing preferences at the
couple level; The complete sample consists of all individuals, including those whose
partner did not participate in the experiment.
The variables which we consider to be possibly correlated with the variation of risk and
time preferences across time are divided into three categories. The first one is the one related to
satisfaction of personal finances, future expectations of their improvement or worsening and the
general satisfaction with the economic situation of the country. The second category is related
to their employment status, we looked closely at the composition and changes in the occupation
7We will only focus our attention on heterosexual couples since we do not have enough same-sex couples in
our sample.
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of individuals. This is of relevance for policy makers since we are interested in what can be
the effect on preferences of general economic changes and personal impact of own and family
employment changes. Last, we look at the level and changes of stated health status.
The following three questions were used to evaluate the first category:
1. How satisfied are you with your financial situation? from 0 (not at all) to 10
(entirely satisfied)
2. Can you indicate, from 0 to 10, whether your financial situation has gotten
better or worse compared to one year ago? from 0 (much worse) to 10 (much
better)
3. Do you expect your financial situation to get better or worse over the coming
12 months? from 1 (will get much better) to 5 (will get a lot worse)
4. How satisfied are you with the current economic situation in the Netherlands?
0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (entirely satisfied)
In Table 4.2 we show the summary statistics for these variables including those of employ-
ment status and health. We observe that there are some very slight differences in the means
between year 1 and year 2. The mean differences can be seen in column three along with their
standard deviation in column four. Responses regarding satisfaction are expected to vary more
often than those regarding employment since these are subjective valuations. Around 90% of
our sample does not change employment status between our time periods.
Finally, the last factor we took into consideration when evaluating variation of preferences
is the general health status of individuals. We obtain this information from a separate survey
question which asks people to rate their overall health on a scale from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent).
With this background information and the information from their choices in our experiment,
we analyze in the following Section to what extent these preferences are stable between these
two time periods and whether some individual or family shocks have any influence on them.
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Table 4.2: Financial satisfaction and employment status
Variable t1 Std. Dev. t2 Std. Dev. t1− t2 Std. Dev.
Fin situation level 6.754 1.784 6.973 1.600 0.127 1.265
Fin situation change 5.270 1.501 5.477 1.393 0.230 1.544
Expectations future 3.131 0.771 3.086 0.678 -0.056 0.782
Satisfaction country 5.184 1.592 5.632 1.486 0.461 1.349
Paid employment 0.500 0.500 0.443 0.497 -0.024 0.254
Job seeker 0.036 0.187 0.032 0.176 -0.005 0.176
Work disability 0.036 0.186 0.037 0.188 0.000 0.097
Self employed 0.055 0.227 0.049 0.217 0.001 0.099
Pensioned 0.215 0.411 0.283 0.451 0.035 0.188
Housekeeping 0.102 0.302 0.106 0.308 0.000 0.128
Voluntary 0.017 0.129 0.015 0.121 -0.003 0.094
Health 3.067 0.726 3.068 0.730 -0.018 0.590
Notes: Means and standard deviations for the first wave (t1), the second wave (t2), and the change between waves
(t1− t2). Complete unbalanced samples for t1 and t2; complete balanced sample for t1− t2.
4.4 Results
In this Section we present the results. In the first subsection we analyze the correlations between
measures of risk aversion and discounting parameters in both waves, showing to what these
measures are stable over these two time periods. We first analyze these correlations without
controlling for individual characteristics and then control for some socioeconomic variables
such as age and level of education. We also compare these correlations of the experimental
measures with those based upon the stated preference survey questions. In the next subsection,
we analyze at the individual level which type of shocks are related to changes of an individual’s
risk and time preferences. Finally, in the third subsection we present the results of the analysis at
the level of couples, focusing on the effects of shocks affecting one spouse on the preferences of
the other spouse. The first two subsections use the full sample to analyze stability of individual
preferences. In the third subsection we use the smaller sample of complete couples to analyze
the data at the couple level.
4.4.1 Stability of preferences
Before looking at the correlations of our structural model parameters, Figure 4.2 presents some
information directly based upon the raw data: It shows the distribution of the differences in the
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number of risk averse choices and the number of choices with earlier payment for the balanced
sample of all respondents participating in both waves. The left hand panel shows substantial
variation in the individuals’ tendency to make risky choices in both directions: many respon-
dents make fewer and many respondents make more risk averse choices in the second wave.
The same applies to the right hand panel, with many respondents going from early to late pay-
off choices or the reverse.
On average people took 3.494 risk averse choices in the first wave and 3.560 in the second
wave. The average number of earlier payment choices in the first wave is 10.116 and 10.069
in the second. Both differences are not statistically significant. The correlation coefficients
between waves for the number of risk averse choices is 0.334 and 0.196 for the number of
earlier payment. Without a structural model, a standard linear regression of the number of risk
averse choices in the second wave explained by the number of risk averse choices in the first
wave has an R2 = 0.1134. I did not find any correlation between actual payment in the first














−10 −5 0 5 10














−20 −10 0 10 20
differences in number of immediate choices
(b) Present choices
Figure 4.2: Differences in decisions
Using the estimates of the structural model introduced in Section 3.2, the raw data have been
transformed into predictions of individual level parameters for risk aversion (γi), time preference
(ln(ri)) and the tendency to make suboptimal choices (ln()τi)); see equation (7). This was done
separately for the two waves. Table 4.3 shows the means and standard deviations of these
parameter predictions along with the qualitative “stated preference" questions of risk aversion
and time preference. The average risk aversion coefficient increased between waves (p= 0.003).
For time preference and error propensity, the differences in means are not significant.
The correlation coefficients between waves are significantly positive: 0.253 for risk aver-
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sion, 0.171 for the time preference parameters and 0.376 for the error propensity. In compari-
son, the existing literature, depending on the methodology and the study, finds correlations over
time between -0.38 and 0.68 for risk aversion, and between 0.004 to 0.75 for time preference
(Chuang and Schechter, 2015). For the stated preference questions, the correlation coefficients
are larger: 0.573 for risk aversion and 0.650 for the stated time preference index. This is in line
with the findings of (Chuang and Schechter, 2015). It could be interpreted as preferences mea-
sured qualitatively being more stable or less prone to measurement errors than the experimental
ones (even though we accounted for the errors when computing the predictions).
Table 4.3: Structural estimates and stated measures
Variable Mean t1 Std. Dev. Mean t2 Std. Dev.
Experimental measures
Risk aversion 0.058 0.088 0.066 0.107
Time preference 0.081 0.297 0.067 0.240
Error parameter 1.392 0.984 1.360 0.999
Stated preferences
Risk aversion 3.221 2.294 3.478 2.370
Money impatience 3.564 2.516 3.551 2.489
N 2825 2224
Notes: Means and standard deviations for the first (t1) and second (t2) wave. Com-
plete unbalanced panel.
To analyze whether the correlations between waves are due to observed or unobserved char-
acteristics, we estimated random effects panel data models using the data from both waves and
look at the contribution of the individual effects to the total unsystematic variation. The results
are presented in Table 4.10 of the Appendix. As controls we include a wave dummy, dummies
for females, age categories, and education, and the natural logarithm of individual net monthly
income. We obtain the usual result that women are more risk averse on average than men and
less prone to making mistakes (negative τ). Older respondents make more mistakes but do not
have significantly different time or risk parameters compared to younger respondents. Higher
education is associated with more patience and a smaller tendency to make suboptimal choices,
as expected. The association between education and risk aversion is weak and only marginally
significant. Fewer mistakes are made in the second wave than in the first wave, ceteris paribus,
perhaps due to learning. Controlling for the socio-demographic variables we see that the val-
ues ρ are only slightly smaller than raw correlations mentioned previously. This shows that
the explanatory variables do not contribute much to the stability of the three parameters over
time. Only for the tendency to make suboptimal decisions the contribution of the explanatory
variables is non-negligible, due to the important role of education.
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In Figure 4.3 we depict the distributions of differences between both waves for the three
predicted parameters. The histograms are centered at zero with symmetric variation around it.
We observe that they both have approximately the same mean and therefore the difference is


























−4 −2 0 2 4
logtaodif


















−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1
logrdif
(c) Time pref (log)
Figure 4.3: Difference wave 1 - wave 2
Another way of understanding how these measures are changing, is to look at how large the
standard deviations of the individual posterior distributions are. For each person and preference,
we calculated the standard deviation of the individual posterior distributions. Comparing the
correlations between waves of those who have low and high standard deviations, we do not find
significant differences.
A high error propensity (τ) diminishes the importance of other preferences (γ and r) in the
risky lottery tasks. To exploit the information given by τ , we separate those cases where γ
and r are not relevant. Splitting the sample according to the median of this variable, I compute
the correlations between time periods of γ and r. The results show an improvement in the
correlations of risk aversion measures between waves for those subjects with low τ which go
from ργ = 0.25 to ργ = 0.41 (closer to the correlation of the stated parameters). The correlation
between time preference parameters increases from ρr = 0.17 to ρr = 0.19. Intuitively, this was
expected since the less likely individuals are to make mistakes in the valuation of the lotteries,
the more likely their preferences determine choices in both waves.
For both waves, the correlation between risk aversion parameters of the lottery experiments
and the risk aversion from the stated questions is around 0.20, while the correlation between our
two time preference measures is insignificant. Therefore, the stated preferences indexes, even
though they can be useful in explaining real life financial decisions of individuals (Falk et al.,
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2015), do not correlate perfectly with the structural measures of risk aversion and discounting.
Nevertheless, both measures capture risk taking attitudes towards real life financial decisions,
such as investments in risky assets or level of financial wealth.
The correlations between stated and experimental procedures can be negatively affected by
independent measurement errors in each of them. If we take the correlation of stated preferences
as a benchmark (i.e., the maximum correlation that we can observe between responses of the
same people at two different points in time to exactly the same question), we saw that these
were lower than 1 (0.573 for risk aversion). Therefore, a correlation between experimental and
stated measures of risk of 0.20 is high compared to a benchmark 0.573. Similarly, Falk et al.
(2016) compute the correlation between two measurements from the same experiment and use
this test-retest correlation as a benchmark correlation. They find that this test-retest correlation
is substantially lower than 1 (0.3469 for risk taking, 0.6715 for discounting).
According to the literature on stability of preferences, we expected preferences to be stable
over this short time period. Studies which used incentivized experiments have varied the timing
of the experiments from 5-10 weeks (Wölbert and Riedl, 2013) up until 17 months Andersen
et al. (2008). However, there are studies which point to short-term effects of sociodemographic
variables Andersen et al. (2008) on measured preferences and other studies which find no evi-
dence Meier and Sprenger (2015).
Another interesting observation is whether the associations between preferences and covari-
ates are themselves stable over time. For example, associations with gender, age and education
are consistent in the direction of the correlation between time periods. Women are more risk
averse than men in both waves and older people are more likely to make mistakes.
4.4.2 Stability of preferences and individual shocks
Given that we observe a degree of variability in responses between years, we want to study
whether individual shocks to employment, health or expectations lead to changes in preference
measures towards risk and discounting. In particular, Andersen et al. (2008) find that the differ-
ence in risk attitudes can be explained partially by the personal financial state of the respondent.
As explained in Section 4.3.3, we have similar information on the respondents’ financial situa-
tion for a large part of our sample.
We estimated fixed effects models which include several controls describing the respon-
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dents’ financial situation: the stated satisfaction with the own financial situation, the expecta-
tion how this will change in the near future, and satisfaction with the economic situation of the
country. Moreover, we include dummies for different types of occupational status: whether the
person receives a pension, is a job seeker, takes care of the household, is self employed, has
a work disability or performs voluntary work. The base category is paid work. See the data
description in Section 4.3.3.
In Table 4.4 we show the results for the fixed effects model.8 Since we have two periods,
the fixed effects panel estimates are equivalent to OLS in (first) differences. The estimates show
whether a change in any of the individual characteristics can explain a change in the elicited
preference measure.
There are not many significant parameter estimates and they vary between experimental and
stated measures. In the first column we can see that being an active job seeker as opposed to
being employed, is associated with with a decrease in risk aversion. The change in net monthly
income or the changes in subjective perceptions of the financial situation are not significant.
The tendency to make suboptimal choices in column two does not seem to vary with any of
our explanatory variables. With respect to time preferences, we find that satisfaction with the
economic situation of the country is positively associated with the discount rate. This means
that as people become more satisfied with the economy, they also become more impatient.
This could be explained by the fact that if people become less worried about the future they
attach more value to their present consumption. Furthermore, taking up responsibilities as a
homemaker is negatively correlated to the discount rate.
The last two columns of Table 4.4 show the coefficients for the regressions on stated risk
and time attitudes. We find that an improvement in the financial situation is associated with a
decrease in risk aversion and impatience. Health is also negatively related to impatience; an
improvement in health is associated with an increase in patience. Finally, a transition from paid
employment to doing voluntary work seems to have a negative impact on the stated measure of
impatience. After performing a joint F-test of all the variables which are not significant, I cannot
reject the H0. This could be due to lack of small variation in the data. It would be necessary
to expand the time frame between both waves to observe larger changes in these variables and
possibly more significant effects. The overall model is significant after controlling for the level
8In the Appendix Table 4.11 we run the same regressions excluding health; since this variable has a lot of
missing values, excluding it considerably increases the sample size. The qualitative results for the remaining
variables stay the same as in our specification.
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of τ .
We might expect that if risk and time preferences are correlated to each other, a shock that
might affect one of them can also carry over to a change in another attitude. To allow for
this possibility we estimated a SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) model in first differences
where we allow the errors among the two preference equations and the propensity to make
errors to be correlated with each other. This gives the same estimates for the slope coefficients
as Table 4.4 but, in addition, gives an estimated correlation structure of the three error terms,
shown in Table 4.12 of the Appendix. We observe that an (unsystematic) increase in impatience
is associated with a(n unexpected) fall in risk aversion. Moreover, an increase in risk aversion
and a decrease in impatience are both associated with a reduction of the tendency to make
suboptimal decisions.
As mentioned before, the correlation between waves is stronger for those subjects who have
low values of τ in both waves. To make our analysis more robust, we perform a median split
according to the values of τ in our sample. Next, we regress risk aversion and discounting for
these two separate samples. Results are presented in Table 4.5. We find a difference in the
significance of the models themselves, as shown by the F-tests. The models belonging to those
subjects with lower values of τ are significant, while those above the median are not. This is
in line with the idea that if error propensity is too high, we cannot obtain accurate measures of
preferences.
4.4.3 Stability of preferences and couple related externalities
Previous literature has found that preferences of spouses are positively correlated. As a con-
sequence, something that changes the preferences of one spouse may also have an effect on
the other spouse Bacon et al. (2014). In this section we analyze the effects of changes in the
financial situation variables, occupational status, and health status of couples on each others’
preference parameters.
In order to perform this analysis, we match each household member to their respective
spouse9 and obtain a total of 765 couples in which both partners are observed in both waves.
We therefore construct a balanced panel with their respective individual and household level
9We talk about spouses in the text but we make no distinction between couples that have a marriage contract
or a partnership agreement (living together). We ran different regressions with controls such as type of contract
and found no difference between them.
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Table 4.4: Fixed effects models: individual level
fe (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Risk aversion Error Impatience Risk stated Impatience stated
Log income 0.002 -0.048 0.006 -0.010 -0.103*
(0.003) (0.030) (0.009) (0.054) (0.055)
Year 0.006* -0.053 -0.013 -0.138** 0.112*
(0.004) (0.033) (0.010) (0.061) (0.062)
Financial situation -0.000 0.016 -0.002 -0.080* -0.081*
(0.003) (0.026) (0.008) (0.048) (0.049)
Expectations -0.006 0.005 0.009 0.010 -0.013
(0.004) (0.040) (0.013) (0.074) (0.075)
Country satisfaction 0.002 -0.028 0.022*** -0.025 0.007
(0.003) (0.025) (0.008) (0.046) (0.047)
Health -0.000 -0.034 -0.018 -0.011 -0.171*
(0.006) (0.054) (0.017) (0.098) (0.100)
Number of kids -0.013 0.094 -0.009 -0.078 0.107
(0.012) (0.116) (0.036) (0.212) (0.216)
Job seeker -0.042** -0.084 0.016 0.027 -0.032
(0.020) (0.191) (0.060) (0.348) (0.355)
Work disab -0.046 -0.531 0.194 -0.280 -0.065
(0.042) (0.398) (0.125) (0.726) (0.740)
Self employed -0.009 -0.167 0.027 0.290 -0.091
(0.041) (0.385) (0.121) (0.703) (0.716)
Pensioned -0.002 -0.085 0.007 0.176 -0.295
(0.019) (0.182) (0.057) (0.333) (0.339)
Housekeeping 0.021 -0.421 -0.221** 0.047 -0.290
(0.031) (0.294) (0.093) (0.538) (0.548)
Voluntary -0.013 0.068 -0.087 -0.455 1.857**
(0.043) (0.409) (0.129) (0.747) (0.761)
Constant 0.059 1.968*** 0.000 7.666*** 5.056***
(0.041) (0.383) (0.120) (0.700) (0.713)
Observations 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658 2,658
R-squared 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.010 0.016
Number of nomem_encr 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 2,302
Notes: riskpost, riskstated: experimental and stated measures for risk aversion; logrpost, moneypat: experimental and stated
measures for impatience; logtaopost: experimental measure for tendency to make suboptimal choices. Estimates use the com-
plete balanced panel of all individuals. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
variables (i.e., number of kids living at home).
Table 4.6 shows the results of the fixed effects models of preferences with the spouse’s and
own covariates as explanatory variables. The main goal of these regressions is to see whether
changes in any of these variables or shocks have a cross-spousal effect on an individual’s pref-
erences. These cross-spousal effects are the effects of the female’s covariates on the man’s pref-
erences (covariates starting with p in columns (1) and (3)) and the effects of the male variables
(not starting with p) on the women’s preferences (columns (2) and (4)). Most cross-spouse vari-
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Table 4.5: Fixed effects model: median split (according to τ)
FE (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risk aversion Discounting Risk aversion Discounting
Log income -0.003 0.010*** -0.001 0.006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019)
Year 0.013*** -0.007** -0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.022)
Financial situation 0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.017)
Expectations -0.001 0.002 -0.016** 0.038
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.030)
Country satisfaction 0.005 0.006** 0.006 0.023
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.016)
Health -0.014** -0.006 -0.002 -0.055
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.037)
Number of kids -0.010 0.000 -0.047** -0.001
(0.015) (0.012) (0.020) (0.087)
Job seeker -0.061*** 0.031** -0.027 0.065
(0.021) (0.016) (0.035) (0.156)
Work disab -0.026 0.164*** -0.149* -0.408
(0.052) (0.039) (0.079) (0.351)
Self employed -0.018 0.016 -0.038 0.096
(0.049) (0.037) (0.055) (0.245)
Pensioned -0.034 0.000 -0.034 0.049
(0.023) (0.017) (0.031) (0.137)
Housekeep -0.017 -0.207*** -0.091* 0.144
(0.041) (0.031) (0.051) (0.226)
Voluntary -0.065 -0.077* 0.009 0.094
(0.054) (0.041) (0.075) (0.333)
Constant 0.117** -0.056 0.125** -0.013
(0.052) (0.040) (0.056) (0.249)
F-test 2.54*** 11.93*** 0.53 0.69
Observations 988 988 1,057 1,057
R-squared 0.083 0.283 0.043 0.020
Number of idnum 582 582 600 600
Notes: riskpost, riskstated: experimental and stated measures for risk aversion; logrpost, moneypat:
experimental and stated measures for impatience. First two columns use observations of those individuals
with τ below the median. Last two columns use observations of those individuals with τ above the
median. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ables do not appear to be significant, except for unemployment due to work disability of wives
(related to risk and time preference of husbands) and financial satisfaction of husbands (related
to error propensity of wives).
Perhaps surprisingly we find that it is the women’s unemployment status which causes the
cross-effects towards mens’ attitudes. The effect of unemployment of women due to work
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disability is correlated with an increase of risk aversion and impatience of their husbands. This
could be a complementarity due to the fact that now that one spouse is out of the labour market,
the couple has more time to consume in the present, and impatience increases. Another possible
interpretation is that due to a negative household shock, spouses concentrate their efforts more
on their present situation compared to those households that do not suffer such a shock (and can
afford to be more forward looking).
We find no significant cross-spousal effects of men towards women except for the women’s
error propensity which is negatively correlated to the financial satisfaction of men.
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
In order to study the changes in elicited and stated risk and time preferences, we performed two
experiments at two different points in time with a large representative sample of adult couples
in the Netherlands. The experimental data were used to estimate, for each wave separately, a
random coefficients model with individual level parameters of risk aversion (the curvature of
the utility function) and time preference (a discount rate), as well as an individual specific ten-
dency to make suboptimal decisions (the standard deviation of the Fechner error). We used the
model estimates and the data to predict individual preferences and error tendencies. These three
individual level predictions for the two waves were the basis for most of our further analysis.
We first analyzed whether choices in both experiments differed and found that there is vari-
ability in the raw choice data. However, the cross-section distribution of the three structural pa-
rameters hardly differs between the two. We found positive correlations of preferences between
waves of around 0.253 for the risk aversion parameter, 0.171 for the time preference param-
eter and and 0.376 for the error propensity. These correlations are lower than those of stated
preferences elicited using simple ordered response survey questions, which are 0.57 and 0.64
respectively. When we divide the sample according to the median value of the error propensity
parameter, we observe that correlations of both, risk and time preferences, increase between
waves. To be able to capture changes in preferences, it is essential for future research to con-
sider the variability due to measurement error of the elicitation procedures.
The average risk aversion measured with the experiment increased slightly from the first
wave to the second. One possibility might be related to with seasonality effects. The exper-
iments took place in May and November. According Kamstra et al. (2017), people might be
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Table 4.6: Fixed effects models: couple analysis
fe (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
riskpost_ priskpost_ logtaopost_ plogtaopost_ logrpost_ plogrpost_
year 0.006 0.004 -0.130** -0.045 -0.016 -0.021
(0.007) (0.007) (0.061) (0.061) (0.018) (0.023)
loginc_ 0.007 0.011 -0.036 -0.023 -0.014 -0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.080) (0.081) (0.023) (0.030)
health_ 0.013 0.003 -0.026 -0.000 -0.036 0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.094) (0.094) (0.027) (0.035)
fin_sit_level_ -0.005 0.007 0.067 -0.107** 0.014 -0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.048) (0.048) (0.014) (0.018)
expectations_ -0.003 -0.002 -0.027 -0.027 -0.016 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.084) (0.084) (0.024) (0.031)
satiscountry_ 0.005 0.007 -0.048 0.025 0.015 0.024
(0.005) (0.005) (0.044) (0.044) (0.013) (0.017)
jobseeker_ -0.046 -0.008 0.136 -0.061 -0.071 -0.013
(0.036) (0.037) (0.338) (0.338) (0.097) (0.127)
selfemployed_ 0.011 -0.003 -0.710 -0.735 0.035 0.006
(0.075) (0.076) (0.696) (0.698) (0.200) (0.261)
workdisab_ -0.041 -0.017 -0.428 -0.401 -0.247 0.024
(0.068) (0.069) (0.631) (0.632) (0.181) (0.237)
pensioned_ 0.023 -0.014 -0.334 0.196 0.009 0.040
(0.043) (0.044) (0.401) (0.402) (0.115) (0.150)
housekeeping_ -0.010 -0.011 0.397 1.435 0.067 0.129
(0.103) (0.104) (0.951) (0.953) (0.273) (0.357)
voluntary -0.019 0.063 -0.176 -0.479 0.031 -0.062
(0.096) (0.097) (0.888) (0.889) (0.255) (0.333)
ploginc_ 0.000 0.003 0.030 -0.072* 0.006 0.026*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.040) (0.040) (0.011) (0.015)
phealth_ -0.014 -0.031*** 0.047 0.160* 0.032 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.092) (0.093) (0.027) (0.035)
pfin_sit_level_ -0.000 -0.000 0.006 0.039 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.048) (0.048) (0.014) (0.018)
pexpectations_ -0.007 -0.015* 0.086 0.166** 0.014 0.017
(0.009) (0.009) (0.083) (0.083) (0.024) (0.031)
psatiscountry_ -0.004 0.000 -0.020 0.025 0.002 0.016
(0.005) (0.005) (0.043) (0.043) (0.012) (0.016)
pjobseeker_ 0.056 -0.039 -0.254 -0.311 0.035 0.158
(0.040) (0.041) (0.373) (0.373) (0.107) (0.140)
pselfemployed_ -0.034 0.104 0.394 -0.791 0.028 0.148
(0.089) (0.089) (0.819) (0.821) (0.235) (0.308)
pworkdisab_ 0.106* -0.074 -1.115** -0.435 0.403** 0.524**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.544) (0.545) (0.156) (0.204)
ppensioned_ 0.006 -0.025 0.248 -0.012 0.060 0.008
(0.030) (0.031) (0.282) (0.282) (0.081) (0.106)
phousekeeping_ 0.007 0.027 0.191 -0.641* -0.034 -0.188
(0.041) (0.041) (0.377) (0.378) (0.108) (0.142)
pvoluntary 0.020 0.007 -0.204 -0.172 0.026 -0.096
(0.056) (0.056) (0.514) (0.515) (0.147) (0.193)
Constant 0.034 0.023 1.457 1.499 -0.063 -0.229
(0.114) (0.115) (1.058) (1.060) (0.304) (0.397)
Observations 888 888 888 888 888 888
R-squared 0.040 0.070 0.050 0.054 0.047 0.055
Number of nohouse_encr 444 444 444 444 444 444
Notes: riskpost, logrpost, logtaopost: experimental measures for risk aversion, impatience and the tendency to
make suboptimal choices for men; Same p-variables: same experimental measures for women. Estimates use the
balanced panel of complete couples. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
98
Stability of Risk and Time Preferences of Individuals and Couples
willing to take more risks in the spring and prefer safer investments in autumn. Their research is
built upon studies on investment behavior in mutual funds, and is related to mood and environ-
mental changes due to shorter days during autumn (which are strongly related to depression).
The changes in observed preference measures may be due to changes related to life events
(e.g. health shocks or unemployment). To explore whether and how such events could ex-
plain variability in preferences, we estimated fixed effects models with the preference measures
as dependent variables. We constructed three equations (for risk, time preferences and error
propensity) for the parameters constructed from the incentivised experiment and two equations
for stated preferences. The significant associations between changes in risk aversion are not
the same as those which affect time preference, but also between measures based upon the
experiment and stated preference measures based upon survey questions.
We found that having a higher level of satisfaction with the economic situation of the country
is a significant predictor of a change in the discount rate. People who become more satisfied
also get more impatient. This could reveal a precautionary savings motive; if people expect
difficulties due to a worsening economy, they may be less inclined to prefer present consumption
over savings. Our results in this respect might be sensitive to the timing of the survey waves,
during the recovery of the economy after the 2008 financial and economic crisis.
We find that an improvement in health is associated with an increase in stated patience,
which is in line with the literature on health habits and economic preferences. Health changes
are not significantly associated with changes in the experimental measure of risk and time pref-
erence. Moreover, our stated and experimental measures of time preference are not significantly
correlated to each other and therefore seem to capture different dimensions of discounting. The
stated question is framed as impatience or impulsiveness with respect to spending, while the
experimental variable is a discount rate of future income. Our finding thus implies that health-
ier people are less impulsive with respect to their spending, in line with literature that explores
health outcomes in relation to economic preferences (Becker et al. (2012), Fuchs (1982), Falk
et al. (2015)). We do not observe any cross-spousal effects with respect to changes in health
status.
Understanding how employment affects risk and time preferences and, accordingly, eco-
nomic decisions, can be an important factor when designing policies towards the unemployed
population. For example, Pannenberg (2010) finds a negative correlation between subjects risk
aversion and reservation wages. If reservation wages of risk averse individuals are lower, then
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these individuals are less likely to be in long unemployment spells (Feinberg, 1977). Using
the experimental measure of risk aversion, we found that respondents who lost their jobs and
are actively looking for employment become less risk averse on average. According to job
matching theories, these subjects, given their higher reservation wages, should last longer in
an unemployment spell. The stated measure of risk taking did not seem to be affected by any
changes in the employment status of the individuals (only weakly correlated to their financial
situation).
People who become a homemaker tend to become less impatient. A person with a lower
discount rate might be expected to work more and sacrifice current leisure in order to consume
more in the future, but we see that the association goes in the opposite direction: becoming a
homemaker leads to more forward looking behavior. The mechanism could be that becoming a
homemaker reduces future income prospects, making people less eager to spend money in the
present – they want to secure consumption in the future. It is worth noting that transitions into
different types of non-employment have different effects; it matters whether non-employment
is "voluntary" or due to a negative shock (such as work disability).
In summary, through the positive correlation between waves we observe a limited degree
of stability of preferences. A higher correlation is observed in the stated questions, which is
expected because these questions are less difficult and therefore less affected by idiosyncratic
measurement errors. Nevertheless, we do observe that some individual shocks to labor or eco-
nomic situation are significantly correlated to some of the variability in risk and time prefer-
ences. Also, we find that shocks to employment do have cross-couple effects, specifically for
those losing their jobs because of work disability. We find that shocks affecting one member of
the household (in this case a spouse) can have spill-over effects towards the behavior of another
member. The stronger effect is on time preferences, where people with an adverse shock (or
shock from their spouses) tend to discount the future more, focusing more on current utility.
Appendix
The lottery experiment consisted of four treatments in the gains domain with five choices in
each treatment in the first wave and five treatments in the gains domain in the second wave. In
each treatment each individual had to decide between two lotteries which varied in probability
throughout the treatment but do not vary in payoffs. The lottery A had a lower variance than
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lottery B and the expected payoff became larger as one proceeded down the list. Each screen
contained five choices and pie charts illustrating the probabilities. Thus each subject has to
choose in total 20 times in the first year and 25 times in the second year. These choices were
used to estimate their preferences. We added five choices to wave 2 in order obtain more
accurate estimates, this new treatment consisted of both choices delivering immediate payment.
The treatments differed in terms of the amounts in euros that could be earned, and in terms
of the time periods in which these payments would take place. Table 4.7 shows the experimental
design in more detail (the probabilities and quantities used to elicit preferences) of wave 1. This
table also shows the expected value of each lottery and which choice a risk neutral individual
would take. The subject chooses A or B in each row and one of these is at the end selected at
random for actual payment. We told the subjects at the beginning of the experiment that they
had a 1/10 probability of getting paid. The average payoffs were 13.4 euros with a standard
deviation of approximately 7 euros.
In Figure 3.4 of Chapter 3 we present an example of a screen that subjects faced during one
of the treatments, the same format and procedure was implemented in both waves.
We designed the choice lists with enough variation in its different dimensions such that we
would be able to identify individual preferences. Before taking the experiment to the field, we
ran simulations assuming a structural form of the utility function and parameters to ensure the
identifiability of the preference parameters.
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Table 4.7: Details of the experimental design
Treatment pA $Ah pA $Al EVA pB $Bh pB $Bl EVB EVA-EVB
Timing 6 months 3 months
I 0.15 11 0.85 9 9.3 0.15 23 0.85 0 3.45 5.85
0.3 11 0.7 9 9.6 0.3 23 0.7 0 6.9 2.7
0.5 11 0.5 9 10 0.5 23 0.5 0 11.5 -1.5
0.85 11 0.15 9 10.7 0.85 23 0.15 0 19.55 -8.85
1 11 0 9 11 1 23 0 0 23 -12
Timing 9 months 6 months
II 0.15 15 0.85 10 10.75 0.15 29 0.85 4 7.75 3
0.3 15 0.7 10 11.5 0.3 29 0.7 4 11.5 0
0.5 15 0.5 10 12.5 0.5 29 0.5 4 16.5 -4
0.85 15 0.15 10 14.25 0.85 29 0.15 4 25.25 -11
1 15 0 10 15 1 29 0 4 29 -14
Timing 3 months 0 months
III 0.15 20 0.85 15 15.75 0.15 25 0.85 2 5.45 10.3
0.3 20 0.7 15 16.5 0.3 25 0.7 2 8.9 7.6
0.5 20 0.5 15 17.5 0.5 25 0.5 2 13.5 4
0.85 20 0.15 15 19.25 0.85 25 0.15 2 21.55 -2.3
1 20 0 15 20 1 25 0 2 25 -5
Timing 3 months 6 months
IV 0.15 12 0.85 7 7.75 0.15 22 0.85 0 3.3 4.45
0.3 12 0.7 7 8.5 0.3 22 0.7 0 6.6 1.9
0.5 12 0.5 7 9.5 0.5 22 0.5 0 11 -1.5
0.85 12 0.15 7 11.25 0.85 22 0.15 0 18.7 -7.45
1 12 0 7 12 1 22 0 0 22 -10
Notes: Each treatment consisted of five possible choices. PA,B are the probabilities of choice A,B
with high and low payoff. EVA: Expected value of option A; EVB: Expected value of option B.
The last column shows the difference between EVA and EVB.
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Table 4.8: Summary statistics wave 1
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Female 0.501 0.500 0 1 2,825
Age 52.041 14.935 18 91 2,825
Level of educ 3.686 1.464 1 6 2,825
High educ 0.345 0.476 0 1 2,825
Married 0.804 0.397 0 1 2,825
Number of kids 0.824 1.098 0 6 2,825
Civil servant 0.007 0.082 0 1 2,778
Self employed 0.055 0.227 0 1 2,825
Monthly gross income 2201.722 1918.725 0 53000 2,682
Investments 0.140 0.347 0 1 2,534
Financial wealth 17627.780 46364.560 -90000 700000 2,534
Total wealth 17671.430 76099.510 -940000 1300000 2,530
Risk stated 3.221 2.294 0 10 2,825
Money patience 3.564 2.516 0 10 2,825
Risk aversion exper 0.058 0.088 -0.218 0.276 2825
Time preference exper 0.081 0.297 0.000 2.330 2825
Error parameter exp 1.392 0.984 0.075 4.184 2825
Notes: Means and standard deviations for the first wave of the experiment.
Table 4.9: Summary statistics wave 2
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Female 0.499 0.500 0 1 2,224
Age 55.674 14.413 20 93 2,224
Level of educ 3.667 1.476 1 6 2,224
High educ 0.352 0.478 0 1 2,224
Married 0.845 0.362 0 1 2,224
Number of kids 0.732 1.063 0 6 2,224
Civil servant 0.006 0.080 0 1 2,188
Self employed 0.049 0.217 0 1 2,224
Monthly gross income 2190.910 1601.783 0 13500 2,109
Investments 0.144 0.351 0 1 2,138
Financial wealth 18555.330 47948.200 -210936 700000 2,138
Total wealth 19061.140 85549.750 -940000 1300000 2,136
Risk stated 3.478 2.370 0 10 2,224
Money patience 3.551 2.489 0 10 2,224
Risk aversion exper 0.066 0.107 -0.235 0.328 2224
Time preference exper 0.067 0.240 0.000 2.668 2224
Error parameter exp 1.360 0.999 0.055 4.770 2224
Notes: Means and standard deviations for the first wave of the experiment.
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Table 4.10: Random effects: individual level
(1) (2) (3)
riskpost_ logtaopost_ logrpost_
female_ 0.027*** -0.101*** 0.005
(0.003) (0.034) (0.009)
Age: 25 -34 -0.007 0.252** 0.016
(0.013) (0.125) (0.035)
35 - 44 -0.003 0.303** 0.015
(0.012) (0.124) (0.034)
45 - 54 -0.001 0.322*** 0.023
(0.012) (0.124) (0.034)
55 - 64 0.004 0.411*** 0.047
(0.012) (0.123) (0.034)
64 + -0.000 0.635*** 0.054
(0.012) (0.124) (0.034)
loginc_ -0.000 -0.011 -0.003
(0.001) (0.008) (0.002)
Education: Intermed Voc Ed -0.003 -0.168*** -0.058***
(0.004) (0.041) (0.011)
Higher Voc Ed -0.007* -0.356*** -0.084***
(0.004) (0.041) (0.011)
University -0.007 -0.517*** -0.092***
(0.006) (0.057) (0.015)
year 0.006** -0.070*** -0.013*
(0.003) (0.024) (0.007)
Constant 0.042*** 1.370*** 0.121***
(0.014) (0.136) (0.038)
rho 0.238 0.330 0.158
0.021 0.020 0.024
Observations 4,791 4,791 4,791
Number of nomem_encr 2,873 2,873 2,873
Notes: riskpost: experimental measure for risk aversion; logrpost:
experimental measures for impatience; logtaopost: experimental
measure for tendency to make suboptimal choices. Estimates use
the complete sample for which we have information on age, income
and level of education. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.11: Fixed effects without health index: individual level
fe (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
riskpost_ logtaopost_ logrpost_ riskstated_ moneypat_
loginc_ -0.001 -0.018 0.007 -0.017 -0.055
(0.003) (0.025) (0.008) (0.049) (0.048)
year 0.006* -0.043 -0.013 -0.221*** 0.177***
(0.003) (0.030) (0.009) (0.057) (0.056)
fin_sit_level_ -0.000 0.010 0.001 -0.046 -0.053
(0.002) (0.023) (0.007) (0.045) (0.044)
expectations_ -0.003 0.010 0.010 0.045 0.027
(0.004) (0.035) (0.011) (0.068) (0.067)
satiscountry_ 0.002 -0.017 0.018*** -0.018 0.009
(0.002) (0.022) (0.007) (0.042) (0.041)
numkids_ -0.014 0.030 -0.000 -0.133 0.181
(0.011) (0.100) (0.031) (0.194) (0.189)
jobseeker_ -0.036** -0.077 -0.000 0.122 -0.029
(0.018) (0.167) (0.051) (0.322) (0.314)
workdisab_ -0.064 -0.396 0.174 -0.195 0.166
(0.040) (0.370) (0.113) (0.715) (0.698)
selfemployed_ -0.012 0.251 -0.130 0.480 -0.273
(0.032) (0.302) (0.092) (0.584) (0.570)
pensioned_ -0.004 -0.046 0.001 0.142 -0.335
(0.017) (0.163) (0.050) (0.315) (0.307)
housekeeping_ 0.013 -0.429* -0.160** -0.115 -0.186
(0.027) (0.253) (0.077) (0.489) (0.478)
voluntary_ -0.023 0.125 -0.062 -0.260 1.361**
(0.039) (0.360) (0.110) (0.695) (0.679)
Constant 0.076** 1.596*** -0.073 7.453*** 3.778***
(0.031) (0.291) (0.089) (0.563) (0.550)
Observations 3184 3184 3184 3184 3184
R-squared 0.011 0.006 0.014 0.014 0.013
Number of individuals 1592 1592 1592 1592 1592
Notes: riskpost, riskstated: experimental and stated measures for risk aversion; logrpost, mon-
eypat: experimental and stated measures for impatience; logtaopost: experimental measure
for tendency to make suboptimal choices. Estimates use the complete balanced panel of all
individuals. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.






ρr -0.188 0.133 1
Notes: Experimental measures
of risk aversion (γ), time prefer-
ence (ln(r)) and suboptimal de-
cision making (ln(τ)) resulting
from SUR model.
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Table 4.13: Fixed effects models: couple analysis
fe (1) (2) (3) (4)
riskstated_ priskstated_ moneypat_ pmoneypat_
year 0.429*** -0.044 0.232** -0.018
(0.112) (0.115) (0.112) (0.116)
loginc_ 0.074 0.213 0.210 0.142
(0.148) (0.151) (0.147) (0.153)
health_ 0.053 0.041 0.253 -0.114
(0.173) (0.177) (0.173) (0.179)
fin_sit_level_ -0.052 -0.202** -0.109 0.098
(0.088) (0.090) (0.088) (0.091)
expectations_ -0.043 -0.031 0.147 0.021
(0.154) (0.158) (0.153) (0.159)
satiscountry_ -0.091 0.052 -0.115 0.019
(0.081) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084)
jobseeker_ 0.097 0.096 0.391 0.400
(0.619) (0.635) (0.618) (0.641)
selfemployed_ -0.455 -0.300 0.750 -0.745
(1.277) (1.309) (1.275) (1.322)
workdisab_ 0.145 -0.646 0.666 -1.638
(1.157) (1.187) (1.156) (1.198)
pensioned_ 0.561 0.086 0.478 0.110
(0.735) (0.754) (0.734) (0.761)
housekeeping_ 3.058* 1.033 1.677 -0.037
(1.745) (1.789) (1.743) (1.806)
voluntary 1.955 1.328 5.866*** -0.859
(1.628) (1.669) (1.626) (1.685)
ploginc_ -0.020 -0.004 -0.076 -0.222***
(0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.076)
phealth_ -0.147 0.222 -0.268 -0.052
(0.169) (0.174) (0.169) (0.175)
pfin_sit_level_ 0.015 0.107 -0.182** 0.020
(0.088) (0.090) (0.088) (0.091)
pexpectations_ 0.314** 0.170 0.206 0.027
(0.152) (0.156) (0.152) (0.157)
psatiscountry_ 0.114 0.165** 0.029 0.138*
(0.079) (0.081) (0.079) (0.082)
pjobseeker_ -0.144 0.361 0.272 0.195
(0.683) (0.701) (0.683) (0.707)
pselfemployed_ -0.212 0.305 -1.620 -0.802
(1.503) (1.541) (1.501) (1.555)
pworkdisab_ -0.368 0.788 1.771* -0.353
(0.998) (1.024) (0.997) (1.033)
ppensioned_ -0.759 -0.255 0.031 -0.552
(0.517) (0.530) (0.516) (0.535)
phousekeeping_ 0.077 -0.355 -0.895 -0.710
(0.692) (0.709) (0.691) (0.716)
pvoluntary 1.476 0.284 0.363 0.586
(0.942) (0.966) (0.941) (0.975)
Constant 2.161 -0.537 2.917 2.630
(1.941) (1.990) (1.939) (2.009)
Observations 888 888 888 888
R-squared 0.077 0.042 0.096 0.054
Number of nohouse_encr 444 444 444 444
Notes: riskstated, moneypat: stated measures for risk aversion and impatience for men. P-
variables: same stated measures for women. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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5 | Does having a higher socioeconomic
status pay off in reciprocal relations?
5.1 Introduction
Ethnic minority groups are often discriminated against in the labor market, housing market, or
in different types of services. For instance, discrimination in the job market has been studied
by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), who showed that for people with the same skills on a
resume, call-back rates for African-American profiles were lower than those for white ones.
Evidence of discrimination in the housing market, transport, or trade is presented by Ge et al.
(2016), Edelman et al. (2015) and Hanson and Hawley (2011) who showed the existence of dis-
crimination in sharing platforms such as Uber, Airbnb and Craigslist. They found that there was
a tendency to infer from users’ profiles (either names or pictures) whether they were African-
American, and this lead to a higher rate of cancellations and rejections of their services. In a
more recent study, Cettolin and Suetens (2016) found that Dutch natives reciprocate trust of a
non-native trustor less frequently than that of a native trustor, suggesting discrimination.
Ethnicity has been found to be correlated to the socioeconomic status (SES) of an individual
or group (Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Williams, 1999).1 SES refers to the ranking of an individual
or group in a given society (Weiss and Fershtman, 1998). A recent study has found that SES
is a powerful predictor of many facets of a child’s economic preferences and IQ, which could
lead to social immobility (Deckers et al., 2015). It is difficult to infer from the above-mentioned
1For instance, Fryer and Levitt show that first names signal socioeconomic status amongst Blacks born after
the 1970’s.
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papers on ethnic discrimination whether ethnicity or SES is the source of the discrimination. In
this paper we solve the identification problem by focusing solely on role of SES, ruling out the
scope for ethnic discrimination.
We study whether people exhibit different levels of trust or reciprocity depending on the
level of SES of their counterparts. We focus our attention on a sample of native Dutch individu-
als. Trust and trustworthiness are components of social capital (Falk and Zehnder, 2013; Loury,
1977; James S, 1990; Putnam, 2000), which in turn is related to economic success. Societies
with high levels of trust have to spend less resources on ensuring their economic transactions or
protecting their property. It has also been shown that societies with low levels of social capital
receive lower returns to education and thus potentially discourage innovation (Arrow, 1972;
Knack and Keefer, 1997).
We use data of a trust game experiment performed on the LISS panel by Cettolin and Suetens
(2016). The LISS Panel is an ongoing panel covering the adult Dutch population, including
those without internet (Scherpenzeel, 2011).2 The main feature of the experiment was the
revelation of the first names of participants to their counterparts. Hence, trustors as well as
trustees were aware of the name of the person with whom they were matched. We elicited
perceived SES related to the first names from a sample which was also drawn from the LISS
panel but did not include participants of the experiment. We asked participants to rate a list
of names on a five-point scale, from low SES to high SES. With these ratings, we constructed
an index per name by computing the average SES given to each name. Even though SES is
a subjective measure inferred by names, the index turns out to be correlated with observed
background characteristics which are considered important for defining status (e.g., level of
education and income). We analyze whether the SES of the matched participant or differences
in SES between them are relevant for explaining the decision to trust or to reciprocate.
We find that the choice to trust or reciprocate is not influenced by the SES of the matched
participant. However, we find an effect of the participants’ own level of SES as well as the
distance in SES between players on the reciprocation rate. That is, trustees with a high SES, or
trustees whose SES is very different from that of the matched trustor, tend to reciprocate more
often. We find no such effects on trust decisions.
Our research is related to the literature which studies the effects of SES on economic be-
havior. One of the first experimental studies with variation in status by Ball and Eckel (1998),
2See https://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/.
108
Does having a higher socioeconomic status pay off in reciprocal relations?
shows that higher status individuals earn more in economic experiments. Consequently, other
studies have examined different mechanisms through which status has an effect on economic
outcomes. For example, Eckel and Wilson (2007) and Ball et al. (2001) show higher coor-
dination rates in an experiment when agents have a high status. Moreover, participants with
high status earn higher payoffs in a market setting (even when this higher status is randomly
assigned). These findings show that individuals (and groups) attach large importance to these
status rankings even when these differences are artificially assigned. Another experiment car-
ried out outside the laboratory is, for example, Falk and Zehnder (2013) who study whether
socioeconomic status can explain why people discriminate in a trust game. They find that peo-
ple participating in a trust game could predict well the trustworthiness of participants living in
high SES areas. Subjects had knowledge of the neighborhood of residence of participants and
could infer SES correctly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we present the design of
the trust game and the SES elicitation method along with the data description. Section 5.3
presents the results of our analysis on trust and reciprocity. Finally, Section 5.4 summarizes and
concludes.
5.2 The trust game and SES: The data
The trust game
Trust and trustworthiness are related to each other but describe the behavior of two different
roles in a given transaction. Trust is exercised by an agent who decides to, for example, transfer
money to another with some expectations of future returns. This decision has some inherent
risk of potential losses due to the possible defection of the receiving agent. Trustworthiness de-
scribes the behavior of the recipient who decides whether to reciprocate; by doing so, increasing
the returns of the trustor.
We use data elicited by Cettolin and Suetens (2016) from a trust game experiment. To
separate possible effects of ethnicity from socioeconomic status, we focus on those treatments
where natives are matched to other natives. We are able to do this since there is enough variation
in the SES of the native participants to be able to identify a possible effect.
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Figure 5.1: Decision tree
Note: Figure 1 taken from Suetens and Cettolin (2016) which displays the format shown to the
participants of the experiment.
The structure of the trust game is described as follows3. Trustors had to choose between
IN and OUT in the three binary trust games where the payoff for OUT was (35,35) in each of
these three treatments. If IN was chosen, the payoff depended on what the trustee chose as an
action. The trustees played three binary trust games where the payoffs from reciprocating are
described by vector x = [(40,40),(60,60),(80,80)]′. If the trustee defected and decided not to
reciprocate, the payoffs were (20,85) in each of the three treatments. Trustees had to decide
their strategy for each game independent of the actions of the trustor. In the final phase of the
experiment, subjects were matched and payments were realized and distributed to their LISS
accounts. Figure 5.1 shows the structure of the game as a decision tree. In the experiment,
subjects had expected earnings between e12 and e21.75 per hour. The approximate duration
of the experiment was ten minutes. The participants additionally received a participation fee of
e1.50.
Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics for trustors and trustees separately. Both groups are
similar in their background characteristics which is as expected given that the roles were ran-
domly allocated. We also show the summary statistics of their trust and reciprocity decisions
for each game, t j and v j, with j = 1,2,3 . We observe differences in the trust and reciprocation
rate depending on the size of the gains from mutual cooperation. For example, if the gains from
cooperation were highest, around 61.7% decided to trust and 65.3% to reciprocate, while if they
were lowest 45.1% and 58.9% trusted and reciprocated respectively. The difference between
3The instructions to the trust experiment as shown to participants, are included in the Appendix.
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cooperation in low versus high mutual gains are highly significant for trust decisions (t-test,
p < 0.01) and weakly significant for reciprocity ones (t-test, p = 0.0501).
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of participants of the trust game
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trustors
Male 326 51%
Age 326 50.620 17.208 16 87
Number of kids 326 0.776 1.105 0 6
Monthly gross income 315 2212.934 1528.407 0 10000
Education level 325 3.846 1.451 1 6
Self employed 326 0.028 0.164 0 1
Pensioned 326 0.242 0.429 0 1
Trust
t1 326 0.451 0.498 0 1
t2 326 0.515 0.501 0 1
t3 326 0.617 0.487 0 1
Trustees
Male 329 49%
Age 329 52.033 17.209 17 88
Number of kids 329 0.641 0.956 0 4
Monthly gross income 306 2314.822 1710.182 0 12674
Education level 329 3.605 1.535 1 6
Self employed 329 0.049 0.215 0 1
Pensioned 329 0.243 0.430 0 1
Reciprocity
v1 329 0.593 0.492 0 1
v2 329 0.617 0.487 0 1
v3 329 0.653 0.477 0 1
Notes: The first panel shows descriptive statistics of the first player (player A/trustor), in-
cluding mean and standard deviation of their decisions to trust in each game. The second
panel shows descriptive statistics of the second player (player B/trustee), including mean and
standard deviation of their decisions to reciprocate in each game.
The game was elicited using the strategy method which is particularly suitable for situations
in which subjects cannot play a game in real time (Selten, 1967; Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993;
Brandts and Charness, 2011). Matching of A and B players, was done by the experimenter
ahead of time. Hence, the names of each pair were common knowledge for both parties. This is
ensured for every pair. Given that this was an Internet experiment, subjects did not have direct
contact with each other.
The experiment was carried out in the LISS panel (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the
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Social sciences) administered by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). The total
sample for the trust experiment consisted of 691 trustees, from which 329 trustees were matched
to native trustors. The elicitation was carried out in two separate waves. The first wave when
trustees had to submit their choices in December 2014, and the second wave in March 2015
when matched trustors had to submit their choices. Both names were common knowledge for
both trustors and trustees.
Socioeconomic status
Socioeconomic status refers to the relative rank or position of an individual or group in society.
The literature on the measurement of SES refers to a variety of determinants which can be
measured objectively or through self-reported assessments. The determinants of SES which can
be measured objectively, can range from characteristics such as the level of education, wealth
and occupation prestige, to the family characteristics, i.e., parents’ level of education (Fryer and
Levitt, 2004; Glaeser et al., 2000; Trautmann et al., 2013; Piff et al., 2012). A popular subjective
measure in the psychology literature, is given by the self-reported position on a ladder which
represents where people stand in society (Adler et al., 2000).
In this study, we elicit perceptions of SES according to names. To elicit perceptions, we
defined SES as: the ranking or position that individuals have in a given society.4
We designed a survey questionnaire in which we asked participants to rate the perceived






4We follow the definition of Weiss and Fershtman (1998)
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In total, we created 15 mutually exclusive lists of 52-55 names each. Each person worked on
one list only. Participants were compensated according to an hourly rate set by LISS panel for
the participation in regular surveys. The hourly rate was 15 euro and participants in the median
duration of the experiment was around 4 minutes, which translates into a participation payoff
of e1. More details and explicit instructions as used in the survey questionnaire translated to
English are included in the Appendix.
We calculated the perceived SES indices based on the mean of the scores assigned by in-
dividuals to each name. The average number of ratings per name was 29 with a standard de-
viation of approximately 6 (see Table 5.2). As mentioned in the previous section, first names
are assumed to reflect socioeconomic characteristics of an individual. Therefore, to test this as-
sumption, we first tested the hypothesis that these average ratings are correlated to background
characteristics which the literature has shown to be associated to SES, such as income or level
of education. For this purpose, we matched SES to the names of the participants of the trust
game and studied the relationship between SES, trust and reciprocity. Allowing for an external
group (to the experimental trust game) to rate perceived SES can mitigate the problem of self-
assessment bias which would be introduced if we asked subjects who participate in the trust
game to rate themselves.
The survey was also carried out in the LISS panel. We selected 572 household members to
participate in the survey and had a 76.9% response rate. In total 440 people participated and 4
people out of this sample did not complete the whole questionnaire. We have information on
the background characteristics of those individuals who are rating the names. Table 5.8 in the
Appendix, shows these characteristics.
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of the indices of perceived SES. The average SES level was
3.183 with standard deviation of 0.272. To check whether the scale is internally consistent, i.e.
the items are capturing the same dimensions through our scale, we calculated Cronbach’s alpha
(Cronbach, 1951) for each list of names. We find that our scale is highly internally consistent
with an average alpha across the lists of 0.805 for the 15 lists and 440 raters in total. A summary
of the main characteristics of our elicitation results is shown in Table 5.2.
An example of the types of names and their index of perceived SES is shown in Figure 5.6
in the Appendix. Here, names are ordered on the horizontal axis according to their perceived
SES index. The vertical axis shows the size of the standard deviation corresponding to each
name. Names with lower standard deviation in their ratings reveal more agreement; later we
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of perceived SES ratings
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics on percieved SES ratings
Mean Std. Min Max Obs
SES ratings 3.183 0.272 2.103 4 453
Raters per name 29.333 5.614 20 40 440
Average Cronbach alpha 0.805
Groups total 15
Notes: The column Obs denotes the observations of the number of names rated
in the first row, and the number of people who rated a list in the second row.
Average Cronbach alpha is calculated as the average alpha across 15 lists. The
individual values of alpha for each list do not vary from this value much.
will use these values to check for the sensitivity of our results.
Once we assigned an index to the each name, we analyzed whether these ratings are corre-
lated to observed characteristics related to SES of individuals. We looked at characteristics for
which we have information available in the panel. Namely, we have information on gender, age,
income and level of education. Other background characteristics we include have been used in
the literature (e.g., see Trautmann et al., 2013) to classify people into different levels of SES
are: the type of job, whether they have supervisory roles and what type of contract they have
(permanent or temporary)5.
5Questions regarding employment of those subjects who are retired, refer to their last employment.
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We performed OLS regressions on the index of SES allowing for the errors of names be-
longing to the same group to be correlated (i.e. groups of people with the same name). In
Table 5.3 we show the results of four linear regression specifications of the index of SES as
the dependent variable. We include gender and age categories of ten years each as controls and
we take the age group 16-24 as the base category. The first specification includes three levels
of education with primary and secondary education as base category. Since we do not have
complete information on income and occupation of all participants, we add a separate specifi-
cation (2) where we show the results of including these variables in the model. In columns three
and four, we analyzed the relationship between their occupational characteristics and their SES
independently.
People with university education on average have higher status rankings compared to those
who only have primary or secondary education and occupation. Income shows a positive co-
efficient which is weakly significant due to collinearity with level of education. We found a
gender effect in SES, i.e., females are significantly lower rated in terms of SES. The results also
show a negative relationship between age and SES, with a stronger effect for the higher age
categories6. Miyakawa et al. (2012), found that subjective social status is negatively correlated
to age and health status, which might reflect their position in society. In columns 3 and 4, we
find a positive correlation between having a permanent contract and SES. Also, having a super-
visory role is weakly correlated to higher SES, even if we control for the level of education (not
shown in the Table)7.
5.3 Results
In this section we analyze the effect of SES of the matched player and the effects of differences
in SES on choices regarding trust and trustworthiness. We first show the reciprocation decision
and after that the results of the trustors. Throughout this section we will denote the trustor as
player A and the trustee as player B.
The channels which we consider through which SES can have an effect on the decision to
6Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of SES split by age categories. We observe that there is less variation in low
age categories than in the older groups.
7Another index we used to control for own SES in the next section is constructed from the observed charac-
teristics of the individuals participating in the trust game (following Trautmann et al. (2013) and Piff et al. (2012))
In the Appendix, show the details of this index. The correlation between between this “objective" index of one’s
SES and perceived SES elicited on the basis of the name is ρ = 0.132 (p<0.01).
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Table 5.3: Results of regressions of SES on individual char-
acteristics















Intermed Voc Ed 0.018 0.013
(0.020) (0.021)




Permanent contract 0.018 0.042** 0.037*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
High job type 0.005 0.007 0.014
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016)




Constant 3.255*** 3.231*** 3.132*** 3.126***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.021) (0.037)
Observations 1,018 973 1,020 974
r2_a 0.115 0.115 0.0120 0.0104
Notes: OLS regression on the mean index of SES. Income is denoted as the logarithm
of monthly gross income. The omitted category of age contains ages which range from
16-24. The omitted category of education is primary and high school (lower secondary
education). Clustered standard errors in parenthesis at the name group level. ***p <
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
reciprocate are the level of SES of the matched player or the differences between players’ SES.
To test whether the differences in SES according to their names can explain heterogeneity in
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reciprocation, we specify three explanatory variables defined as follows:
SESA (5.1)
Di fSES = SESB−SESA (5.2)
Absdi fSES = |SESB−SESA| (5.3)
where Di fSES denotes the differences allowing for positive or negative differences depending
on whether player B’s SES is higher or lower than that of A. Absdi fSES shows the absolute
value of the difference in status between A player and B player and therefore, a measure of the
distance between them.
To explore this relationship, we constructed a random effects model of reciprocation. We
defined the outcome of the decision to reciprocate as a binary variable Vit = {0,1}. Also, we
defined v∗it as the trustee’s unobservable latent propensity to reciprocate. The index i denotes










itγ +αi + εit (5.4)
v∗it > 0 i f Vit = 1
v∗it ≤ 0 i f Vit = 0
where αi is the individual specific effect which is constant over time. We assume αi is i.i.d. and
follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2α . The variable SES
A
i denotes the
socioeconomic status of the trustor, or in separate specifications, the differences in SES. MaleAi
is a dummy for player A’s gender.8 Observed characteristics of the trustee are denoted by the
vector Xi. These characteristics include trustee’s age, level of education, gender and logarithm
of monthly gross income. In a separate specification we also included her own level of SES
(SESBi ). The three games correspond to the different level of payoffs and are controlled for in
vector payoff′it , where the first game is the omitted category.
Results are shown in the first two columns of Table 5.4. The first three columns of the panel
corresponds to including different definitions of SES as defined above. The last two columns
8We decide to include gender explicitly to look at the effect of SES keeping this variable constant.
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of the panel corresponds to the same specifications and additionally adding own SESB of the
player making the choice to reciprocate. In the first specification we do not find any significant
explanatory variables. In the second, we find that differences in SES positively correlate with
the propensity to reciprocate. This means that if player’s B status increases relative to that of A,
the more likely she will reciprocate. The coefficient of the third model specifying the absolute
difference or distance between SESA and SESB is also positive and significant. For instance,
calculating the marginal effects, we find that if the distance increases by 1 point, the likelihood
of reciprocating increases by around 16%.
The results of including the own SES of player B are included in the last two columns
of Table 5.4. We find that own SES is significant in predicting the propensity to reciprocate.
These results hold even when controlling for variables which are correlated to SESB. Model
(5) shows that the absolute distance also increases the propensity to send back a high amount,
keeping SESB constant.9 To compare models (4) and (5), and given that they are non-nested, we
performed a Vuong test which compares the likelihood contributions of both models (Vuong,
1989). We cannot reject the null hypothesis that both specifications are equivalent (p = 0.117).
In the Appendix, Table 5.11, we show the results of constraining the sample to those names
that have low standard deviations in their individual ratings10. Results do not change signifi-
cantly, except for Model (3) in which the absolute difference is no longer significant.
Next, instead of using the subjective SES elicited by the names, we use an objective index
based on observed characteristics (refer to the Appendix for details on the construction of this
index). In the Appendix, on Table 5.6, we show the results of using the objective SES of player
B and the subjective SES of player A as explanatory variables of the reciprocity decision. Here,
we do not find any effect of the differences in SES of players; also not of their own objective
SES (in line with the findings of Trautmann et al.). These results may imply that perceived SES
on the basis of names captures dimensions of SES that our objective index does not capture.
9The variation captured by the unobserved heterogeneity random effects model is ρ = 0.227. With respect
to the effects of the observed characteristics, in a separate model, we interacted age with the indicator of each
game since the gains from cooperation increased in each of them. According to Bellemare and Kröger (2007) in
an investment game, age and the size of returns by the second player exhibit a U-shaped relationship. We find
different effects of age on reciprocity which depended on the size of the gains from cooperation. Studies like
Dohmen et al. (2008) and Falk et al. (2015) have found a positive relationship between positive reciprocity and
age, or an inverted U-shape relationship. However, these measures are substantially different from the trust game
since they are based on survey questions. We also analyzed each game separately without including random effects
and we found similar results for the game with the highest payoffs. See Table 5.9 in the Appendix.
10We split the sample by the median of standard deviations.
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Table 5.4: Probit regression on reciprocity decisions







MaleA -0.157 -0.146 -0.172 -0.149 -0.164
(0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.110)
Payoff medium 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Payoff high 0.178 0.179 0.177 0.178 0.177
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
SESB 0.455* 0.562**
(0.232) (0.237)
Constant 0.848 0.228 0.113 -0.606 -1.703**
(0.741) (0.243) (0.251) (1.044) (0.805)
Observations 918 918 918 918 918
Number of id 306 306 306 306 306
rho 0.227 0.222 0.221 0.222 0.213
ll -586.8 -585.2 -585.1 -584.8 -582.2
Dependent variable: reciprocity in 3 games. Income is expressed as the natural loga-
rithm of the monthly gross income. All models include controls for age, gender, income
and level of education of the trustee, none of which are significant at the 10% level.
Think, for example, of culturally related dimensions that are uncorrelated with income.
Similarly, we analyze A’s decisions to trust player B with a random effects model. We
include as explanatory variables three different specifications of SES. First, we include the
level of SES of player B (the matched player). Second, we introduce the differences in SES
between player A and B. Third, we introduce the absolute differences:
SESB (5.5)
Di fSES = SESA−SESB (5.6)
Absdi fSES = |SESA−SESB| (5.7)
According to the literature, some of the motivations which may drive the decision to trust
can range from the belief of player’s B trustworthiness to individual risk aversion (Schechter,
2007; Sapienza et al., 2013). Schechter shows that not controlling for risk aversion when re-
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gressing trust, can significantly bias other estimates. Risk taking attitudes were obtained with
a qualitative survey question regarding their willingness to take risks which is standard in the
literature11. Let us define the dependent variable as the decision to trust in each game Tit and











itγ +αi + εit (5.8)
t∗it > 0 i f Tit = 1 (5.9)
t∗it ≤ 0 i f Tit = 0
where αi is the individual specific parameter constant over time. We assume αi is i.i.d. and
follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2α . The variable SES
B
i denotes
the SES of the trustee or in separate specifications, the differences in SES. MaleBi is a dummy
representing the trustee’s gender. Observed characteristics of the trustor are denoted by the
vector Xi. These characteristics include trustor’s age, level of education, gender, and logarithm
of monthly gross income. In a separate specification we also included her own level of SES
(SESAi ). The three games correspond to the different levels of payoffs, which are controlled for
in vector payoff’it .
Results are shown in Table 5.5. SES levels of the trustor or trustee and their differences
are not significantly correlated to the decision to trust. The effect of the higher payoffs are
positively correlated to a higher likelihood of trusting behavior. Another significant variable is
risk aversion; the less willing a person is to take risks the less likely she will choose to trust.12
In the Appendix, Table 5.12, we show the results of constraining the sample to those names that
have low standard deviations in their individual ratings13. When we restrict the sample to those
names with low standard deviations, the absolute difference in SES is weakly significant.
If we estimate a probit for each game separately, we find that additionally in the high payoff
game, own level of status (player A) is positively correlated to the propensity to trust (p =
11See, for example, Dohmen et al. (2011); Charness et al. (2013); Falk et al. (2016)
12This is in line with what previous research has found, such as (Schechter, 2007; Sapienza et al., 2013). Other
studies have failed to find a relationship between trust and risk aversion. For instance Houser et al. (2010), Eckel
and Wilson (2004) and Fairley et al. (2016) do not find a relationship between risk elicited experimentally through
an investment game or a lottery game. Fairley et al. do find a relationship between trust and risk if the uncertainty
comes from a social component rather than a lottery. Therefore, this relationship is sensitive to the way in which
risk aversion is elicited.
13We split the sample by the median.
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0.062).14
Table 5.5: Probit regressions on trust decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)







MaleB 0.000 0.001 -0.012 -0.001 -0.013
(0.115) (0.114) (0.113) (0.115) (0.113)
Payoff medium 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Payoff high 0.499*** 0.499*** 0.499*** 0.499*** 0.499***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
Risk averse -0.062** -0.062** -0.063** -0.062** -0.062**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
SESA 0.156 0.165
(0.242) (0.242)
Constant 0.544 0.162 0.129 0.047 -0.405
(0.757) (0.278) (0.287) (1.080) (0.835)
Observations 741 741 741 741 741
Number of id 247 247 247 247 247
rho 0.144 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.142
ll -493.1 -492.9 -493.0 -492.9 -492.8
Dependent variable: trust in 3 games. Income is expressed as the natural logarithm of the
monthly gross income. All models include controls for age gender, income and level of edu-
cation, none of which are significant at the 10% level.
As in our previous analysis of reciprocity decisions, the trustor in this case has better knowl-
edge of her own SES. Therefore, we use an objective SES measure to compare the differences
in SES. Table 5.7 in the Appendix, shows the results for similar regressions where we show
that differences in SES as defined objectively do not have any significant effect on the likeli-
hood of trusting. Again, only the size of the payoff and the risk aversion levels are significantly
correlated to trust.
14Table 5.10 in the Appendix.
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5.4 Summary and conclusion
Socioeconomic status is related to a wide range of economic outcomes, such as labor market
success, health outcomes, returns to education, among others. On the one hand, having a high
level of status can potentially lead to higher cooperation and a higher level of earnings; as has
been explored using economic experiments. On the other hand, studies have provided evidence
that ethnic discrimination and ethnicity are correlated to SES. We show a scenario in which
ethnic differences are not present. We studied the possible effects of SES on two important
components of social capital: trust and reciprocity. Trustworthy and trustful behavior can have
positive outcomes on diverse economic domains. Therefore, if people trusted less or would
be less trustworthy towards certain groups with low status, this could potentially affect the
economic outcomes of these groups.
This paper shows that SES of others has no effect on trust and reciprocity. That is, we
did not find evidence that people who participated in a trust game discriminated according to
SES. We constructed two different indices of SES, a subjective one and an objective one. Both
measures support these results.
Using an objective SES index, we did not find any differences in behavior between high and
low status individuals. This is in line with Trautmann et al. (2013), who found no effect of SES
on the decision to reciprocate using a composite measure of socioeconomic variables as proxies
for SES.
SES as inferred by first names is not a strong predictor of trust or reciprocity, therefore, in a
society such as the Dutch one, people do not discriminate according to this measure. This result
can be due to The Netherlands being a country which is rather homogeneous in terms of socioe-
conomic inequality among natives (Gini coefficient = 0.283).15 Even though we could classify
different names to different levels of SES, another explanation of the results is that information
on SES might not have been relevant due to the strategic nature of the game. For instance,
Charness and Gneezy (2008) found that, comparing a treatment where names are revealed to
one where they are not, people react to this information only if there is no strategic motive
(dictator game vs. ultimatum game). Here, strategic considerations (in the trust decision) might
crowd out information gained regarding SES. However, this would not explain the differences
15Source: OECD (2017), Income inequality (indicator). doi: 10.1787/459aa7f1-en (Accessed on 18 March
2017)
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in the reciprocation rates, since reciprocation is not a strategic action.
We speculate that our result that having a different SES than the trustor increases recipro-
cation rates of trustees is composed of two different behaviors, depending on whether it is the
trustee or the trustor who has the highest SES. First, as we have shown, trustees with a high
SES reciprocate more often overall. The implication is that trustees with a high SES matched to
a trustor with a low SES reciprocate more often than trustees with a low SES. Second, we spec-
ulate that the reason why trustees with a low SES are highly reciprocal to trustors with a high
SES is that people with a low SES generally look up to people with a high SES. As is shown
by Eckel and Wilson (2007) and Ball et al. (2001), even when status is randomly assigned, high
status individuals are treated better and earn more16.
16The latter shows that high status participants in a experimental market game earn more money in the experi-
ment.
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Appendix
Instructions Trust Game: Cettolin and Suetens (2016) Appendix A
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Instructions SES
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The following Figures depict the screen shots of the Instructions that LISS participants saw
on their computers. The first two Figures show the experiments (in Dutch) and the third Figure
shows an example of how the names are listed with their respective rating options.
Figure 5.3: Instructions I
Translation: In this questionnaire, you will see lists of first names of men and women. The gender is
shown next to each name. Your task is to rate each name according to what you believe is the social
status of that person in the Netherlands.
The social status of a person is the prestige, position or rank from that individual in society. You rate
this social status based on a 5-point scale which goes from low to high.
It is very important for this research that you pay attention to your answers. Take as much time as you
need and think thoroughly about your answers.
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Figure 5.4: Instructions II
Note: Gender abbreviations are shown as:
M (Man)
V (Woman)
Figure 5.5: Instructions II
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Objective measure of SES
Following Trautmann et al. (2013) and Piff et al. (2012), we construct and objective index. We
dichotomize variables related to socioeconomic status according to their median:
1. Income: Monthly gross income
2. Wealth: Savings + value investments + life insurance + real estate - value mortgage -
loans
3. Job type:
(a) High: academic, independent professional, managerial, intermediate academic.
(b) Low: commercial, administrative, unskilled, agrarian.
4. Contract type:
(a) High: Permanent, self-employed/freelancer, independent professional.
(b) Low: Temporary, On-call employee.
5. Supervisory roles
6. Higher education:
(a) High: University, Higher vocational education
(b) Low: Intermediate vocational, secondary, primary.
We dichotomize these variables by calculating the median and splitting the categories ac-
cordingly. The final measure of SES objective is the summation of these six indicators. To
make it comparable to subjective measures, we standardize the index. The correlation between
the objective and perceived index is ρ = 0.132 (p<0.01).
It does not change our results whether we dichotomize variables according to their median,
or whether we use a more continuous variable of their income (for example, by standardizing
six variables mentioned above and taking their mean).
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Table 5.6: Reciprocity and objective SES
(1) (2) (3) (4)






MaleA -0.174 -0.176 -0.161 -0.171
(0.112) (0.112) (0.115) (0.114)
Payoff medium 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Payoff high 0.179 0.178 0.179 0.178
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)
SESoB 0.007 -0.011
(0.053) (0.059)
Constant 0.313 0.337 0.836 0.355
(0.264) (0.270) (0.746) (0.285)
Observations 918 918 918 918
Number of id 306 306 306 306
rho 0.228 0.227 0.227 0.227
ll -586.9 -586.8 -586.8 -586.8
Dependent variable: Reciprocity in 3 games. SESoB is the standard-
ized measure constructed from their actual socioeconomic variables;
SESpA is the subjective measure. Income is expressed as the natural
logarithm of the monthly gross income. All models include controls
for age and level of education, none of which are significant at the
10% level.
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Table 5.7: Trust and objective SES







MaleB 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.008
-0.114 -0.113 -0.115 -0.113
Payoff medium 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Payoff high 0.499*** 0.499*** 0.499*** 0.499***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
Risk averse -0.062** -0.061** -0.062** -0.061**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
SESpA 0.008 -0.001
(0.088) (0.088)
Constant 0.162 0.251 0.190 0.250
(0.278) (0.291) (0.318) (0.325)
Observations 741 741 741 741
Number of id 247 247 247 247
rho 0.143 0.143 0.144 0.143
ll -492.9 -492.9 -493.1 -492.9
Dependent variable: Trust in 3 games. SESoA is the standardized measure con-
structed from their actual socioeconomic variables; SESpB is the subjective mea-
sure. Income is expressed as the natural logarithm of the monthly gross income.
All models include controls for age and level of education, none of which are
significant at the 10% level.
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5.4.1 Tables and Figures
Figure 5.6: SES and names

























































































































Note: On we horizontal axis we show the SES rating and on the vertical axis we show the standard deviation of
this rating. The diameter of the data points varies according to the frequency of that name in the sample of the
trust game.
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Table 5.8: Background characteristics of raters
Descriptives of raters
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.611 0.488 0.513 0.500
Age
25-34 0.116 0.320 0.133 0.340
35-44 0.114 0.318 0.142 0.349
45-54 0.143 0.351 0.168 0.374
55-64 0.173 0.378 0.176 0.381
>65 0.300 0.459 0.244 0.430
Household size 1.518 1.357 2.747 1.331
Children 0.784 1.154 0.927 1.164
Levels of education
vmbo 0.223 0.417 0.221 0.415
havo/vwo 0.137 0.344 0.115 0.319
mbo 0.219 0.414 0.238 0.426
hbo 0.189 0.392 0.227 0.419
wo 0.100 0.301 0.106 0.308
Monthly gross income 1875.633 1644.719 2377.762 19865.530
Urbanization
Urban 0.257 0.437 0.257 0.437
Moderately urban 0.234 0.424 0.228 0.419
Slightly urban 0.206 0.405 0.215 0.411
Not urban 0.179 0.384 0.152 0.359
Obs max 440 8181
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the sample of people rating the lists of games (first two columns).
The last two columns show the same characteristics but for the complete LISS panel at the moment
of elicitation.
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Table 5.9: Reciprocity per treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SESpA -0.060 -0.196 -0.320
(0.302) (0.299) (0.306)
SESpB 0.285 0.376 0.585*
(0.316) (0.310) (0.313)
MaleA -0.298** -0.199 0.058 -0.302** -0.229 0.030
(0.152) (0.150) (0.153) (0.151) (0.151) (0.152)
MaleB -0.092 -0.053 -0.300* -0.070 -0.020 -0.263*
(0.156) (0.154) (0.157) (0.154) (0.154) (0.155)
EducationB
Intermed Voc Ed 0.293 0.162 -0.376* 0.299 0.234 -0.364*
(0.198) (0.192) (0.196) (0.198) (0.195) (0.196)
Higher Voc Ed -0.260 0.317 -0.280 -0.251 0.367* -0.263
(0.206) (0.209) (0.211) (0.206) (0.211) (0.209)
University -0.344 -0.073 -0.058 -0.337 -0.082 -0.049
(0.262) (0.258) (0.272) (0.261) (0.259) (0.271)
AgeB 0.016*** 0.005 -0.005 0.015*** 0.000 -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log-incomeB -0.011 0.009 0.014 -0.007 0.017 0.024
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045)
AbsdifSESp 0.096 1.181*** 0.306
(0.347) (0.360) (0.345)
Constant -1.007 -0.565 0.048 -0.278 -0.154 0.915***
(1.439) (1.407) (1.432) (0.343) (0.343) (0.354)
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306
Log-likelihood -192.3 -198.7 -188.8 -192.7 -194.0 -190.7
Dependent variable: reciprocity in 3 games. Income is expressed as the natural logarithm of the monthly
gross income. All models include controls for age and level of education, none of which are significant at the
10% level.
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Table 5.10: Trust per treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SESpA -0.187 0.045 0.684*
(0.357) (0.353) (0.362)
SESpB -0.164 -0.366 0.172
(0.338) (0.330) (0.334)
MaleA 0.214 -0.333* 0.092 0.205 -0.321* 0.126
(0.183) (0.180) (0.184) (0.181) (0.178) (0.182)
MaleB 0.198 -0.025 -0.142 0.181 -0.056 -0.124
(0.171) (0.167) (0.171) (0.168) (0.164) (0.168)
AgeA 0.013** -0.001 -0.007 0.014** -0.001 -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
EducationA
Intermed Voc Ed -0.024 -0.192 -0.068 -0.026 -0.176 -0.024
(0.214) (0.210) (0.214) (0.216) (0.211) (0.213)
Higher Voc Ed -0.149 0.122 0.207 -0.168 0.109 0.262
(0.225) (0.221) (0.230) (0.224) (0.220) (0.228)
University -0.446 -0.031 -0.203 -0.487 -0.045 -0.067
(0.310) (0.292) (0.297) (0.304) (0.286) (0.289)
Log-incomeA -0.006 0.072* 0.016 -0.007 0.072* 0.016
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
Risk averseA -0.118*** -0.041 -0.031 -0.117*** -0.042 -0.033
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038)
AbsdifSES 0.066 0.192 0.135
(0.394) (0.388) (0.394)
Constant 0.833 1.028 -1.930 -0.315 -0.057 0.762*
(1.631) (1.605) (1.624) (0.413) (0.404) (0.416)
Observations 247 247 247 247 247 247
Log-likelihood -157.4 -166.5 -156.5 -157.6 -167.0 -158.3
Dependent variable: trust in 3 games. Income is expressed as the natural logarithm of the monthly gross
income. All models include controls for age and level of education, none of which are significant at the
10% level.
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Table 5.11: Reciprocity subsample





Absdi fSESp 0.428 0.609*
(0.330) (0.339)
MaleA -0.148 -0.140 -0.156 -0.142 -0.144
(0.142) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.140)
Payoff medium 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.048
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134)
Payoff high 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.086 0.085
(0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133)
SESpB 0.480* 0.629**
(0.286) (0.297)
Constant 1.334 0.202 0.126 -0.300 -1.951*
(1.077) (0.297) (0.307) (1.441) (1.028)
Observations 630 630 630 630 630
Number of id 210 210 210 210 210
rho 0.243 0.237 0.242 0.237 0.231
ll -398.3 -397.0 -398.1 -396.9 -395.8
Dependent variable: Reciprocity in 3 games. Income is expressed as the natural
logarithm of the monthly gross income. All models include controls for age and level
of education, none of which are significant at the 10% level. Subsample selected on
the basis of having low standard deviation of the ratings of SES (subjective).
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Table 5.12: Trust subsample







MaleB 0.054 0.057 0.086 0.053 0.085
(0.164) (0.162) (0.160) (0.163) (0.160)
Payoff medium 0.293* 0.292* 0.291* 0.292* 0.291*
(0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Payoff high 0.616*** 0.616*** 0.614*** 0.616*** 0.615***
(0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165)
Risk averse -0.065* -0.064* -0.064* -0.063* -0.063*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
SESpA 0.177 0.164
(0.321) (0.318)
Constant 0.350 0.099 -0.029 -0.199 -0.553
(1.182) (0.391) (0.390) (1.546) (1.089)
Observations 396 396 396 396 396
Number of id 132 132 132 132 132
rho 0.122 0.120 0.106 0.120 0.104
ll -259.3 -259.2 -257.6 -259.1 -257.5
Dependent variable: Trust in 3 games. Income is expressed as the natural logarithm of the
monthly gross income. All models include controls for age and level of education, none of
which are significant at the 10% level. Subsample selected on the basis of having low standard
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